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Abstract
Abstract
Open environments involve distributed entities interacting with each other in an
open manner. Many distributed entities are unknown to each other but need
to collaborate and share resources in a secure fashion. Usually resource owners
alone decide who is trusted to access their resources. Since resource owners in
open environments do not have a complete picture of all trusted entities, trust
management frameworks are used to ensure that only authorized entities will ac-
cess requested resources. Every trust management system has limitations, and
the limitations can be exploited by malicious entities. One vulnerability is due to
the lack of globally unique interpretation for permission specifications. This lim-
itation means that a malicious entity which receives a permission in one domain
may misuse the permission in another domain via some deceptive but apparently
authorized route; this malicious behaviour is called subterfuge.
This thesis develops a secure approach, Subterfuge Safe Trust Management
(SSTM), that prevents subterfuge by malicious entities. SSTM employs the
Subterfuge Safe Authorization Language (SSAL) which uses the idea of a lo-
cal permission with a globally unique interpretation (localPermission) to resolve
the misinterpretation of permissions. We model and implement SSAL with an
ontology-based approach, SSALO, which provides a generic representation for
knowledge related to the SSAL-based security policy. SSALO enables integration
of heterogeneous security policies which is useful for secure cooperation among
principals in open environments where each principal may have a different security
policy with different implementation. The other advantage of an ontology-based
approach is the Open World Assumption, whereby reasoning over an existing
security policy is easily extended to include further security policies that might
be discovered in an open distributed environment. We add two extra SSAL rules
to support dynamic coalition formation and secure cooperation among coalitions.
Secure federation of cloud computing platforms and secure federation of XMPP
servers are presented as case studies of SSTM. The results show that SSTM pro-
vides robust accountability for the use of permissions in federation. It is also
shown that SSAL is a suitable policy language to express the subterfuge-safe
policy statements due to its well-defined semantics, ease of use, and integrability.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Controlling access to protected data, resources, and services has been a major
issue in information security since the beginning of the information security dis-
cipline [1]. Access control systems mediate access to a protected resource by
only allowing authorized users to perform an operation on a particular resource.
Traditional access control mechanisms are robust enough to address authoriza-
tion control in closed environments. These systems are not sufficient to address
authorization control in open environments. Trust management systems were
introduced to address various concerns in decentralized access control. Although
trust management systems have a major advantage over traditional access control
approaches, they are vulnerable to subterfuge. Subterfuge is a deceptive behaviour
with the goal of evading the actual intention of a security mechanism. This thesis
explores the notion of subterfuge in current trust management frameworks, and
then introduces a subterfuge safe trust and authorization model for addressing
access control in open environments. This new approach for trust management
supports subterfuge safe cooperation by unknown entities in open environments.
In section 1.1 we discuss the motivation for this research. Section 1.2 covers the
contributions of the thesis to the field of trust management. Section 1.3 gives an
overview on the research. The structure of the thesis is outlined in section 1.4.
Section 2 discusses background and related work. The subterfuge vulnerability is
introduced in section 2.3. In section 2.4 we discuss delegation subterfuge in ex-
isting trust managements. Finally, a summary for the chapter is given in section
2.5.
1
1. Introduction 1.1 Motivation
1.1 Motivation
Traditional access control mechanisms focus on the protection of data in closed
environments. A security administrator is familiar with all resources in the system
and when a request for a resource is received, first determines who the requester
is. It typically uses an authentication protocol in which the requester digitally
signs the request. Then the administrator queries an internal database to decide
whether the signer should be granted access to the resource and allowed to per-
form the requested action. Access control mechanisms for closed environments
can be categorised as mandatory access control (MAC) [2, 3], discretionary ac-
cess control (DAC) [4], and role-based access control (RBAC) [5–7]. All these
access control models include subject, object, action, and function. Subjects are
entities that can perform actions on the system; objects are the entities repre-
senting resources to which access may need to be controlled. An access control
function is a matrix that maps each combination of subject, object, and action to
an authorization decision. The authorization decision result is either the access
request is granted, or the access request is denied. Figure 1.1 depicts a general
model of access control for closed environments. In closed environments, grant-
ing permission for a resource is controlled by a security administrator. A security
administrator is familiar with all resources that it controls and has a complete
overview on subjects, objects, and actions in the system. Thus, a security ad-
ministrator chooses a specific name schema for defining permissions for accessing
resources. Therefore, permissions that a security administrator defines to grant
access to a resource have a unique meaning in the system and can be only used
for that particular resource. In this way, the possibility of deceiving a security
administrator to define a permission specification that can be used to access two
different resources is very low.
When environments become open and decentralized, the distributed users may
make requests to access other users’ resources. Each resource owner is familiar
with its own resources and authorization is controlled by resource owners. The
resource owners and requesters may not be known to each other in advance. Ac-
cess control solutions need to decide which requester can be granted access to
the protected resource, as well as which principal is qualified to provide this re-
source [8]. Certificate-based access control models have been proposed to address
access control in open and decentralized environments. When a user makes a
request to access a resource, it must provide a certificate to the resource owner
proving that the requester has permission to access that resource. The resource
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Figure 1.1: Centralized access control model
owner defines a permission specifying that the holder of that permission is allowed
to access a particular resource. Therefore, defining a globally unique permission
relies on the expertise of the resource owner who defines the permission specifica-
tions. In open environments, a resource owner does not have a complete overview
on the name schema that other resource owners use for specifying permissions for
their resources. One resource owner may define a permission specification that
is the same as the permission specification that another resource owner specified
for accessing its resources. This ambiguity means that a malicious requester may
bypass the actual intention of a permission specification and deceive a resource
owner into allowing access to its resources with an apparently legitimate permis-
sion. Preventing deception of a principal depends on the expertise of the resource
owner who defines the permission specification, and the sources of vulnerability in
the actual security mechanism that the resource owner uses. Many existing trust
management systems are designed in an ad-hoc manner to prevent malicious be-
haviour. Their design follows best practice, and withstand only certain classes of
known malicious behaviours. They lack a systematic way of specifying a globally
unique interpretation for a permission. Without a globally unique interpretation
for permissions, a principal that receives a permission in one domain, may misuse
that permission in another domain via some deceptive, yet apparently authorized
route, i.e. the behaviour called subterfuge. Many existing trust management
frameworks such as [9, 10] are designed to specify arbitrary permissions. They
assume unique and unambiguous permission specifications are provided by using
a global name service. Although, global name services provide a unique interpre-
tation for each specification, the principals participating in a federation may still
define arbitrary specifications to represent their own resources. Specifying non-
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1. Introduction 1.2 Contributions
ambiguous permissions depends on the expertise of the administrator who defines
the permissions. However, the design of non-ambiguous permissions should not
rely on ad-hoc methods; it should be formalized in a systematic way. Due to the
lack of systematic design approaches, designing a well-founded security mecha-
nism is a challenging task. This thesis explores the possibility of designing a
well-founded security mechanism by answering the following research question:
Can we design a well-founded systematic method to avoid subterfuge for
cooperation of distributed principals in open environments?
1.2 Contributions
This thesis contributes to the field of trust management by focusing on preventing
subterfuge when managing trust and delegation relationships among distributed
entities in open environments. The main contributions are as follows:
1. The notion of localPermission is introduced with the purpose of defining
permissions locally, while also providing an automatic globally unique in-
terpretation for that permission.
2. A logic-based authorization language, Subterfuge Safe Authorisation Lan-
guage (SSAL), is introduced to support secure delegation of permissions in
open cooperation. SSAL is a simple yet expressive language. SSAL can
be used to prevent subterfuge without relying on a central authority and a
pre-agreed global naming service.
3. An ontology for SSAL is developed. The ontology-based approach, SSALO,
is also used as a technique for integration of heterogeneous security policies.
In open environments, different organizations may define different security
policies to meet their security requirements. These security policies may
be implemented with different techniques and different policy languages.
SSALO provides a mechanism for integration of these security policies.
SSALO can be viewed as a query engine for Subterfuge Safe Trust Man-
agement (SSTM).
4. Using SSTM, a formal framework for establishing secure dynamic coali-
tion and cross coalition cooperation is introduced. With this framework, a
coalition can be dynamically established in a fully distributed manner with-
out relying on a central authority. This framework can be used to merge
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coalitions and split a coalition into further coalitions.
5. The applicability of SSTM in two real world examples (cloud federation,
and federation of XMPP servers) is demonstrated. The results show that
SSTM is a robust mechanism for subterfuge safe delegation of permissions
in federation and also provides strong accountability for principals. The
success of SSTM for these case studies indicates that it provides a general
solution for subterfuge safe management of trust and authorization relation-
ships in open collaboration of entities. It can be applied to other examples
of open collaboration in open distributed environments.
The results in this thesis have been published in peer-reviewed publications as
follows:
1 Simon N. Foley and Samane Abdi, "Avoiding delegation subterfuge us-
ing linked local permission names.," In Proceedings of the 8th international
conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust (FAST’11),Lueven, Bel-
gium, September 2011.
2 Simon N. Foley, and Samane Abdi, "Avoiding Delegation Subterfuge Using
Linked Local Permission Names," Formal Aspects of Security and Trust.
(pp. 100-114). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
3 Samane Abdi, "An Autonomic Trust Management Framework For Secure
Dynamic Coalition Cooperation," In Proceedings of the 10th IEEE Confer-
ence on Autonomic and Trusted Computing (ATC 2013), Vietri sul Mare,
Italy, December 2013.
4 Samane Abdi, "Integration of Heterogeneous Policies for Trust Manage-
ment" In Proceedings of the 38th IEEE International Conference in Com-
puter Software and Applications (COMPSACW), Västerås, Sweden, July
2014.
5 Samane Abdi, "I was confused: Robust accountability for permission del-
egation in cloud federations," In Proceedings of the 38th IEEE Interna-
tional Conference in Computer Software and Applications (COMPSACW),
Västerås, Sweden, July 2014.
6 Samane Abdi and John Herbert, "An Algorithm for Distributed Cer-
tificate Chain Discovery in Open Environments,” In Proceedings of the
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7 Samane Abdi,"Federated Autonomic Trust Management," In Proceedings
of the 1st Insight Student Conference, Dublin, Ireland, September 2014.
The thesis is part of the Federated, Autonomic Management of End-to-end
communication services (FAME) project (http : //www.fame.ie/).
1.3 Research Overview
In this thesis, we introduce a logic-based authorization language to support open
and subterfuge free delegation of permissions for secure federations. This can
be used as a policy language to construct statements and manage authoriza-
tion/delegation relationships, and to automate the decision making process for
securely sharing resources among federated participants. This language also uses
the notion of localPermission to eliminate ambiguity concerning the interpre-
tation of a permission and thereby avoid subterfuge attacks. The notion of
localPermission refers to permission specifications that are defined locally but
have globally unique interpretation. The use of localPermissions means that a
principal receiving two identical permission specifications cannot misuse the per-
missions for non-intended purposes, since the permissions have globally unique
interpretations and clearly refer to a global context. Thus, localPermissions can
prevent subterfuge when unknown entities cooperate in open environments. This
new trust model can be used as a basis for the establishment and management
of secure dynamic cooperation in open environments.
Subterfuge Safe Authorization Language (SSAL) is designed to support sub-
terfuge safe delegation in open environments. SSAL provides the necessary ex-
pressiveness of an authorization language while supporting subterfuge safe del-
egation by using the notion of localPermission without requiring a pre-agreed
global and unique name scheme for defining permissions. The logic of the lan-
guage is robust enough in terms of providing a reliable formal way to determine
whether delegation of a particular permission to principals is able to resist against
a malicious principal’s misbehaviour.
It is essential to establish a common vocabulary that specifies the structure and
semantics of SSAL statements. Modelling SSAL within an ontology provides a
standard and formal semantic for the SSAL language. An ontology provides a
conceptual model of a domain of interest which is a formal description of concepts
and their relationships in the domain of discourse, and is intended for sharing
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and reusing knowledge. It provides the ability to make logical statements of
shared information and infer new knowledge in the domain of discourse. A SSAL
ontology (SSALO) supports reasoning and querying about the knowledge in SSAL
statements without requiring an application side reasoning service. SSALO can
be used to integrate heterogeneous policies (issued by different principals in open
environments) and so supports well-founded access decisions that comply with
the policies of all of the principals involved.
SSALO is modelled in the OWL-DL sublanguage whose expressive power relies
on the expressiveness of Description Logic (DL) and the Web Ontology Language
(OWL). Using OWL-DL supports maximum expressiveness while guaranteeing
decidability and tractability. There is a rationale for using the ontology for en-
coding permissions. Permissions are structured data and ontologies are useful
to model structured data. A permission specification’s hierarchical structure can
be expressed in more detail by capturing relations and constraints in the ontol-
ogy. SSALO can be viewed as a Subterfuge Safe Trust Management (SSTM)
engine. Any particular application or service can use SSTM to manage access
control for its resources. A principal makes a request to an application or service
to access some resources. A query interpreter then interprets the request and
queries SSALO. SSALO returns the query results to the resource owner. More-
over, each principal may have its own local policy for access control for its own
resources. The principal adds its local policy to SSALO, presenting a set of cer-
tificates. SSALO then decides whether to permit the request based on the SSAL
statements, rules, and the local policy.
Every delegation certificate delegates some permission from its issuer to its sub-
ject. Chains of delegation certificates issued by different issuers may be formed,
thus enabling permission to be granted in a decentralized manner. Certificate
chain discovery refers to presenting a set of certificates relevant to a request. Del-
egation certificates can form chains of delegation, where permissions are delegated
from one principal to another. In order to prove to the resource owner that the
requester is authorized, the requester must present a set of certificates relevant
to its request to the resource owner.
SSTM can be used as a basis to form secure coalitions. The design of secure coali-
tions allows for secure cooperation and sharing of resources within one coalition
and across different coalitions.
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1.4 Structure of Thesis
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The remainder of this chapter gives
the reader a background on trust management and the problem of subterfuge
in conventional trust management systems. Chapter 3 introduces a policy lan-
guage that prevents the subterfuge problem in a systematic way, the Subterfuge
Safe Authorization Language, SSAL. In chapter 4, an ontology-based approach
is introduced to implement SSAL as a policy engine, and to address the integra-
tion of heterogeneous policies defined by different entities in open environments.
A secure dynamic coalition framework that uses the subterfuge safe trust man-
agement model, SSTM, to support establishment of secure coalitions and safe
cross-coalition delegation is described in chapter 5. The application of this ap-
proach is demonstrated through two real world examples in chapter 6. Chapter
7 concludes the thesis and shows directions for possible future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
An important requirement for information systems is managing how the protected
data and resources must be secured against unauthorized principals, while making
them available to authorized principals. This feature is called "access control"
[11–13]. In access control, the principal that receives a request for access to its
resources first checks who the requester is, by using an authentication mechanism,
and then queries a centralized database to decide whether the access should be
granted or denied. On the other hand, trust management, introduced in [14], is
an approach for managing trust and authorization among distributed principals.
The concept of trust management is closely related to that of distributed access
control for open environments. The remainder of this chapter first reviews existing
access control models, with a focus on trust management systems. Then, we
investigate a vulnerability in current trust management frameworks that results
in the violation of the intention of a security mechanism. The review starts
from early work on access control models, and then continues with existing trust
management frameworks.
2.1 Traditional Access Control Models
Early work on access control can be categorized as mandatory access control, dis-
cretionary access control, and role based access control. In the following sections
we discuss these access control models.
9
2. Background and Related Work 2.1 Traditional Access Control Models
Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
Access control models came from the study of security policies in the 70s [15,16].
In hierarchical organizations the primary concern is confidentiality of data, where
prevention of information leakage is the most important goal. In response to this
need, Bell and LaPadula [15] introduced a security model that restricts flows of
classified information. Their work led to the development of numerous multilevel
security systems, and is arguably one of the most influential models in the history
of computer security. Multilevel security was developed as a means to manage
classified information in hierarchical organizations. Each document is labelled
with a degree of sensitivity, known as a classification such as: unclassified, confi-
dential, secret, and top secret. All the personnel of an organization are assigned
a clearance level on the same labelled scale as the classification. This assignment
may depend on a variety of factors, including professional rank, organizational
unit. The access control policy states that a reader must have a clearance at
least as high as the classification of the document he/she attempts to read. In
MAC models [12, 17, 18], the security policy is determined centrally by a system
administrator instead of by resource owners. In other words, the most important
feature of mandatory access control is that users who create resources do not
control these resources. The system security policy, set by the administrator,
entirely determines the access rights.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
The main idea behind DAC is that the owner of a resource should be trusted to
manage its security. More specifically, owners are granted full access rights to the
resources under their control, and are allowed to decide whether access rights to
their resources should be passed to other subjects or groups of subjects at their
own discretion. Lampson formulates the first abstract model of DAC from the
point of view of operating systems [19]. In his model, an access control matrix is a
two-dimensional matrix with a row for each subject and a column for each object
(resource). An element in the matrix specifies the access rights that a subject
has for an object. An access matrix is a convenient abstraction for expressing
discretionary access control polices. As a practical example, the UNIX file system
implements discretionary access control. It defines three subjects in the access
control matrix: the object owner, group, or everyone in the system. The user
who creates an object is the owner and only the administrator can change the
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Figure 2.1: DAC: UNIX access control matrix
ownership of an object. There are three access modes: read, write and execute,
and the access rights for each subject is represented as a 3-bit value,"rwx". Figure
2.1 is an illustration of UNIX access matrix. The key to UNIX access control is
that the owner decides who is allowed to access the object and what kind of
permission they should have. The controls are discretionary in the sense that
a subject who holds an access permission may also delegate the permission to
others. In DAC, although the resource owners determine their security policies
but the super security administrator can change the whole security policy and
control the system.
Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
In the beginning of the 90s, it was observed that resources are generally not
owned by users, but rather by the organization or agency to which these users
belong. Access requests are typically made by a user in the capacity of some
role, and thus, access control decisions are often determined by the acting roles
[6,7]. Over the years, many researchers have proposed models for RBAC [6,7,20–
26]. While the differences in these models are quite significant, the core concept
remains fairly consistent between them. In RBAC, the basic components are
users, permissions, and roles. A user in RBAC typically refers to a human being,
although this definition can be extended to include machines, computer processes
or autonomous agents. Permissions are defined as an approval to execute an
operation on one or more protected objects. An operation could be a simple
access mode such as read, write, update, or a complex operation such as a method
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Figure 2.2: A role-based access control example
invocation in an object-oriented system [22, 23]. Central to RBAC is the notion
of relation that connects permissions, users, and roles. Permissions assigned to
a role represent organizational security policies and are granted to users only
through roles. Suppose a user in a bank attempts to withdraw money from an
account, she must be assigned to some role that permits money withdrawal, for
instance, cashier. Note that, in RBAC it is possible to assign multiple roles to
a single user. In RBAC, the security policy is determind centrally by a system
administrator. Figure 2.2 demonstrates an RBAC model.
2.2 Distributed Access Control Models
The traditional access control models are insufficient in meeting the requirements
for access control in open environments. Traditional approaches assume that a se-
curity administrator is familiar with all the system and manages the access control
to all the protected resources. However, with the emergence of open networks, a
central security administrator is not sufficient to manage available resources. New
challenges exist for access control on resources owned by distributed principals.
The open networks are generally heterogeneous, decentralized and large scale,
with possibly millions of entities which may be individuals, agents, organizations
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or other administrative domains. These entities wish to share their resources in a
secure and controlled fashion. Collaborating entities may be mutually unknown
to each other, thus access control cannot be based on a central administrator,
as is the case in traditional approaches. Most modern distributed access control
systems apply the ideas of cryptographic credentials as a proof of access rights in
open and distributed environments [27–34]. In these approaches, any entity that
can be authenticated is called a principal. The use of public keys for authen-
tication and signing the credentials is widespread due mainly to the complexity
of key management with symmetric key cryptography [35]. A principal and a
service must share a secret key which is distributed over the internet. Therefore,
it is desirable to constrain the use of a secret key to each individual service to
limit the damage caused by disclosure of the key. Public key cryptography sig-
nificantly simplifies key management because it is sufficient for a communicating
party to know only public keys. A public key credential binds a public key to
some attributes of the holder of the corresponding private key. From now on,
in this thesis, we use certificate to refer to the cryptographic credentials. Based
on how certificates are used, distributed access control may be grouped into two
categories: the identity-based approach, and key-based approach.
Identity-based Approach
One common use of access control certificates is to bind the name of a subject
with access permissions. The idea is that once the name of a requester has been
verified by a reliable authentication mechanism, access control certificates with
the matched name can then be used to make access decisions. This approach sep-
arates access control into two distinct stages: authentication and authorization.
Authentication requires the binding of a public key to a name, while authoriza-
tion is handled by the access control certificates which bind a name and a set of
permissions. The security of this approach therefore depends on the reliability of
both bindings. Standards exist for the binding of a public key to a name. Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP) [36,37] and X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [38–41]
are the two most widely used standards today. The most prominent standard for
binding public keys to names are the X.509, Privilege Management Infrastruc-
ture (PMI) with its support for attribute certificates [42], and Simple Distributed
Security Infrastructure (SDSI) [43].
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Key-based Approach
Another possible use of access control certificates is to directly bind a public key
with permissions, thus avoiding the use of names completely. With this approach,
the public key in an access control certificate effectively identifies a subject, and
if possession of the corresponding private key can be proved, a service accepting
this certificate can be sure of the identity of the subject and make access decisions
simply by examining the access permissions specified in the certificate. Unlike
the identity-based approach, the key-based approach integrates the problem of
authentication and authorization into one step. Most of the key-based access
control models are known as trust management systems. Examples are Simple
Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) [44,45], and KeyNote [46]. We describe conven-
tional trust management systems and analyse a specific vulnerability associated
with them in the next section.
Trust Management Systems
In open environments there can exist a number of principals who may send re-
quests to the other principals to access their resources. These principals may be
unknown to each other unless they have had interactions before. Therefore, an ac-
cess control mechanism needs to be maintained securely in a distributed manner,
and has to be stored across the entire network to make the appropriate access deci-
sion. Thus, a distributed and flexible process for establishment of trust and mak-
ing authorization decisions has been proposed called Trust Management. Trust
Management [10, 43, 44, 47–53] is an approach to establish trust and manage au-
thorization relationships among distributed principals that mediates access con-
trol. It is divided into two main categories: reputation-based trust management
systems, and certificate-based trust management systems. In reputation-based
trust management systems, entities establish a trust relationship based on beliefs
resulting from past interactions, which predict future behaviour [49–51, 54–58].
In certificate-based trust management systems, entities establish a trust relation-
ship based on some evidence called certificates [10,43,47,48,59–63]. With a given
set of certificates that the requester provides to the resource owner (recipient)
for accessing specific resources, the recipient makes an access decision that com-
plies with the security policy. This approach not only allows unknown requesters
to prove their authorization for some resources, but also provides decentralized
control to support delegation of authorization among unknown principals to prop-
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Figure 2.3: An overview on trust management system
agate access rights. In this thesis, when we use the term "trust management" we
mean certificate-based trust management.
Trust management systems are more expressive and scalable than classical access
control systems for distributed environments. Each principal can define its own
access control policy for its resources without the need to rewrite and reinterpret
its security mechanism when joining other principals in a distributed environ-
ment. It is also independent from the design of individual security policies in
applications. The trust management approach is based on the notion of delega-
tion certificate, where every delegation certificate delegates some permission from
its issuer to its subject. Chains of delegation certificates issued by different issuers
may be formed, thus enabling access to be granted in a decentralized manner.
Figure 2.3 depicts a trust management system. A principal sends access requests
for a resource to the trust management service via an API. The trust manage-
ment system checks whether the requester has provided the necessary certificates
for its request. The response determines whether access to the resource should
be granted or denied.
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Glossary
To clarify fundamental elements of trust management systems, we now provide a
glossary of relevant terms. These terms occur throughout the rest of this thesis.
Principal An entity that can be authenticated via an authentication mecha-
nism in distributed environments. Principals are entities that may be trusted and
consequently authorized to perform an action.
Permission A permission specifies the access rights to some resources. Permis-
sions imply a hierarchy of access rights and so a principal holding a permission
dominating other permissions can also holds the dominated permissions.
Delegation Propagation of a permission, that a principal holds, to other prin-
cipals is called delegation.
Policy A set of rules specifying the conditions under which a request may be
granted.
Compliance Checker A compliance checker handles the access decisions based
on a set of certificates and policies. For example, a bank trusts its employee Alice
to create a bank account. The bank authorizes Alice by issuing a certificate
for this purpose. Alice presents her request for creating a bank account along
with the relevant certificates to the trust management system. The compliance
checker checks Alice’s access for creating a bank account based on the certificates
she provides to the trust management system.
Certificates Cryptographic assertions as proof of authorization for some ac-
tions or delegation of permissions to other principals.
Actions Operations on protected resources that need to be controlled by the
trust management system.
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Authorization The authority to perform an action on some resource by a prin-
cipal is called authorization. Note that authorization is different from permission.
A permission is a specification of some action on some resource. Authorization
refers to binding a principal to a set of permissions.
Existing Approaches for Trust Management
Trust management frameworks may vary in terms of the infrastructure that they
use to establish trust relationships. However, at a higher level, they all have an
automatic way to manage the authorization by building up trust relationships
among ordinary principals in open and distributed environments. The term trust
management was coined when PolicyMaker was introduced by Blaze et al. [14]
in 1998. The main idea in PolicyMaker is authorizing decentralized access by
checking a proof of compliance. It provides a unified framework for managing
security policies, certificates and their trust relationships. Blaze et al. argue that
identity based approaches such as PGP [36, 37] and X.509 are limited and are
appropriate to only one application, and do not support security for applications
that are distributed. In PGP and X.509, a user’s public key is linked to the user’s
identity within the X.509 certificate, and also the user’s identity is linked to a set
of actions that the user is authorized to perform. The linking of a user’s identity
to the set of authorized actions should be implemented for each application sep-
arately; thus, this approach is inefficient for open and distributed environments.
PolicyMaker associates the user’s identity with a set of authorized actions by
binding a user’s public key to the actions they are authorized to perform. The
PolicyMaker engine takes the request, certificates, and local policy as input, and
the compliance checker provides a proof of compliance, returning True or False.
The True or False result determines whether or not, respectively, the requester
is authorized for performing the action that he/she requested. Certificates are
mainly used for trust delegations. A trusted principal issues a certificate to a
non-trusted principal to become trusted and, in turn, the new trusted principal
issues a similar certificate to another principal, and so on. The principal receives
the permission for a resource through a delegation certificate. Delegation is an
important feature that provides decentralized scalability for trust management
and access control. Certificate structures in PolicyMaker are arbitrary and can
be encoded within any programming languages. Moreover, permissions are spec-
ified arbitrarily and the global uniqueness of a permission specification depends
on the expertise of the security administrator, who defines these permissions, to
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take care of providing a globally unique interpretation for them.
KeyNote [46, 47], which is the second generation of PolicyMaker, is also based
on certificates and local policies. In KeyNote, certificates and policies have the
same syntax and are both referred to as assertions. The only difference between
certificates and policies in either KeyNote or PolicyMaker is that certificates are
signed assertions and policies are not signed because they are locally trusted by
KeyNote trust management. A Principal is identified by a principal identifier
which is a public key. A principal signs certificates and distributes them across
an untrusted environment where they are used by other KeyNote trust manage-
ment systems. A principal P may request some action while the other principal
Q issues a certificate related to that action and delegates the permission for that
action to the principal P . All assertions in KeyNote are expressed in a lan-
guage managed by the KeyNote compliance checker. In receiving a query, the
KeyNote trust management constructs a graph where each node corresponds to
a principal’s public key and an edge corresponds to the assertion that represents
delegation of a permission. The root of the graph is the policy assertion and an
algorithm tries to construct a path to the requester’s public key, using certificates
to satisfy the compliance checker for acceptance or rejection of a request. De-
spite the fact that PolicyMaker leaves the verification of the requester’s signature
key with the application, KeyNote accomplishes this task inside the trust man-
agement system. The compliance checker inside the trust management system
evaluates the request and the result of the query is returned to the application.
The KeyNote compliance evaluation value is flexible and depends on the applica-
tion design, while in PolicyMaker compliance values are the binary values of True
or False. KeyNote defines a specific language to construct certificates, compared
with PolicyMaker where certificates can have arbitrary structure encoded within
any programming languages. These features make KeyNote more flexible to use
as a trust management system to integrate into applications rather than the pre-
vious trust management system, PolicyMaker. However, similar to PolicyMaker,
in KeyNote permissions are specified arbitrarily and the global uniqueness of a
permission specification depends on the expertise of the security administrator,
who defines these permissions, to take care of providing a globally unique inter-
pretation for them.
SPKI/SDSI is another certificate-based mechanism that can be viewed as a trust
management system. This mechanism is a combination of two different ap-
proaches, SPKI (Simple public key infrastructure) and SDSI (Simple Distributed
Security Infrastructure) [43]. SPKI/SDSI was combined in 1999 with the goal of
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easy use of public key infrastructure (PKI) [64]. The combined SPKI/SDSI [60]
uses the SDSI approach for name certificates and the SPKI approach for autho-
rization certificates. It addresses the naming of principals, creation of groups of
principals, associating permissions for actions with principals, and the delegation
of permissions from one principal to another. A SPKI/SDSI name certificate is
inherited from SDSI’s name certificate [43], and provides a way of naming public
keys that are meaningful in a principal’s name space. A principal’s name space
is specified by its public key. Each principal chooses an arbitrary name for the
other principal in its name space and binds that arbitrary chosen name to its
public key to refer to that principal in a global manner. This binding is done
by issuing a name certificate. The name N , bound to a principal’s name space
identified by its public key K is called a local name, denoted as (K N). A name
certificate (K N) −→ P is a statement signed by the owner of public key K
that principal P is defined to be N in K’s local name space. A name certificate
can also be issued to refer to another local name principal, called an extended
name. Moreover, a name certificate can be issued to specify group membership.
A SPKI/SDSI authorization certificate is inherited from the SPKI approach [60].
The SPKI mechanism identifies principals only as public keys but allows binding
of permission to those keys and delegation of permissions from one key to another
by issuing an authorization certificate. An authorization certificate denoted by:
P
X
=⇒ Q indicates that principal P delegates authority for permission X to prin-
cipal Q. SPKI/SDSI inherits this approach for authorization and delegation of
permissions among principals that are identified by either their public keys or
local names.
PolicyMaker, KeyNote, and SPKI/SDSI have similar approaches where certain
permissions are delegated from their issuers to the other principals. Other prin-
cipals may delegate further those permissions.
Role-based Trust management (RT) [9,65] and secPAL [10] are other approaches
that are based on constrained Datalog [66, 67]. The RT is influenced by SDSI
and Delegation Logic [48, 68, 69]. Local names in SDSI correspond to roles in
RT. The notion of roles unifies concepts such as conditions in KeyNote, names in
SDSI, and permission tags in SPKI. For example, if P is a principal, N and R are
roles, P.N in RT may correspond to the local name (P N) in SDSI and P.R may
correspond to a permission which is defined in the condition field in Keynote and
permission tags in SPKI. RT is a family of a number of languages with a common
basic structure. The core basic language of RT is RT0, and additional features
were introduced as parametrized roles in RT1, delegation of activation of roles in
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RTD, and manifold roles and role-product operators in RTT . In general, in the
RT family, principals are roles who also can define new roles, issue certificates,
and make requests. Principals may be identified by a public key, or by a user ac-
count. For example, Alice is a principal that may be identified by her public key
kA and is a member of role "Bank1.Manager". Permissions are also represented
by roles. Membership of a role assigns permissions that are defined to authorize
the principal who is a member of that role. For example, the permission for
opening an account on Bank1 can be represented by role "Bank1.openAccount".
Hence, a principal that belongs to the role "Bank1.openAccount" is authorized to
open an account in Bank1. In RT each principal may have a role and the tra-
ditional permissions that were mentioned in PolicyMaker, KeyNote, SPKI/SDSI
and delegation of permissions among principals are unified to the role assignment
concept.
secPAL is another approach for trust management which was proposed in [10,70].
It is a logic-based policy language that addresses establishment of trust and man-
agement of authorization in open and distributed environments with no predefin-
ing trust relationships. Policies and certificates are expressed by predicates, and
constraints within logical clauses. Authorization and delegation to principals are
defined in predicates. Further delegation is also supported to either fixed or
arbitrary depth of delegation. Assuming the same scenario in the previous ex-
ample for RT, the BankManager may decide to delegate permission for creating
an account (creatAccount) in Bank1 to its employees and allow its employees to
delegate of this permission to other principals in different domains. This can be
expressed in secPAL as the following assertions:
BankManager says X can say∞ createAccount
if X is an employee
delegation is expressed by "can say∞" construct and the suffix "∞" means that
the statement " can say∞ createAccount" can be delegated further with no depth
limit. All assertions are signed by their issuers, so the above assertion is signed
by BankManager. Returning back to the previous scenario, Alice can delegate
createAccount to Bob if the following statement exists:
BankManager says Alice can say∞ createAccount
if Alice is an employee
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then the statement "createAccount is accepted" can be derived. Note that the "is
accepted" is an example of an attribute. secPAL supports expressing a wide range
of policies with role hierarchies, parametrized roles, and threshold constraints
using statements close to the natural English language.
2.3 Subterfuge Vulnerability
Subterfuge is a deceptive behaviour with the goal of evading the actual control
intention of a security mechanism [71, 72]. Many existing trust management
frameworks are explicit in their assumption that principals are uniquely identi-
fied, however the literature has generally not been as prescriptive regarding the
uniqueness of permissions. Authorization certificates are used to specify delega-
tion of permissions among principals. Permissions are bound to the certificate
issuer’s public key to facilitate access control in a decentralized approach. Since
binding permissions to public keys is not particularly meaningful to principals, a
series of delegation certificates, that a principal uses to prove authorization for
some action, may not return a result that reflects the exact intention of all partic-
ipants in the existing chain. A principal can somehow bypass the actual intention
of a series of delegation certificates via some indirect but apparently authorized
route. Delegation subterfuge refers to the inconsistency problem in delegation of
a permission that can arise when there is ambiguity concerning the uniqueness
and interpretation of a permission. In the following sections we investigate the
subterfuge vulnerability in the trust management frameworks discussed in section
2.2 with examples and more details.
2.4 Delegation Subterfuge in Existing Trust
Management Approaches
A trust management aids principals to carry out a task through an automated
decision making process. Malicious principals are incompetent principals who are
not expected to carry out an action based on the actual control intention of the
security mechanism. They attempt to perform the action by using a vulnerabil-
ity in a security mechanism via a sequence of deceptive but apparently legitimate
behaviours. Subterfuge is one of these deceptive behaviours performed by incom-
petent and malicious principals with the goal of evading the intended control of
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a security mechanism and misleading the accountability tracking for a permis-
sion. Although, existing trust management languages have uniquely identified
assumptions for principals; they do not provide a systematic method for unique
interpretation of permissions. We explain subterfuge by giving some examples
of delegation in the mentioned trust managements. Although, they all rely on
some form of global name providers to ensure that different parties get the right
name for resources, still malicious principals may bypass the actual intention of
a delegation.
2.4.1 Delegation Subterfuge in KeyNote
KeyNote relies on the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) [73] as a name
service provider to ensure that different parties get the right name for resources.
However, global name providers are not security administrators; they only provide
each name with a unique meaning and have no control over how names are used.
Principals from different name spaces may still use arbitrary specifications to
represent their own resources. Assume that an electronic banking system in
Bank1 uses KeyNote trust management to build and manage trust relationships.
The Bank1Manager, owner of public key kBM , issues a certificate that states
Alice, owner of public key kA, is trusted to create account for Bank1. This is
represented by the following delegation certificate:
KeyNote-Version: "2"
Comment: Certificate(1)
Authorizer: kBM
Licensees: kA
Condition: Action=="create account";
signature: by kBM
Alice may decide to delegate permission for create account in Bank1 to Bob,
owner of public key kB, who is an employee of Bank3. She issues the following
certificate:
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KeyNote-Version: "2"
Comment: Certificate(2)
Authorizer: kA
Licensees: kB
Condition: Action=="create account";
signature: by kA
The electronic banking system in Bank2 also uses KeyNote as its trust manage-
ment system. Eve, the owner of public key kE, is an employee of Bank2. Eve
delegates the permission for create account in Bank2 to Bob who is an employee
of Bank3. Eve issues the following certificate:
KeyNote-Version: "2"
Comment: Certificate(3)
Authorizer: kE
Licensees: kB
Condition: Action=="create account";
signature: by kE
Bob is willing to delegate the permission create account in Bank2 that he obtained
from Eve to Dave, the owner of public key kD to access resources of Bank2. Bob
issues the following certificate:
KeyNote-Version: "2"
Comment: Certificate(4)
Authorizer: kB
Licensees: kD
Condition: Action=="create account";
signature: by kB
Dishonest Dave obtains certificates (1) and (2) and represents the chain of certifi-
cates (1),(2),(4) as proof of his authorization to create account in Bank1. How-
ever, Bob’s intention by issuing certificate (4) to Dave was to allow Dave to
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present the certificates (3), (4) as a proof of authorization to Bank2.
2.4.2 Delegation Subterfuge in RT
The RT family [65] uses Application Domain Specification Documents (ADSDs)
[9] to ensure the globally unique naming. Although ADSDs provide a unique in-
terpretation for each name, the principals of different domains may still use arbi-
trary names to represent their own resources. For example, an electronic banking
system enables Alice to activate the role "Bank1.employee" to use in a session.
The role "Bank1.employee" is authorized for permission "Bank1.createAccount".
Alice delegates this role to Bob by issuing the delegation certificate for this pur-
pose denoted as:
Alice
act as Bank1.employee
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Bob
"act as Bank1.employee" is called "role activation". Suppose that malicious Eve
obtains this role activation "act as Bank1.employee". She first intercepts the
above delegation certificate and then delegates this role to Bob by issuing the
certificate:
Eve
act as Bank1.employee
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Bob
Bob may further delegate this role activation to Dave by issuing the certificate:
Bob
act as Bank1.employee
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Dave
Dave requests to create an account in Bank1 in the capacity of
"act as Bank1.employee" that can be represented by the following statement:
Dave
act as Bank1.employee
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Bank1.creatAccount
This request is granted because there is a chain of delegation from Alice to
Dave for the role activation "act as Bank1.employee". However, Bob’s inten-
tion by delegating the role activation "act as Bank1.employee" to Dave was
that Dave present the delegation chain from Eve to Dave for his request. This
happens because Bob does not understand that Eve has no authority over
"act as Bank1.employee" activation role. Therefore, the intercepted delegation
statement can be used by Dave to create an account for Bank1.
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2.4.3 Delegation Subterfuge In secPAL
We consider the previous scenario, the electronic bank system, and using the
secPAL policy language to investigate the subterfuge vulnerability in secPAL. In
the following example, we show how using the secPAL policy language results in
delegation subterfuge. We identify principals by their names as Bank1Manager,
Alice, Bob, Eve, Dave,... where a public key is associated to each of these names
in the implementation of secPAL as kBM , kA, kB, kE, kD, ... respectively. Bank
Manager issues a delegation statement for all of its employees to permit them to
create an account in Bank1. Note that, the constructor "say∞" means that the
permission in that statement can be delegated further. This delegation statement
is expressed as the following assertion in secPAL:
Bank1 Manager says X can say∞ createAccount
if X is an employee
Bank1 Manager says Alice is an employee
and therefore these statements can be inferred:
Bank1 Manager says Alice can say∞ createAccount
Alice delegates this permission to Bob by issuing the following assertion:
Alice says Bob can say∞ createAccount
The manager of Bank2 issues a similar statement for permitting its employees to
create an account. Thus, Bank2 Manager issues the following assertion:
Bank2 Manager says X can say∞ createAccount
if X is an employee
Bank2 Manager says Eve is an employee
and the following statement can be satisfied for X = Eve:
Bank2 Manager says Eve can say∞ createAccount
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Malicious Eve delegates the permission for creating an account to Bob for further
delegation in the following assertion:
Eve says Bob can say∞ createAccount
Bob unwittingly delegates the createAccount permission, that he obtained from
Eve, to Dave to present to Bank2 for creating an account. Note that, the con-
structor "say0" means that the following statement is only accepted if it is directly
asserted by Dave and is not deduced by a chain of delegation assertions.
Bob says Dave can say0 createAccount
However, Dave can present the following collection of assertions along with his
request to Bank1 :
Bank1Manager says Alice can say∞ createAccount
Alice says Bob can say∞ createAccount
Bob says Dave can say0 createAccount
The intention of Bob by delegating the permission for creating account was to
allow Dave to use the following chain of delegation assertions:
Bank2Manager says Eve can say∞ createAccount
Eve says Bob can say∞ createAccount
Bob says Dave can say0 createAccount
This subterfuge happens because of poor expression in the statements by the
issuers. Good assertion construction depends on the issuers’ expertise. However,
the issuer of assertions does not have a clear view of all available naming schemes
across other domains. So, in the above scenario, Bob was confused because of
misinterpretation of permission creatAccount that he received from two different
principals.
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2.4.4 Delegation Subterfuge In SPKI/SDSI
In SPKI/SDSI permissions are identified by tags or S-expressions. Authorization
certificates specify either authorization or delegation of permissions to princi-
pals. Permissions are bound to the public key of the certificate’s issuers. Since
binding permissions to public keys does not provide a meaningful interpretation
for principals, a series of delegation certificates that a principal uses to prove
its authorization for some resources may not reflect the exact intention of those
delegation certificates. This issue is described in more detail in the following
examples. In the following examples, the permission tag:
T = (tag(download X))
refers to the permission specification defined in the SPKI/SDSI framework for
downloading AlbumX. We refer to this tag simply as AlbumX.
Example 1 Atlantic Records signs a music publishing contract with a Music
Broker Service (owner of public key kB), that by their agreement, the broker
service would be able to issue permission for its customers to download from
Atlantic Records website by paying $10 for AlbumX. Atlantic Records (owner
of key kA) adds Music Broker Service to its contract list which is identified by
the SDSI name (kA Contracts), that all members of SDSI group (kA Contracts)
are authorized to download AlbumX by paying $10. Principal kE registers in
Music Broker Service and is identified by the local name (kB Customers). kE
sends the request to download the AlbumX from Atlantic Records and presents
the following certificates as proof of its authorization (notations are explained in
2.4):
kA
AlbumX
=⇒ (kA Contracts)
(kA Contracts)→ kB
kB
AlbumX
=⇒ (kB Customers)
(kB Customers)→ kE
The expected certificate chain between Atlantic Records company andMusic Bro-
ker Service is depicted in Figure 2.4.
On the other hand, Motown Records is another music company that also signs
a publishing contract with the same Music Broker Service (owner of public key
Subterfuge-Safe Trust Management for
Delegation of Permissions in Open
Environments
27 Seyedehsamane Abdigarmestani
(Samane Abdi)
2. Background and Related Work
2.4 Delegation Subterfuge in Existing Trust
Management Approaches
Figure 2.4: Expected chain for downloading AlbumX
kB), which by their agreement the Music Broker Service would be able to is-
sue permission to its customers to download from Motown Records by paying
$1 for AlbumX. Motown Records, the owner of public key kM , adds kB to its
contracts list specified by SDSI group (kM Contracts), where all the members of
this group are authorized for AlbumX. Dishonest kE can collect all the certificates
and present the following certificates to Motown Records to pay less for AlbumX :
kM
AlbumX
=⇒ (kM Contracts)
(kM Contracts)→ kB
kB
AlbumX
=⇒ (kB Customers)
(kB Customers)→ kE
However, kB’s intention when delegating permission AlbumX to the SDSI group
(kB Customers) is that kE uses the expected chain as proof of authorization to
download from Atlantic Records and make purchases by paying $10. Unknown to
kB, dishonest kE collects all other certificates and uses the above unexpected chain
to make a cheaper purchase by paying $1 to Motown Records rather than $10
to Atlantic Records. The unexpected certificate chain between Motown Records
company and Music Broker Service is depicted in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Unexpected chain for downloading AlbumX
Example 2 Eve (the owner of public key kE) sets up a bogus company and
masquerades as kM , the owner of the bogus company. Note that Eve is also
the owner of public key kM . Eve encourages the Music Broker Service (owner of
public key kB) to join its company and consequently to its group (kM Contracts).
Eve, masquerading as kM , delegates permission on downloading AlbumX which
is the same as the permission that kB already holds from a different company.
kB does not realize this and delegates the permission on downloading AlbumX to
(kB Customers) and consequently to kC as a customer of Music Broker Service.
kC normally would not be expected to hold this permission. This confusion
occurs as kB might have too many certificates to manage and does not track
which permission should be associated to which company.
In this case, kB’s intention by registering in kM ’s company was purchasing mini-
mum quality and cheaper services for its ordinary customers. However, kC as an
ordinary customer of Music Broker Service can present the following certificates
to access Atlantic Records and download the higher quality and more expensive
product:
kA
AlbumX
=⇒ (kA Contracts)
(kA Contracts)→ kB
kB
AlbumX
=⇒ (kB Customers)
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Figure 2.6: Subterfuge scenario by establishing a bogus company
(kB Customers)→ kC
Note that kC pays the Music Broker Service and the Music Broker Service pays
its contract companies. Hence, kB presumes that it should pay kM ’s company,
but Atlantic Records charges kB for principal kC ’s purchase. This scenario is
depicted in Figure 2.6.
Example 3 In Figure 2.7, AtlanticRecords delegates the permission AlbumX
to its group with the local name (kA Contracts). kC registers in the group
(kA Contracts) and is not aware of the permissions that this group has.
If kC delegates the permission Atlantic.com/AlbumX that she received from
Atlantic Records to another principal such as kM , the expected chain that kM
presents for requesting access to AlbumX on Atlantic Records would be the fol-
lowing chain:
kA
Atlantic.com/AlbumX
=⇒ (kA Contracts)
(kA Contracts)→ kC
kC
Atlantic.com/AlbumX
=⇒ kM
On the other hand, kE and kM are principals that can use the vulnerability
in permission naming to perform the following attack on Atlantic Records to
access AlbumX illegitimately. However, if kC is not willing to give the permission
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Figure 2.7: Subterfuge in the delegation of permission Atlantic.com/AlbumX
Atlantic.com/AlbumX that she obtained from Atlantic Records to kM , kE can
collude with kM and intercepts kA
Atlantic.com/AlbumX
=⇒ (kA Contracts). kC has no
idea about the permissions that the group (kA Contracts) has. In addition, kC
does not realize kE has no authority over permission Atlantic.com/AlbumX, and
delegates the permission Atlantic.com/AlbumX to kM which it received from kE.
Therefore, kC ’s intention when delegating permission on Atlantic.com/AlbumX
to kM is that kM uses the expected chain:
kE
Atlantic.com/AlbumX
=⇒ kC
kC
Atlantic.com/AlbumX
=⇒ kM
as proof of authorization to kE. However, dishonest kM obtains all the cer-
tificates in the chain and presents the following collection of certificates to
Atlantic Records to access AlbumX without kC’s knowledge.
kA
Atlantic.com/AlbumX
=⇒ (kA Contracts)
(kA Contracts)→ kC
kC
Atlantic.com/AlbumX
=⇒ kM
Note, even if kE obtains permission Atlantic.com/AlbumX legitimately, they can
also collude with kM to perform the above attack.
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2.5 Summary
This chapter has presented an overview of the research in access control models.
It has also briefly reviewed the research on distributed access control, starting
from the identity-based approaches to the modern key-based approaches. The
identity-based approach uses certificates as assertions for the binding of a public
key with a name. The representative work in this area is the X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI), and Simple
Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI). The newer key-based approach as-
sociates a public key directly with permissions, thus avoiding the use of names.
Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI), and PolicyMaker/KeyNote are repre-
sentative work in this area. In particular, PolicyMaker/KeyNote with an inte-
grated approach to the specification of security policies and trust relationships
underlies trust management systems.
Trust Management like many other protection techniques, provides operations
that are used to control access. As with any protection mechanism the chal-
lenge is to make sure that the mechanisms are configured in such a way that
they ensure some useful and consistent notion of security. We showed how poorly
characterized permission specifications within cryptographic certificates can lead
to authorization subterfuge during delegation operations. This subterfuge results
in a vulnerability concerning the accountability of the authorization provided by
a delegation chain. The delegation operations in the chain may not reflect the
actual intention of the security mechanism. The challenge here is to ensure that
permissions can be referred in such a way that properly reflects their context.
Since permissions are intended to be shared across local name spaces their re-
ferences must be global. We discussed some ad-hoc strategies to ensure global
permissions. In particular, we consider the use of global name services and pub-
lic keys as the sources of global identifiers. However, the design of a security
mechanism should not rely on ad-hoc methods, rather, should be formalized in a
systematic way to prevent subterfuge.
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Subterfuge Safe Trust
Management
This chapter introduces Subterfuge Safe Trust Management (SSTM). SSTM rep-
resents and expands the works that were introduced in [74, 75]. We begin with
an overview of the SSTM infrastructure, outlining the basic concepts and key
features in section 3.1. Section 3.2 introduces the Subterfuge Safe Authoriza-
tion Language (SSAL), a policy language for specifying trust-related policies. In
section 3.3, a formal foundation for SSAL is given. Section 3.4 outlines the poten-
tial threats to SSTM. Section 3.5 addresses certificate chain discovery for SSTM.
Finally, a summary of the chapter is presented in section 3.7.
3.1 Overview on SSTM Infrastructure
SSTM is a framework for specifying, expressing, and managing trust and au-
thorization relationships among distributed principals in open environments. It
provides a trust model for subterfuge safe delegation of permissions in large scale
distributed systems without relying on a pre-agreed global naming service or a
super security administrator. In SSTM, a principal may be a person, an organi-
zation, a computer process, or any other entity authenticated by some authority.
Principals are identified by either public keys or locally defined names that are
identified uniquely in global environments. Permissions are considered to be spec-
ified locally in some principal’s name space, however, they have globally unique
interpretations. A principal can delegate a permission to others. A principal de-
scribes its own security policy in its name space, therefore, a language is designed
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Figure 3.1: Overview of SSTM framework
for policy specification, called Subterfuge Safe Authorization Language (SSAL).
Figure 3.1 shows a general overview of the SSTM framework.
3.2 Subterfuge Safe Authorization Language
Subterfuge Safe Authorization Language (SSAL) is intended to be used by prin-
cipals to specify their policies regarding subterfuge safe trust/delegation relation-
ships. SSAL introduces usage of localPermissions instead of using conventional
specification of permissions in existing trust management systems. This section
describes the syntax of the language and provides a formal semantics using formal
methods. The three main concepts in the language: principals, permissions, and
delegation will be discussed in the following sections.
3.2.1 Principals
There are two types of principals in SSAL, both of which are uniquely identifiable
in a global manner. A principal can be specified by a public key, and therefore
is globally unique. A principal can also be an arbitrarily chosen name associated
with a public key called local name, therefore is globally unique as well. Local
names are inherited from Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) [43]
and are formed by linking principals to arbitrary chosen names. Each principal
has its own name space, identified by its global unique identifier (either public
key or local name), and can choose independently an arbitrary name to refer to
another principal in its own name space. Binding a principal that is recognized
by its local name to a name identifier provides an extended local name. An
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of a local name, a group, and an extended local name.
extended local name is a public key followed by two or more names. Note that
the arbitrarily chosen name can be a name for a group of principals called a group.
A group is a public key followed by a name. For example, the airline A, identified
by its public key kA, can choose an arbitrary name for its manager and define
the local name (kA Manager) as a unique reference for its manager in global
environments. The airline A can also define a group of brokers as (kA Brokers).
Assuming that the airline A’s manager has an employee called Clare, which is
unique in the name space of the manager, then Clare can be identified by the
extended local name (kA Manager Clare). Figure 3.2 illustrates this example.
Extended local names and groups do not have a separate definition; their meaning
is defined in terms of the meaning of the local names. In this thesis, we refer to
local names, extended local names, and groups simply as local names.
Public key
Public key cryptographically enables entities to securely communicate in insecure
open distributed environments, and reliably verifies the identity of an entity via
digital signatures. The public key is meant to be available for anyone in an open
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---- BEGIN ... PUBLIC KEY ----
Comment: Public key for Alice
AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAIEA1on8gxCGJJWSRT4uOrR13mUaUk0hRf4RzxgE
SZ1zRbYYFw8pfGesIFoEuVth4HKyF8k1y4mRUnYHP1XNMNMJl1JcEArC2asV8sHf
6zSPVffozZ5TT4SfsUu/iKy9lUcCfXzwre4WWZSXXcPff+EHtWshahu3WzBdnGxm
5Xoi89zcE
---- END ... PUBLIC KEY ----
Figure 3.3: Example of a public key
distributed environment. The private key is meant to be confidential, no one but
the owner is allowed to access it. The private key can be used to sign documents
such as statements, certificates, etc. Since it is kept privately only the owner can
use the private key. The public key can be used to verify a signature. Therefore,
once a document is signed by a private key anyone in the open environment can
verify the signature with the corresponding public key. Given these properties of
a public and private key pair, a principal can be represented by its public key as
a global unique identifier. We assume that no two entities share the same public
key and thus are globally unique and verifiable by others. Otherwise, if two or
more entities have the same public key they could impersonate each other. While
it is theoretically possible to generate the same public key, given the sizes of the
keys (1024 bits, about 309 digits), it is extremely unlikely to generate the same
public key in reality. Figure 3.3 depicts a Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File
Format [76].
For simplicity in this thesis, we use k followed by a small number, letter or word
to refer to the public keys. For example, kA might represent the public key in
Figure 3.3.
Local Name
The syntax of the local name is the public key followed by a sequence (one or
more) of arbitrarily chosen names. A local name is an arbitrary name N that
principal P (identified by either a public key or a local name) chooses for principal
Q in its (P ’s) name space. Principal P refers to principal Q in its name space as
N and in the global environment as (P N). (P N) is called the local name for
Q and their relationship is represented using the speaks for relation whereby the
statement principal Q speaks for local name (P N) is denoted as:
(P N) −→ Q
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Any statement that is signed by Q can be viewed as originating from (P N). For
example, an airline owner such as A, represented by its public key, kA, signs a
statement that Bob, the owner of public key kB, is acting as its broker:
(kA Brokers) −→ kB
which means that a message signed by the broker kB can be considered to be
originated from (kA Brokers).
Name Certificate
The local name and its relationship with other principals is identified by issuing
a name certificate. The principal P which signs the certificate is the issuer of the
name certificate, N is the locally chosen name in the name space of P , and Q is
the subject of the certificate that the issuer P refers to with the locally chosen
name N . The subject of the name certificate can be either a public key, or local
name. A name certificate is represented as the following where sK means the
certificate is signed by the owner of public key K (i.e. P ):
{|N, Q|}sK
It states that principal Q is referred to by the name N in a principal’s name space
that is identified by public key K. For example, the certificate {|Bob, kB|}skA
specifies that Bob is the name that the owner of public key kA arbitrarily chose
to refer to (the owner of) kB in her name space. The speaks for relation can
be inferred from the name certificate whereby the name certificate {|N, Q|}sK
implicitly states that principal Q speaks for the principal (K N). It means that
a message signed by principal Q can be considered to be originated from N in
the name space of a principal identified by public key K.
Definition "B speaks for A" if and only if there exists a certificate where B is the
subject and A is the certificate issuer’s public key followed by an arbitrary chosen
name (local name). When Principal B makes a request, it can be interpreted that
the request came from A.
The following rewrite rule provides a speaks for interpretation for name certifi-
cates. Given Principal (local name or public key) Q, name N , public key K, the
following rule will be interpreted as speaks for relation, that Q speaks for (K N):
Subterfuge-Safe Trust Management for
Delegation of Permissions in Open
Environments
37 Seyedehsamane Abdigarmestani
(Samane Abdi)
3. Subterfuge Safe Trust
Management 3.2 Subterfuge Safe Authorization Language
{|N, Q|}sK
(K N)→ Q
In addition to a single name, a name certificate may specify a group name, where
N represents the name for that group and can be bound to several principals
that are members of the group. Every member of the group speaks for the entire
group. For example, an airline owner, Alice, represented by her public key kA,
specifies a group of brokers. All she needs to do is give each member of the group
a name definition (kA Brokers) and issue one certificate. It is not necessary to
issue a new certificate for each individual member. If she decides to add some
members, she needs only issue a new name certificate for that principal. kA signs
a statement that kB is a member of its brokers (i.e. speaks for (kA Brokers)):
{|Brokers, kB|}skA
(kA Brokers) −→ kB
This means that a message signed by the broker kB can be considered as origi-
nating from (kA Brokers). The speaks for relation between kB and (kA Brokers)
is denoted by the following:
(kA Brokers) −→ kB
3.2.2 Permissions
Permissions are a set of rights that a principal may issue or obtain in a net-
work. They are specifications that define access rights to specific principals
and/or groups of principals. They are defined as an approval to perform an
action on one or more protected resources. A permission could be a simple ac-
tion on a file system such as read, write, update, or a complex specification such
as a method invocation in an object-oriented system. As discussed in chapter
1, existing trust management systems such as SPKI/SDSI, and KeyNote allow
specifying arbitrary permissions. In these systems it depends on the experience
of the principal who defines the permission for protected resources. However, in
distributed environments, none of the principals have a complete overview of the
name schema that other principals use for specifying arbitrary permissions for
their resources; therefore, they are vulnerable to the subterfuge problem. SSAL
introduces a systematic way of specifying subterfuge-safe permissions (rather than
relying on an ad-hoc method) called localPermission [74].
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localPermission
A new notion for a globally unique permissions called localPermission is intro-
duced in SSAL. A localPermission is a permission specification that is bound to
its originator name space and has therefore a globally unique interpretation in
open environments. A localPermission is formed by a principal followed by a per-
mission specification. The reason for introducing localPermissions in SSAL was
to provide a globally unique interpretation for permission specification to prevent
ambiguity, and therefore subterfuge, in delegations. In other words, a principal
receiving two identical permission specifications cannot misuse the permissions
for non-intended purposes, since the permissions have globally unique interpre-
tations and refer clearly to a global context. localPermissions provide a reliable
scheme for naming permissions relative to their originator’s public key or local
names. In localPermission definition, permissions are arbitrarily chosen specifica-
tions. By binding permissions to their originator’s public key or local name, they
will have a global unique interpretation while preserving their locality to their
originator’s name space.
Definition A localPermission is an arbitrary permission specification that a
principal defines to access its resources in its name space. The arbitrary de-
fined permission specification is bound to the originator’s name space and refers
to a global unique context.
Each principal can define its own permission specification referencing a global
unique context. The global unique context is the signed value of that permission
specification signed by the permission originator P (where K is the public key of
P ), represented as {|P erm|}sK . This represents a permission specification P erm
that originates from a principal which is the owner of public key K. Therefore,
a principal by signing the statement {|P erm, {|P erm|}sK |}sK binds its arbitrary
defined permission specification P erm to the self signed permission {|P erm|}sK
to introduce a globally unique interpretation of P erm in its name space denoted
as 〈P P erm〉.
For example, an airline owner Alice, identified by her public key kA, specifies
permission for selling flights for her airline as sell, and delegates this permission
to the brokers. On the other hand, Dave, identified by his public key kD, the
owner of another airline defines the same permission specification sell for selling
flights for his airline by his brokers. Using the localPermission scheme provides
a systematic way of globally and uniquely interpreting these two identical per-
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mission specifications relative to their originators’ name spaces without relying
on a global name service. Table 3.1 depicts permission sell in two different name
spaces of airline owners kA and kD with the globally unique interpretations.
Table 3.1: Permission sell and its definition in two different name spaces
Name Space Permission Specification Global Context localPermission
kA sell {|sell|}skA 〈kA sell〉
kD sell {|sell|}skD 〈kD sell〉
The localPermission 〈kA sell〉 clearly references the global unique context
{|sell|}skA , therefore it is globally unique.
Similarly, the localPermission 〈kD sell〉 clearly references the global unique con-
text {|sell|}skD which is different from the interpretation of 〈kA sell〉.
localPermission Characteristics
We assume that a localPermission has the following characteristics in its defini-
tion.
Reference to a Globally Unique Context A permission’s global unique
context is the signed value of a permission specification by the originator of the
permission. Each localPermission references a global unique context.
Local to a Name Space Although a localPermission has a globally unique
interpretation, it also preserves its locality to its issuer’s name space. localPer-
missions in different name spaces are distinct from each other even if they have
the same specification. In the example described in Table 3.1, 〈kA sell〉 is different
from 〈kD sell〉.
Associated with Their Originator The localPermissions are associated with
their originator’s either public key or local name. The localPermission of the form
〈P P erm〉 indicates that the principal P originated the permission P erm.
Globally Unique Interpretation Each localPermission references a global
unique context (self signed permission specification), and therefore has a unique
interpretation across all name spaces in open environments.
Subterfuge-Safe Trust Management for
Delegation of Permissions in Open
Environments
40 Seyedehsamane Abdigarmestani
(Samane Abdi)
3. Subterfuge Safe Trust
Management 3.2 Subterfuge Safe Authorization Language
Long-Lived Data It is assumed that permissions are considered as long-lived
data which do not need a specific validity period. When a principal originates a
permission in its name space, it is considered that the permission specification is
valid until the corresponding resource is unavailable. In other words, permission
specifications can be defined for a long period of time and are always valid.
Associating a validity period with permission certificates states that permission
specifications are not considered to be valid for all time [77], which contradicts
our assumption. This will be discussed in more detail in section 3.4.
Permission Certificate
There is also a permission certificate which binds a local specified permission in
an originator’s name space to a global context. The global context is the signed
permission by the permission originator {|P erm|}sK and represents a permission
specification P erm that originates from a principal owning public key K. Based
on the assumption that a public key is considered to be globally unique, a per-
mission signed by the key can be considered to have a globally unique permission
interpretation and is assumed unambiguous. By signing {|P erm|}sK , its origi-
nator is the owner of key K, and has just one interpretation for P erm in its
name space. When a principal originates a new permission to allow access to
its resources, that principal signs a self-signed certificate that binds the permis-
sion specification P erm to the globally unique value {|P erm|}sK . The permission
certificate is represented as the following:
{|P erm, {|P erm|}sK |}sK
Permission Global Ordering
localPermissions originate in some principal’s name space, and therefore a prin-
cipal must explicitly define how its locally specified permission relates to other
permissions either in its name space or other name spaces. For example, assume
Alice authorizes Bob to access all her resources and the global context for this
permission is {|all|}skA . When Bob requests write permission for Alice’s docu-
ments, the trust management (policy) engine must infer that permission 〈kA all〉
dominates permission 〈kA write〉. Both permissions 〈kA all〉, and 〈kA write〉 are
globally defined values as {|all|}skA , and {|write|}skA respectively. There is implicit
ordering relations between these two unique values. Thus, we define an explicit
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ordering relationship among localPermissions for further inferences to make ac-
cess decisions. A binary relation is defined between localPermissions to introduce
a meaningful ordering between them such that X  Y represents permission
Y is "no less authoritative than" permission X. Therefore, a principal that ei-
ther issues or obtains permission Y is implicitly considered to hold permission
X. A principal may issue permission certificates to define permission orderings
that specify how a permission in its name space is related to permissions in other
name spaces, where:
{|P erm, X|}sK
is a statement by principal P who is the holder of public key K stating that the
permission P erm in its name space (denoted as 〈P P erm〉) is no less authoritative
than the permission X. The above permission certificate is denoted as:
X  〈P P erm〉
It indicates that permission X is dominated by permission 〈P P erm〉. In other
words, each principal that holds permission 〈P P erm〉 also holds permission X.
Principal P must hold the permission X to define the global ordering relation
with X relative to permission P erm in its name space. In general, the set of all
localPermissions S provides a lattice (S,⊑). A lattice is a partially ordered set
in which every two elements X and Y have a least upper bound U and a greatest
lower bound L. An upper bound U of S is said to be its least upper bound if
U ⊑ W for each upper bound W of S. A set has zero or no more than one least
upper bound. Dually, L is said to be a grater lower bound of S if E ⊑ L for each
lower bound E of S. A set may have many lower bounds, or none at all, but can
have at most one greatest lower bound. The following diagram depicts a set of
permissions {a, b, c}, where the greatest lower bound of two elements {a, b} and
{a, c} is {a}. Therefore, permissions {a, b} and {a, c} dominate permission {a}.
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{a, b, c}
{a, b} {a, c} {b, c}
{a} {b} {c}
∅
Definition The greatest lower bound of localPermissions X and Y is denoted
as:
(X ⊓ Y )
(X ⊓ Y ) dominates any localPermission Z that is a lower bound of localPer-
missions X and Y . For example, localPermissions 〈kA {read, write}〉 and
〈kA {read, execute}〉 dominate localPermission 〈kA read〉; that is:
〈kA read〉 (〈kA {read, write}〉 ⊓ 〈kA {read, execute}〉)
3.2.3 Delegation
Delegation refers to the act of a principal to propagate the permissions that ei-
ther it originates or obtains from other principals or group of principals. This
process can continue and form a chain of delegation. In delegation, the principal
who propagates permissions to others is called a delegator and the principal who
receives permissions is called a delegatee. A principal may be delegated a permis-
sion directly from another principal called direct delegation, or may be delegated
a permission via a chain of direct delegations called indirect delegation. The ex-
ample depicted in Figure 3.4 illustrates the delegation between Alice and Bob. It
means that Alice allows Bob to propagate permission X to other principals. Bob
then delegates permission X to Dave, and then Dave has been delegated X from
Alice indirectly. The delegation between Bob and Dave is a direct delegation.
The delegation between Alice and Dave is an indirect delegation.
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Figure 3.4: Direct and indirect delegation
Delegation Certificate
Delegation certificates are represented by the following syntax:
{|Q, X, D, V |}sK
A principal P (owner of public key K) signs the certificate and delegates the
authority for permission X (where X is a localPermission) to Q which is the
subject of the delegation certificate. Q is a principal or group of principals that is
identified by either its/their public key(s) or local name(s). For ease of exposition,
we ignore the delegation bit D and validity period V . The delegation certificate
is denoted as the statement P
X
=⇒ Q and indicates that principal P delegates
authority for permission X to principal Q. For example, the airline A, holder of
public key kA, delegates permission for selling flights (〈kA sell〉) to a group of its
brokers ((kA Brokers)). This delegation is accomplished by issuing the following
delegation certificate:
{|(kA Brokers), 〈kA sell〉, d1, v1|}skA
denoted as:
kA
〈kA sell〉
=⇒ (kA Brokers)
Note that, in SSAL, delegation of a permission does not imply that the recipient
of the permission holds it,
First, it depends on whether the permission was originated from the principal that
the permission specification was defined in that principal’s name space. When a
principal originates a permission specification, the permission specification occurs
inside a permission certificate that is assumed to be in the certificate issuer’s name
space. A general localPermission is of the form 〈K P erm〉 where K is the issuer’s
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public key and P erm is an arbitrary chosen permission specification. Principal P ,
the owner of public key K, originates permission specification P erm in its name
space and binds permission P erm to the self signed permission {|P erm|}sK as a
reliable reference to the globally unique context. Then, it is implicitly inferred
that P holds 〈P P erm〉, denoted as P ∋ 〈P P erm〉. In the above example, the
delegation of 〈kA sell〉 implies that the (kA Brokers) holds it, since kA is the
originator of permission 〈kA sell〉.
Second, the principal who is willing to delegate a permission must finally hold the
permission in order to propagate it further. This prevents malicious principals del-
egating permissions that they do not hold, and consequently are not expected to
delegate. For example, the malicious broker kM may delegate permission 〈kA sell〉
to Clare, holder of public key kC . In the presence of the delegation statement
kM
〈kA sell〉
=⇒ kC , kC does not know whether kM ∋ 〈kA sell〉 and mistakenly thinks
that she holds the permission 〈kA sell〉.
3.2.4 Accountability
Accountability refers to the obligation of a principal to be responsible for its ac-
tivities based on the permission that is delegated to it. Delegation subterfuge is
possible when one cannot precisely specify how a permission is held by a principal.
It leads to breakdown in tracking accountability. A principal who is concerned
about subterfuge checks whether other earlier principals in the chain are respon-
sible for the permissions they delegate. When a principal originates a permission
it is implicitly held accountable for that permission, denoted as P⊲〈P P erm〉. In
general, a principal is considered to be accountable for a permission if it accepts
responsibility for the result of the actions done by other principals using the del-
egated permission. For example, in issuing permission 〈kA sell〉 for airline A, the
principal kA is considered to be accountable for the use of permission 〈kA sell〉
by any principal that holds this permission. Note that, holding a permission by a
principal may not result in that principal’s accountability for that permission. In
other words, a principal may not be considered to be accountable for a permission
that it holds, unless it clearly states that it accepts accountability for that per-
mission. This prevents malicious principals deceitfully delegating a permission to
other principals to make them accountable by holding a permission. On the other
hand, a principal must hold the permission to assert accountability. This ensures
that a non-trusted malicious principal cannot assert accountability by issuing an
accepts accountability statement for a permission for which they are not trusted
Subterfuge-Safe Trust Management for
Delegation of Permissions in Open
Environments
45 Seyedehsamane Abdigarmestani
(Samane Abdi)
3. Subterfuge Safe Trust
Management 3.3 Formal Foundation for SSAL
to hold. A principal who is accepting accountability for the permission issued by
a group of principals implicitly accepts accountability for the similar permission
specification referring to the name space of each member of the group. For ex-
ample, if Emily is a member of group (kA Brokers) and accepts accountability
for permission that is originated by (kA Brokers) group as 〈(kA Brokers) sell〉,
she implicitly asserts being accountable for 〈kE sell〉. Therefore, in delegating
〈kE sell〉 to Bob for further delegation, Emily accepts accountability for how
〈kE sell〉 is handled by Bob.
Moreover, permission ordering relations may not result in accountability, where
one cannot infer accountability for any permission in one name space dominated
by another permission originated in a different name space. If this were permitted
then Bob may not be aware of this and specifies his own permission 〈kB sell〉 and
asserts 〈kM sell〉  〈kB sell〉. Then since Bob is by default accountable for all
the permissions he originates then he would be inferred as accountable for the
〈kM sell〉 permission which results in subterfuge for kM .
3.3 Formal Foundation for SSAL
In this section we present a logic for the SSAL language which provides
subterfuge-freedom in delegation of permissions in open environments. When
a set of statements and certificates is defined, and an authorization request is
formulated, the logic rules can be used to check whether the request is valid as
a consequence of the existing SSAL statements. The SSAL logic uses the follow-
ing notations and formulae where P, Q, R represent principals; X, Y, Z represent
localPermissions; N is an arbitrary chosen name for a principal; P erm is an
arbitrary chosen specification of a permission, and A, B are formulae:
• P ∋ X: principal P holds permission X.
• P −→ Q: principal Q speaks for principal P .
• P
X
=⇒ Q: principal P delegates permission X to principal Q.
• P ⊲X: principal P is accountable for permission X in the delegation chain.
• X  Y : localPermission Y is no less authoritative than localPermission X.
• (P N): local name N in the name space of principal P .
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• 〈P P erm〉: locally defined permission P erm in the name space of principal
P .
• A ⇒ B: the statement A implies statement B.
Note that, by mentioning principal kA we mean that there is a principal A that
is the owner of public key kA. The main focus of the SSAL logic is a set of new
axioms, expressed as rewrite/inference rules that extends the SPKI/SDSI logic by
incorporating localPermissions and demonstration of how localPermission names
can avoid subterfuge in delegation of permissions. The idea behind the logic is to
allow a principal to make a subterfuge-safe decision, whether it is safe to delegate
a permission based on a collection of statements, and also whether there is any
principal accountable for the action performed based on that permission. The
SSAL logic is comprised of 21 axioms including 6 axioms (N1, N2, N3, D1, D2,
and D4) that come directly from SPKI/SDSI.
3.3.1 Principal Names Relation
Each name certificate denotes a speaks for relation between the subject of a
certificate and the arbitrary chosen name in the certificate issuer’s name space.
N1
Given principal (local name or public key) P , name N , and public key K, the
following rule will be interpreted as speaks for relation, that P speaks for (K N):
{|N, P |}sK
(K N) −→ P
N2
This reduction combines two linked speaks for statements. Given local names (or
public keys) P, Q, R and an arbitrary chosen name N then:
(Q N) −→ P ;R −→ Q
(R N) −→ P
This rule indicates that principal Q may define an arbitrary name N for principal
P in its (Q’s) name space; if principal Q speaks for principal R, then R also refers
to principal P in its (R’s) name space with the same name identifier N .
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N3
Given principals P, Q and R the speaks for relation is transitive, that is:
P −→ Q;Q −→ R
P −→ R
3.3.2 Permission Delegation
D1
The following rule provides an interpretation for delegation.
{|P, X, D, V |}sK
K
X
=⇒ P
D2
Given principals P, Q, R, S and permission X then the direct delegation reduction
rule is:
P
X
=⇒ Q;Q −→ R
P
X
=⇒ R
This rule indicates that the permission X which is delegated to principal Q is
also delegated to any principal (R) that speaks for the delegatee.
D3
In direct delegation of permissions, if principal P delegates a permission Y to
principal Q, principal P implicitly delegates any permission X dominated by Y .
P
Y
=⇒ Q;X  Y
P
X
=⇒ Q
D4
The permission that a principal is delegated via indirect delegation is the inter-
section of all permissions delegated in the chain.
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P
X
=⇒ Q;Q
Y
=⇒ R;
P
X⊓Y
=⇒ R
3.3.3 Permission Holding
H1
Given a public key K and arbitrary chosen specification N for permission, we
define the following Holding rule, that the owner of public key K holds localPer-
mission 〈K N〉:
{|N, {|N |}sK |}sK
K ∋ 〈K N〉
H2
Q is authorized for X, if P holds X in the first place and delegates it to Q:
P ∋ X, P
X
=⇒ Q
Q ∋ X
H3
A member of a group holds any permission that is held by the whole group:
P ∋ X, P −→ Q
Q ∋ X
Note that the group of principals does not hold the permissions that each of its
members holds in their own name spaces.
H4
A principal holding permission Y , holds all permissions, X, dominated by Y :
P ∋ Y ;X  Y
P ∋ X
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3.3.4 Permission Ordering
P1
The following inference rule is the ordering interpretation for permission certifi-
cates. Given public key K, permission X and permission specification P erm then
〈K P erm〉 is no less authoritative than X:
{|P erm, X|}sK , K ∋ X
X  〈K P erm〉
P2
The ordering relationship  between permissions is, by definition, reflexive:
P ∋ X
X  X
P3
If a localPermission X dominates locally defined permission P erm in the name
space of principal P , it implicitly dominates the similar permission specification
P erm in the name space of all principals that have speak for relation with P :
〈P P erm〉 X;P −→ Q
〈Q P erm〉 X
P4
localPermission reduction is defined by the following rule, whereby, given prin-
cipals P and Q, localPermissions X and Y , and an arbitrary chosen permission
specification P erm, then:
X  〈P P erm〉;P −→ Q; 〈Q P erm〉 Y ;Q⊲ 〈P P erm〉
X  Y
This rule indicates that if a permission P erm originated in the name space of
principal P , and dominates permission X, and there exists the same permis-
sion specification P erm in the name space of Q; where Q speaks for P , then Q
must explicitly provide an accountability for permission 〈P P erm〉 so that any
permission Y that dominates 〈Q P erm〉 also dominates X.
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P5
A permission that is a lower bound of permission X and Y is dominated by the
greatest lower bound of X and Y :
Z  X;Z  Y
Z  (X ⊓ Y )
3.3.5 Accountability for Permissions
A1
The owner of public key K that originates the permission 〈K P erm〉 is considered
to be accountable for any actions permitted by that permission. We have:
K ∋ 〈K P erm〉
K ⊲ 〈K P erm〉
A2
A principal K that holds a permission may accept accountability for a valid
permission X by signing a statement indicating acceptance of accountability.
The following rule denotes this:
{|accept_accountability(X)|}sK ;K ∋ X
K ⊲X
A3
A principal P is considered to be accountable for a permission X if a principal
Q that is accountable for that permission X speaks for P :
Q⊲X;P −→ Q
P ⊲X
A4
For a principal referenced within a localPermission, the following accountability
may be deduced, that is:
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R ⊲ 〈P P erm〉;P −→ Q
R ⊲ 〈Q P erm〉
A5
A principal that is accountable for a permission is considered to hold the permis-
sion, that is:
R⊲X
R ∋ X
3.3.6 Logical Properties
The following properties are derived from the previous axioms. Their reason-
ableness provides confidence in the correctness of the SSAL logic. The formulae
A ⇒ B indicates that the statement A implies statement B.
Property 1
The following property can be inferred from combining rule P5, D3, and the SPKI-
delegation rule D4 in section 3.3.2. This allows a principal to reason about indirect
delegation based on a collection of delegation statements and localPermission
relations. Given principals P, Q, R and permissions X, Y, Z then we infer:
((P
X
=⇒ Q) ∧ (Q
Y
=⇒ R) ∧ (Z  X) ∧ (Z  Y )) ⇒ (P
Z
=⇒ R) (3.1)
Property 2
This follows from Holding rule H2 and Permission Ordering rule P3 that, in
delegation of a localPermission Y by a principal that holds it, the recipient also
holds any localPermissions dominated by Y :
((P ∋ X) ∧ (P
Y
=⇒ Q) ∧ (X  Y ))⇒ (Q ∋ X) (3.2)
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Property 3
Any principal that speaks for the recipient of a localPermission also holds all
dominated localPermissions. It follows from combining Permission Delegation
rule P4, and Holding Permission rule H3:
((P ∋ X) ∧ (P
Y
=⇒ Q) ∧ (X  Y ) ∧ (Q −→ R))⇒ (R ∋ X) (3.3)
Property 4
If a principal is delegated some permissions and the delegator holds any domi-
nated permissions, that delegatee also holds the dominated permissions.
((P ∋ X) ∧ (P
Y
=⇒ Q) ∧ (X  Y ))⇒ (Q ∋ X)
Property 5
If a principal P originates a permission P erm in its name space, then it dominates
the same permission name P erm in the name space of all principals that have
speaks for relation with P .
((P ∋ 〈P P erm〉) ∧ (P −→ Q))⇒ (〈Q P erm〉 〈P P erm〉) (3.4)
Property 6
If we consider well-defined (held by principals) localPermissions X, Y and Z then
by reflexivity of speaks for and no less authoritative than, it follows that permis-
sion ordering is transitive in the sense that:
((X  Y ) ∧ (Y  Z))⇒ (X  Z) (3.5)
Proposition (3.5) can be considered in the context of a conventional trust manage-
ment system whereby some "super security authority" effectively asserts a global
pre-order over permissions (P ERM,⊑) and thus the set (P ERM, ) forms a
pre-order.
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Property 7
If a principal Q accepts accountability for permission P erm in the name space of a
principal P and principal Q also speaks for P , any permission, X, that dominates
permission P erm referring to its name space, also dominates the permission P erm
referred to by principal P that is:
((〈Q P erm〉 X) ∧ (P −→ Q) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈P P erm〉))⇒ (〈P P erm〉 X) (3.6)
Property 8
If a principal Q accepts accountability for the permission P erm in the name
space of principal P , and Q speaks for P , any permission that is dominated by
permission P erm in P ’s name space, is also dominated by the same permission
P erm in the name space of Q.
((X  〈P P erm〉) ∧ (P −→ Q) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈Q P erm〉))⇒ (X  〈Q P erm〉) (3.7)
Property 9
By reflexivity 〈P P erm〉 〈P P erm〉 on well-defined localPermissions, it follows
from proposition (3.6) that if a principal Q speaks for P and is accountable for
permission P erm referred to within principal P ’s name space, then the permission
P erm referred to by principal Q dominates permission P erm originated by P :
((P −→ Q) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈P P erm〉))⇒ (〈P P erm〉 〈Q P erm〉) (3.8)
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3.4 Threats and Mitigation
Here, we describe the threats that can affect the global unique interpretation
of a localPermission. A localPermission is an interpretation of a permission in
a specific principal’s name space. A name space is identified by a principal’s
public key; therefore, any threat on that principal’s public key may affect the
localPermission’s global unique interpretation. A principal’s public key may be-
come compromised, changed, or expired and the localPermission interpretation
for that public key may no longer be valid. In this section, we review these threats
and propose a solution to mitigate the threats.
3.4.1 Key Expiration Threat
Each public key has an expiration date indicating the public key is invalid and
should not be trusted after the expiration date. When a principal’s public key has
expired, any localPermission interpretation that refers to that key will no longer
be valid. Assuming airline A’s public key is kA, after originating localPermission
〈kA sell〉 and delegating to Bob expires, then, when kA expires, the global unique
interpretation for 〈kA sell〉 is invalid.
3.4.2 Key Refreshing Threat
A public key’s expiration date can be extended. When a key holder finds out that
its public key (consequently private key) is expiring, they request the key provider
to extend the expiration date and retrieve the updated public key (actually key
pair). Thus, the localPermission interpretation that refers to that key would not
be changed. However, the originator of a permission needs to issue the permission
certificate with the public key that has a new expiration date.
3.4.3 Key Change Threat
A principal may change its public key (key pair); therefore, the localPermission
and its interpretation that is bound to that key would be affected. The localPer-
mission of the form 〈K P erm〉 emphasizes that permission P erm originates from
a principal with public key K and belongs locally to the name space of holder of
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key K. If any change is applied to the originator’s public key, then, the localPer-
mission interpretation needs to be redefined with the new public key. Consider
the scenario that airline A changes its public key from kA to kA′ . Assuming that
it already has originated permission sell in its name space as 〈kA sell〉, after
changing its public key, it has to sign all the existing permission certificates with
its new private key that corresponds to the new public key.
3.4.4 Key Compromised Threat
The use of a private key (corresponding to a public key) that an attacker has stolen
to sign the permission on behalf of the resource owner leads to referring to that key
pair as compromised [78]. Although obtaining a private key is a difficult process
for an attacker, it is possible. After an attacker obtains a private key, that key
pair is compromised. An attacker can use the stolen key to originate or modify
permissions and pretend that the permissions are from the legitimate resource
owner without the knowledge of the resource owner. Based on our assumptions,
permissions in our model are globally unique and long-lived data; therefore, they
do not have a validity period or at least are considered to have a long term
validity period. Thus, a malicious principal such as Eve with the public key kE
has enough time to obtain the compromised key and originate a new permission,
say 〈kA all〉 by using the compromised key kA and pretending that this permission
is from airline A.
3.4.5 Threat Mitigation Techniques
In this section, we discuss the solutions for threat mitigation and finally introduce
a reliable scheme for preventing the existing threats on localPermissions.
Setting Expiration Date for Permissions
Despite the characteristics in the definition of localPermission, we assume a va-
lidity period for a localPermission when a principal signs a permission certificate.
This validity period is independent of the validity period of the public key of the
originator of the permission, and also independent of the validity period of the
delegation certificate. The permission certificate with validity period is repre-
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sented as:
{|P erm, {|P erm|}sK , V |}sK
where P erm is a permission specification, V is a validity period of the localPer-
mission that references the permission value {|P erm|}sK , and K is a public key
of the principal who originates the permission. In this scheme, when the va-
lidity period ends, the localPermission interpretation is not valid any more. In
addition, a principal can issue a permission certificate, within the validity period
V1, that dominates the other localPermission within the validity period V2, if V2
contains V1. For example, kA may issue a localPermission 〈kA sell〉 within valid-
ity period V1 = (02/06/2014, 04/06/2014), and define its global ordering relation
to permission sell in kB’s name space, 〈kB sell〉, within the validity period of
V2 = (01/06/2014, 05/06/2014), as 〈kB sell〉  〈kA sell〉). Validity period V2
contains the validity period V1 and indicates a principal must issue a permission
ordering certificate to any other permissions in the interval of validity period of
the dominated permission. Note that, if V2 ≤ V1, the permission ordering cannot
be effective after the time that the dominated permission expires. Moreover, a
delegation certificate that contains a localPermission is not effective outside of
the interval that the localPermission is valid. In the delegation of a permission
there is the complication of dealing with two levels of intervals, the interval at
which a delegation certificate is valid, and the interval at which a permission
is alive. A principal can issue a delegation certificate with validity period not
greater than the permission certificate validity period. For example, if we have
V1 validity period for the delegation certificate, and validity period V2 for the
permission certificate, the effective interval that the delegation certificate is valid
is V1 ⊓ V2. The above shows how validity periods for permission certificates can
be incorporated to the model. However, later discussions show the use of an
ephemeral key and a separated key for signing permission certificates makes it
non essential to use a validity period for permission certificates. Therefore, we
assume localPermissions to be long lived data without validity period.
Using an Ephemeral Key for Signing Permission Certificates
The signed permission as a global reference for a localPermission can be decrypted
by the holder of a public key to verify that the permission is originated by the
owner of the private key. Using a different key pair for signing permissions (called
permission key), rather than the permission originator’s identity public/private
key, will prevent the threats of expiration, refreshing, or changing the identity
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key. However, even by using a different key for signing the permissions rather
than the permission originator’s identity key, there might exist enough time for
a malicious principal to run a compromised key attack for a permission key. To
prevent a compromised key attack, we propose using ephemeral keys [79–81] to
handle the security of localPermissions over a long period of time. An ephemeral
key is a private or public key that is unique for each signing scheme. An ephemeral
private key is to be destroyed as soon as computational need for it is completed.
It enables a principal to sign a permission in a way that ensures the private
key cannot be re-used after a finite period of time, and eventually prevents the
compromised key attack. Before the expiration time, the principal that aims to
encrypt the permission specification uses the ephemeral private key for signing
the permission and binds the permission global unique context to the locally
defined permission. The provider of an ephemeral key destroys the ephemeral
private key to prevent key recovery after a short time. In this way, an attacker
cannot obtain the principal’s ephemeral private key, since that is valid only for
a short period of time. A principal that originates the localPermission references
its permission key to its identity key by issuing a speaks for relation between the
permission key and identity key. Consider ke as permission key of the principal
that is the owner of the public key k, we have the following inference by rule N1
in SSAL (Note that in the name certificate the name can be null):
({|null, k|}ske )⇒ (ke −→ k) (1)
A principal with public key k, originates permission P erm in its name space and
issues the permission certificate with the permission key ke, that is:
({|P erm, {|P erm|}ske |}ske )⇒ (ke ∋ 〈ke P erm〉) (2)
consequently by rule H3, statements (1), and (2) we deduce that k ∋ 〈ke P erm〉,
that is:
((ke ∋ 〈ke P erm〉) ∧ (ke −→ k))⇒ (k ∋ 〈ke P erm〉)
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3.5 Certificate Chain Discovery
In distributed and open environments when a principal requests access to a re-
source, in order to prove to the resource owner that the requester is authorized,
the requester must present to the resource owner a set of certificates relevant to
its request. The requester may not know what set of certificates it should present
to the resource owner to be granted access to that resource, or even may not
know about the existence of such a set of certificates. It is assumed all relevant
certificates to a request are stored with the requester. If the requester main-
tains a database of a small number of certificates, it would be straightforward
to extract the certificates related to the request and send them to the resource
owner. However, if stored by distributed principals and each principal maintains
a large number of certificates, it is not obvious which set of certificates the re-
quester must present to the resource owner to prove authorization for accessing a
particular resource. Therefore, an automated process is required for discovering
and generating the sequences, if a valid chain of certificates exists. The pro-
cess of discovering the set of certificates that proves authorization for a resource
is called certificate chain discovery. In a centralized environment, a certificate
chain discovery algorithm addresses how to discover a set of certificates relevant
to a request from a large number of certificates that are stored in a centralized
manner. However, in decentralized environments certificates are issued by dis-
tributed principals. In order to discover a set of certificates related to a request,
a requester or even a resource owner does not have all certificates in one loca-
tion. In this section, we present a certificate chain discovery algorithm for SSAL
that discovers the full set of certificates related to a request when certificates are
stored with distributed principals.
3.5.1 Related Work
Certificate Chain Discovery in SPKI/SDSI
SSAL builds on some of the features of SPKI/SDSI. However, SPKI/SDSI does
not contain the notion of "localPermission" and specifies permissions in tags (s-
expressions). Several certificate chain discovery algorithms have been proposed
for SPKI/SDSI. Most of these [59,82] assume that all of the potential certificates
related to a request are centralized in one place, and they do not address how
these certificates are gathered. This assumption is unusual for trust management
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systems, since they establish and manage trust and authorization relationships
between decentralized principals. Moreover, SPKI/SDSI uses an ACL (Access
Control List) that controls access to the resource belonging to the principal which
holds the ACL. A certificate chain discovery algorithm for SPKI/SDSI was pro-
posed in [59, 83]. In this approach the set of certificates are stored centrally, so
the proof of authorization is constructed in a centralized manner. Another certifi-
cate chain discovery algorithm based on the theory of push-down automata was
proposed in [82] for SPKI/SDSI. However this algorithm also assumes that certifi-
cates are stored centrally and proof of authorization requires finding a certificate
chain among a set of certificates that are stored centrally.
Certificate Chain Discovery in PolicyMaker and Keynote
While PolicyMaker and Keynote [14,47] support trust relationships in distributed
environments, they do not address mechanisms for certificate chain discovery.
They include a mechanism for checking the existence of a particular trust rela-
tionship called a compliance checker. The compliance checker service determines
how an operation requested by a principal should be handled, given a policy and
a set of certificates.
Certificate Chain Discovery in RT
Li et al. [84] proposed a certificate chain discovery algorithm for Role-based Trust
management (RT) that discovers the certificate chain when the storage of cer-
tificates is either centralized or decentralized. The scheme uses three algorithms:
forward search algorithm, backward search algorithm, and bidirectional search
algorithm. The bidirectional search algorithm is an alternative for both forward
and backward search algorithms when some chains cannot be found by neither
forward nor backward search algorithms individually. Although the certificate
chain discovery algorithm for RT addresses certificate discovery from distributed
principals, the proof of authorization is constructed in a centralized manner [84].
In our approach, certificate storage is distributed and various principals summa-
rize their part of the proof of authorization before sending it to other principals.
In addition, our approach uses a simple and effective algorithm to discover certifi-
cates without requiring centralized data storage such as the ACL in SPKI/SDSI.
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3.5.2 Certificate Chain Discovery for SSTM
Certificate Storage Strategy
In our model, distributed storage is provided by the repositories that are running
on different principals’ servers. When a principal issues a certificate, it stores
that certificate in its own repository called a "local cert". The issuer publishes its
certificate in another principal’s repository, a so called "copy cert". The purpose
of publishing the certificates to another principal’s repository is that those certifi-
cates can be distributively located and used by other principals. Each repository
supports insertion and storage of name, permission, and delegation certificates
to perform authorization queries and discovery of proof of authorization. Certifi-
cates, after being issued, are inserted in the issuer’s local repository. Copies of
these certificates are published to the repository of the subject of the certificates.
Consider airline A is a resource owner and delegates the permission 〈kA sell〉 to
a group of its brokers denoted as (kA Brokers). Bob is a member of this group.
The airline A issues the following delegation, name, and permission certificates:
C1 : kA
〈kA all〉
=⇒ (kA Brokers)
C2 : (kA Brokers) −→ kB
C3 : 〈kA sell〉 〈kA all〉
Airline A stores these certificates in its local repository. Copies of these certificates
are also stored with Bob, the owner of public key kB. Bob originates a new
permission in his name space as 〈kB all〉 and states that this permission dominates
the permission that he received from airline A. He then delegates the permission
〈kB all〉 to Dave. These assertions are defined by issuing the following certificates:
C4 : 〈kA all〉 〈kB all〉
C5 : kB
〈kB all〉
=⇒ kD
When Dave requests authorization for sell at airline A, he has a copy of certifi-
cates C4 and C5 (obtained from Bob and denoted as C4
′
and C5
′
) in his local
repository. Dave contacts Bob’s repository to collect all the certificates related
to permission 〈kA sell〉, where Bob is the subject of those certificates. Therefore,
C1
′
, C2
′
, and C3
′
will be found. Dave presents all those certificates to Airline A.
Hence, the set of certificates from different locations are successively discovered.
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Figure 3.5: "local cert" and "copy cert" in local repositories.
The requester collects all related certificates from different locations to discover
a delegation chain from the resource owner (airline A) to the requester (Dave) if
one exists. Figure 3.5 depicts the local repositories that contain the certificates
which support the trust relationship between airline A, Bob, and Dave.
Algorithm
The certificate chain discovery algorithm is used by the requester to discover
a set of certificates that provide a proof of the requester’s authorization. The
following protocol demonstrates the requesting process by requester A for an
action a on a resource r where principal B is the owner of resource r. The
notation A ։ B : {a, b, c, ...}sA indicates that the entity A sends a message to
entity B. The message {a, b, c, ...} is signed by the sender (sA).
Msg1 : A։ B : {(a, r)}skA
Msg2 : A։ B : {S}skA
Msg3 : B ։ A : Authorization Decision
1. The requester sends a request to the resource owner to access resource r for
action a.
2. The requester sends a set of certificates S related to the permission
〈kB (a, r)〉.
3. If the resource owner verifies the proof of authorization, it grants the re-
quester access to the requested resources.
The certificate chain discovery algorithm is used for step 2. The algorithm takes
the requester’s public key kA, permission related to the requested action and
resource 〈kB (a, r)〉, a set of certificates, and current time as input, and returns
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a certificate chain if one exists. The certificate chain provides proof that the
requester (public key kA) is authorized to perform the action a on resource r
at the time specified in the time interval I. If the time I is not specified in a
certificate it is assumed to be valid forever (−∞ to +∞). The set of certificates
in S includes all type of SSAL certificates, i.e. name certificates, permission
certificates, and delegation certificates.
The algorithm first excludes irrelevant certificates. Irrelevant certificates are cer-
tificates that are useless in deriving the proof of authorization. The following are
the certificates that need to be removed before the discovery process:
1. The certificates that either their signatures cannot be verified or are outside
of the valid time period.
2. Delegation certificates that do not include the permission that was requested
in the request.
3. Permission certificates which are not a superset of the requested permission.
Before the certificate chain discovery process, the permissions that are not a
superset of the requested permission are removed. For example, in the case that
there is the following permission ordering:
〈kA read〉 〈kA write〉 〈kA all〉
when a principal requests write on kA’s resources, the permission certificate for
〈kA read〉 will be removed before the certificate chain discovery process starts.
This is because the algorithm first checks that the requested permission is a subset
of the permissions in each of the delegation certificates. If there is a delegation
certificate whose permission is not a superset of the requested permission, the
certificate sequence is invalid, and is useless in providing a proof of authorization.
These certificates are useless in trying to derive the desired set of certificates.
The certificate chain discovery algorithm checks if there is a chain of delegation
certificates from resource owner to the requester. The complexity of discovering a
chain of delegation certificates depends on the subject of the delegation certificate.
We explain the discovery process based on the subject of delegation certificates:
public keys, local names, and extended local names.
Subjects as Public Keys The subject of a delegation certificate can be spec-
ified by its public key. The issuer of the delegation certificate is the resource
Subterfuge-Safe Trust Management for
Delegation of Permissions in Open
Environments
63 Seyedehsamane Abdigarmestani
(Samane Abdi)
3. Subterfuge Safe Trust
Management 3.5 Certificate Chain Discovery
owner who originates the permission for access to its resources. The delegation
certificate grants the permission to the subject for the resources in the name space
of the issuer of the certificate. Considering P and Q as public keys, 〈P P erm〉
denotes the permission specified as P erm in the name space of P . The follow-
ing denotes a delegation certificate where P grants permission P erm in its name
space to Q
P
〈P P erm〉
=⇒ Q
Assuming all the delegation certificates are as above and all the useless certificates
are removed before the process, the algorithm proceeds for the scenario with
principals as public keys as follows:
1. A directed graph is set up where each public key is represented by a vertex
and the delegation relation between public keys is represented by an edge
between the associated vertices. The following is a directed graph with two
vertices and one edge representing the delegation certificate:
2. A Depth-First Search (DFS) algorithm [85] is used to determine if a path
exists from vertex kO (the public key of the resource owner) to vertex kR
(public key of the requester).
3. If the path exists the path is returned, and if there is not a path, it termi-
nates with failure.
Subjects as Local Names In this scenario, we assume that the subjects of the
delegation certificates are local names. To proceed with certificate chain discovery
the local names must be reduced to their public key values. Given public keys P
and R, local name Q, and permission 〈P P erm〉, the following rule (1) reduces
local names to their public key values:
P
〈P P erm〉
=⇒ Q;Q −→ R
P
〈P P erm〉
=⇒ R
The permission P erm originating in the name space of the issuer of the delegation
certificate P is delegated to a principal identified by its local name Q. The result
of this computation is a set of delegation certificates with the subjects as public
keys only. Recalling the scenario with only public keys, we can now run the
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algorithm described for that scenario over the remaining delegation statements.
Subject as Extended Name The subject of a delegation certificate can be an
extended name. In most applications the use of extended names is not needed.
However, for those applications that need extra expressiveness for naming the
principals, extended local names can be used. For instance, Insight is a research
centre in University College Cork (UCC), and UCC is a member of the National
University of Ireland (NUI), then (kNUI UCC Insight) is an extended name
that identifies the unique name Insight in the name space of the principal that
is identified by its local name (kNUI UCC). Extended names can be reduced
to local names and further reduced to public keys using the following reduction
rule. The following rule (2) states that an extended local name ((Q N) M) can
be reduced to the local name (R M). Given local names (or public keys) Q, R,
and public key P and arbitrary chosen names N and M then:
((Q N) M) −→ P ;R −→ (Q N)
(R M) −→ P
Principal (Q N) may define an arbitrary name M for principal P in its name
space; if principal (Q N) speaks for principal R, then (R M) has the same public
key value. For example, the delegation certificate denoted k1
X
=⇒ (k2 N1 N2),
and the name certificates denoted as: (k2 N1) −→ k3 and (k3 N2) −→ k4 can be
reduced to the delegation statement k1
X
=⇒ k4. The result of this computation
is a set of delegation certificates with the public key as subject. Recalling the
scenario with only public keys, the algorithm described for that scenario can now
be run over the remaining delegation statements.
Distributed Chain Discovery
In this section, we demonstrate the certificate chain discovery through an exam-
ple. Recall that the issuer of each certificate stores the original certificate in its
local repository and sends a copy of that certificate to the repository of the subject
of the certificate. The distributed certificate chain discovery process starts from
the requester. The requester may hold a copy of the delegation certificate that is
related to the permission that it (the requester) needs for its request. Therefore,
the chain discovery algorithm looks up the local repository of the issuer of the
certificate to check if the requester holds a copy of that certificate. In the follow-
ing, we explain the procedure that will be applied to the local repository of the
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principals:
1. Remove useless delegation certificates.
2. Convert the remaining name, permission, and delegation certificates to
name, permission, and delegation statements, respectively.
3. Compute the reduction rules (1) and (2) on these statements. This compu-
tation results in the subjects of all delegation statements being converted
to their public key values.
4. Extract all statements of the form ki
T =⇒ kj .
5. Form a directed graph, where the vertices are ki
T and kj, and the edges are
the delegation relations between ki and kj (ki and kj are public keys).
6. Use a DFS to determine if there is a path from resource owner ko to the
requester kr.
7. Output the desired set of certificates if there is a path, otherwise terminate
with failure.
This procedure is explained in detail in the following example. Suppose
that company A, identified by public key kA, sets up a group of brokers,
(kA flightBrokers), to sell flights on its behalf, by issuing the name certificate
c1, and sets up a group (kA hotelBrokers), to book its hotel rooms, by issuing
the name certificate c2. A allows its brokers to delegate further their permission
for selling flights and booking hotels. The other principals in this scenario are
kB, kC , kD, kF , kS, kT and (kT employees). Note that kS is not only a hotel
broker for A, but also is an employee of another company which is identified by
public key kT . A also issues the following delegation certificates c3, c4, and c5.
Certificates c6, c7, and c8 are further delegations of the permissions that are orig-
inated by kA. Certificate c9 defines kS is a member of the group of principals,
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Figure 3.6: Initialization of certificates in distributed repositories
(kT employees).
c1 : (kA flightBrokers) −→ kC
c2 : (kA hotelBrokers) −→ kD
c3 : kA
T 〈kA sell〉=⇒ (kA flightBrokers)
T
c4 : kA
T 〈kA book〉=⇒ (kA hotelBrokers)
T
c5 : kA
T 〈kA sell〉=⇒ kB
T
c6 : kD
T 〈kA book〉=⇒ kS
F
c7 : kC
T 〈kA sell〉=⇒ kF
T
c8 : kF
T 〈kA sell〉=⇒ kS
F
c9 : (kT employee) −→ kS
Figure 3.6 depicts the initialization of each certificate in each local repository.
Assume that all certificates are valid for the period (15/04/2014, 17/04/2014).
For simplicity we omitted the validity period in defining the certificates. However,
the validity period can be added simply to the above delegation certificates. At
time (16/04/2014), kS (a hotel broker) requests kA for permission to book kA’s
hotel rooms and runs the certificate chain discovery algorithm for permission
〈kA book〉.
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The process is as follows:
In local repository of principal S
Step 1S. Remove the useless certificates: certificates c8
′
and c9
′
grant permission
〈kA sell〉, therefore are useless in discovering the certificate chain for per-
mission 〈kA book〉. The set of certificates that remains as a result of this
step is:
c
′
6 : kD
T 〈kA book〉=⇒ kS
F
Step 2S. Compute the reduction rules over the set of certificates in step 1S which
results in the following delegation statement:
kD
〈kA book〉
=⇒ kS
Step 3S. Collect the original version of certificate c6. The result of this step is the
following certificate if found and stored in the local repository of S:
kD
T 〈kA book〉=⇒ kS
F
In local repository of principal D:
Step 1D. Remove the useless certificates: all of the certificates in repository D are
related to granting permission 〈kA book〉. The set of certificates from this
step is:
c
′
2 : (kA hotel brokers) −→ kD
c
′
4 : kA
T 〈kA book〉=⇒ (kA hotel brokers)
T
c6 : kD
T 〈kA book〉=⇒ kS
F
Step 2D. Compute the reduction rules over the set of certificates in step 1D. Comput-
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ing the reduction rule 1 over certificates c2 and c4 results in the delegation
statement:
kA
〈kA book〉
=⇒ kD
Step 3D. Collect the original delegation certificates c2 and c4 from their issuers (kA).
The original version of these certificates will be sent to the local repository
of S.
kA
T 〈kA book〉=⇒ kD
T
In local repository of principal S
Step 4S. Set up a directed graph and do a Depth First Search to determine if there
is a path from kA to kS. The result of this step is as follows:
The DFS algorithm returns the path: kA, kD, kS. This shows that a cer-
tificate chain from kA to kS exists.
Step 5S. Produce the certificate chain: reconstruct and output the desired set of
certificates from the information computed in the previous steps, consisting
only of the input set of certificates. The resulting set of certificates to
present to the resource owner kA is as follows:
c2 : (kA hotel brokers) −→ kD
c4 : kA
T 〈kA book〉=⇒ (kA hotel brokers)
T
c6 : kD
〈kA book〉
=⇒ kS
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Therefore, the requester kS, signs an access request for 〈kA book〉, along with the
above set of certificates (result of step 5S) to the resource owner kA. In the next
chapter, we show how the policy engine determines that this set of certificates
complies with the security policy to grant a request.
3.6 Discussion
Signed permissions are an effective approach to avoiding ambiguity in permis-
sion names. We followed SDSI’s rationale for local names and introduced an
extension to SPKI/SDSI that uses localPermissions in order to provide support
signed permissions and thereby provide an authorization language that incorpo-
rates localPermission for subterfuge safe delegation. The logic supports truly
decentralized access control whereby a principal may define, without rely on any
central authority, its own permission locally and define a global orderings relative
to permissions in other name spaces. Typical trust management systems make the
implicit assumption that there exists a super security administrator that defines
the global unique permissions. Many existing trust management systems such
as PolicyMaker, KeyNote [46], SPKI/SDSI [43,60], RT [86], and secPAL [10] are
designed to specify arbitrary permissions. They assume unique and unambiguous
permission names are provided by using a global name provider’s services. For
example, X.509 [40] uses X.500 naming service, the KeyNote uses the Internet As-
signed Number Authority (IANA) [73]. In addition RT uses Application Domain
Specification Documents (ADSDs) [86] to ensure the globally unique naming.
Although, global name providers provide a unique interpretation for each name,
the administrators may still use arbitrary names to represent their own resources.
It depends on the expertise of the administrator who creates the permissions to
specify non ambiguous permissions. Moreover, we introduced a simple certificate
chain discovery algorithm that takes a set of certificates and returns a chain of
certificates if one exists.
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced and developed the concept of localPermission,
and introduced the SSTM framework to support subterfuge safe delegation of
permissions in open environments. SSTM follows SDSI’s rationale for choosing
arbitrary names for principals and proposes an extension to SPKI/SDSI in order
to provide support for signed permissions. An authorization language, SSAL, is
provided to support truly decentralized and subterfuge safe trust management. A
principal may define, without reference to any central authority, a permission in
its own name space and define the global ordering relation of its localPermission
with other permissions. Typical trust management systems make the implicit as-
sumption that there exists a super security authority that defines the permission
name space and ordering. In [87] a role-based distributed authorization language
is described that provides subterfuge-freedom by constraint delegation to per-
missions that have an associated "originating" public key. While effective, this
approach suffers the challenge of reliably referencing public keys and relies on a
globally-defined function to define permission relationships (corresponding to an
ordering). The FRM distributed policy management framework [88, 89] permits
principals to locally define their permissions and orderings, and while it does
permit a principal to define permission relationships with local policies of other
principals, it is limited to permission orderings that form tree hierarchies. FRM
also uses signed permissions to avoid subterfuge, but effectively relies on using
public key values/X.509 certificates as principal identifiers.
The proposed logic comprises 15 axioms in addition to the original six axioms
that describe SPKI/SDSI. 9 properties derived from these axioms provide some
degree of confidence in the logic. Finally, we introduced a simple certificate
chain discovery algorithm for SSTM. First, we addressed how to store certificates
in a distributed manner. Then, we used an efficient algorithm to discover the
certificate chain between a resource owner and the requester when certificates
are stored with distributed principals. It has been shown that a DFS algorithm
returns the chain if one exists.
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Ontology-Based Implementation
for SSTM
In this chapter, we demonstrate an ontology-based approach, SSALO, that was
introduced in [90]. SSALO represents the SSAL using a Description Logic (DL)
[91] subset of the Web Ontology Language [92] (OWL-DL), and Semantic Web
Rule Language (SWRL) [93]. SSALO is used as the SSTM policy engine where
an incoming authorization request is evaluated by using a DL reasoner. Thus,
the implementation provides a trust engine that enforces subterfuge-safe access
to the protected resources of distributed parties. SSALO also provides a common
domain model for integration of heterogeneous security policies. This approach
is useful for secure cooperation and interoperability among principals in open
environments, where each principal may have a different security policy with
different implementation. We discuss the characteristics of SSALO in capturing
SSAL and providing a framework for secure, automatic and dynamic integration
of heterogeneous security policies specified by distributed principals in different
domains. We employ various tools such as Protégé [94], Pellet [95], the Java
programming language [96], and Jena framework [97] to implement our model.
This chapter is organized as follows: first we give the preliminaries in section
4.1, then we demonstrate the ontology model, SSALO in section 4.2. We later
show how SSALO is used for integration of heterogeneous policies that may be
implemented in different languages with different techniques. An example of us-
ing SSALO as policy engine is given. The work is then discussed in terms of its
characteristics for automatic integration of locally defined policies to capture sub-
terfuge safe trust management for cooperation of principals in open environments.
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Finally, we summarize the chapter in section 4.3.
4.1 Preliminaries
4.1.1 Definition of Ontology
The term Ontology is borrowed from philosophy where ontology means a sys-
tematic account of existence [98]. An ontology deals with questions concerning
what entities exist or can be said to exist, and how such entities can be grouped,
related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differ-
ences. Ontology as "an explicit specification of a conceptualization" is its first
definition in the context of computer science and information systems, defined by
Gruber [99]. A more formal definition of ontology used by many researchers in
the field [100–103], is as follows:
"An ontology is a formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptualization" [99]
Sharing of knowledge is one of the more common goals in developing ontolo-
gies. This facilitates organizations, programs, and humans to share and reuse
knowledge. A conceptualization is an abstract model that consists of the relevant
concepts and relationships that one wishes to represent for some purpose [104].
There must be a general accepted conceptualization of the specifications to be able
to reuse the ontology by a community who have an interest in the corresponding
knowledge. The core of an ontology is conceptualization which consists of the con-
cepts, for example: General Practitioner, Patient, Disease; and the relationships
that are assumed to be relevant to the concepts, for example: "General Practi-
tioner visits Patients", "Patient has Disease". Without conceptualization words
have no precise semantics where the word "Patient" has two different meaning
as a noun or adjective. Ontologies can be used for a range of applications such as
information retrieval [105–107], and information integration [108–112]. In recent
years, the use of ontologies for computer security, especially in the area of informa-
tion security [113,114], access control [115–127], and trust management [128–133]
has increased significantly.
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4.1.2 Ontology Languages and Reasoning Tools
We describe the ontology languages and reasoning tools that we used in modelling
SSALO. A sub-piece of the web ontology language that is based on description
logics is called OWL-DL and is used to model the knowledge base for SSALO.
SWRL is used for expressing a set of axioms introduced in SSAL. A DL reasoner
is used for classification, realization and consistency checking of the knowledge
base. The reasoning tool is also used to reason over the asserted knowledge and
for inferring new knowledge.
Web Ontology Language
An ontology language is a formal language used to construct semantics for terms
and syntax. OWL is a World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) recommendation to
express meanings and semantics of an existing entity. OWL includes the definition
of three variants with different levels of expressiveness as OWL-Lite, OWL-DL,
and OWL-Full. The OWL-DL language is most closely related to the SHOIN(D)
description logic [134]. In SHOIN(D), S stands for ALC (Attributive Concept
Language) [135] plus role transitivity, H stands for role hierarchy, O stands for
nominals, I stands for inverse role, N stands for cardinality restrictions, and D
stands for data types. In order to encode knowledge in OWL-DL, an understand-
ing of the constructors for SHOIN(D) is necessary. This is given in the following
sections.
Description Logic
The Description Logic (DL) [91] is a decidable fragment of First Order Logic
(FOL) [136] and constitutes the formal basis for OWL-DL, a very expressive and
yet decidable subspecies of OWL. Building an ontology requires the use of a logic
as a means of axiomatizing [137]. Description Logics (DLs) [91] are a family
of concept based knowledge representation formalisms. They are characterized
by the use of constructors to describe complex concepts and relations among
concept instances which form a decidable subset of First Order Logic (FOL)
[136]. This decidability is very convenient for reasoning about ontologies. FOL
is not decidable, which means that it is not possible to know in advance the
validity of a formula and the computation can run forever without giving an
answer [138]. However, although the DLs have some limitations in expressiveness
Subterfuge-Safe Trust Management for
Delegation of Permissions in Open
Environments
74 Seyedehsamane Abdigarmestani
(Samane Abdi)
4. Ontology-Based Implementation
for SSTM 4.1 Preliminaries
such as the absence of variables, they ensure decidability. Knowledge in DLs is
represented in a hierarchical structure of concepts (or classes). These concepts
are defined in terms of some specified properties (or roles) that individuals must
satisfy in order to belong to those concepts. In other words, concepts represent
sets of instances, and properties represent binary relations between instances.
Making an individual, an instance of a concept, is called instantiation [139].
Concepts are either atomic (those identified by a name) or complex (those derived
from atomic concepts using a set of constructors). DL basics include Concepts
(unary predicates, corresponding to classes in OWL ), Roles (binary predicates,
corresponding to properties in OWL), Individuals (constants, corresponding to
instances in OWL), and Operators (corresponding to constraints in OWL).
A DL-based ontology consists of a set of terminological axioms (called TBox) and
assertional axioms (called ABox). Concepts and properties are separated from
instances by partitioning the knowledge base into the TBox and the ABox. The
TBox is constructed through declarations that describe properties for concepts.
The ABox contains extensional knowledge that is specific to instances of concepts
of the domain of interest.
Constructors Description logic can be used to represent much more than just
concepts, properties and instances. A description logic also offers a formal syntax
which specifies how to construct well formed statements. It also provides formal
semantics for relating those statements to a model. Statements are formulas to
represent concepts, properties, and instances. Thus, the constructors are used to
derive well formed formulas. SHOIN(D) as a family of DLs uses several kinds of
constructors and axioms. These constructors and axioms allow building complex
concepts and property relationships from atomic concepts, and atomic properties.
Note that, atomic concepts correspond to the unary predicates in FOL, atomic
properties correspond to the binary predicates in FOL. An OWL-DL knowledge
model consists of the Tbox and the Abox; where Tbox contains axioms relating
to concepts and properties, while the ABox contains axioms relating to individ-
uals. Both ABox and TBox utilize a comprehensive set of constructors (such as
intersection, union, universal quantifier, or existential quantifier) to derive well
formed formulas. The following constructors are used in this thesis.
Intersection (⊓): It is interpreted as the intersection of sets of individuals.
For example, the intersection of concepts Patient and Doctors is expressed as the
Subterfuge-Safe Trust Management for
Delegation of Permissions in Open
Environments
75 Seyedehsamane Abdigarmestani
(Samane Abdi)
4. Ontology-Based Implementation
for SSTM 4.1 Preliminaries
following:
P atient ⊓Doctors
This denotes those instances of concept Patient that are shared with concept
Doctors.
Union (⊔): It is interpreted as the union of sets of individuals:
P atient ⊔Doctors
This denotes those individuals that belongs to either concept Patient or Doctors.
Existential quantifier (∃): Constrains those individuals that have a relation-
ship to instances of some concept. The following expression:
∃visits.Doctors
is the set of individuals, each of which has the property relation visits to some
instances of concept Doctors.
Universal quantifier(∀): Constrains those individuals that have a relationship
to only instances of some concept. The following expression:
∀hasP atient.P atient
is the set of individuals that have the relationship via hasPatient property to
only instances of concept Patient. Note that, universal quantification does not
ensure that there will be a property that satisfies the condition, but it guarantees
that if there is such a property, its range has to be constrained to the given
concept or type. In the table 4.1, we list some of very common constructors in
SHOIN(D), their notations, and their semantics as they are used in the ontology.
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Table 4.1: Concrete syntax of DL constructors
Constructor DL Syntax Example
Intersection C1 ⊓ ... ⊓ Cn Patient ⊓ Doctors
Union C1 ⊔ ... ⊔ Cn Patient ⊔ Doctors
Complement ¬C ¬ Patient
Universal quantifier ∀P.C ∀ hasPatient.Patient
Existential quantifier ∃P.C ∃ visits.Doctors
MaxCardinality ≤n P ≤1 hasPatient
MinCardinality ≥n P ≥1 hasDoctor
ExactCardinality =n P =1 patientRoom
Notation: C and D are concepts, P is property.
Table 4.2: A comparison of SHOIN(D) and OWL-DL constructors
Constructor SHOIN(D) OWL-DL
Intersection C1 ⊓ C2 intersectionOf(C1, C2)
Union C1 ⊔ C2 unionOf(C1, C2)
Complement ¬C complementOf(C)
Universal quantifier ∀P.C allValuesFrom(C) on Property(P )
Existential quantifier ∃P.C someValuesFrom(C) on Property(P )
MaxCardinality ≤n P maxCardinality(n) on Property(P )
MinCardinality ≥n P minCardinality(n) on Property(P )
ExactCardinality =n P exactCardinality(n) on Property(P )
In addition, the OWL-DL constructors along with the corresponding SHOIN(D)
constructors, are listed in the table 4.2.
Description Logic Axioms Axioms in an OWL- DL ontology can be classified
according to the knowledge they describe as TBox entities or ABox entities. A
description logic knowledge base KB may be defined as the tuple consisting of a
TBox T and an ABox A. KB = (T, A), where T is the union of the set of concepts
with the set of property relations in the domain, and A is the set of individuals
in the domain. Furthermore, the TBox also contains axioms relating to concepts
and properties, while the ABox contains axioms relating to individuals. Based
on this categorization various DL axioms will be explained in the following.
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Terminological Axioms Terminological axioms are statements related to
TBox entities as concepts and properties, but not individuals. These axioms
can be classified as either inclusion or equality axioms.
Inclusion An inclusion (⊑) states a necessary but not sufficient condition for
being an instance of some concept. The first type of inclusion is simply a concept
inclusion. The inclusion statement C ⊑ D is interpreted that for a TBox entity
to be included in the concept C, it is necessary to have the condition D. However
this condition D alone is not sufficient to conclude that the individual (or any
object) is in the concept C. In other words, if a random TBox entity satisfies
condition D, it does not necessarily belong to the concept C. An example of this
kind of axiom is:
Surgeon ⊑ (Doctors ⊓ Consultant)
where an individual who is a doctor and a consultant, is not necessarily a surgeon.
The second type of inclusion axiom is the specialization, which has the abstract
form C ⊑ A. This is similar syntax to that of the inclusion axioms, but the
right hand side of a specialization must be atomic (hence A). It indicates that
having properties of concept C is necessary for an entity in order to be included
in concept A. An example of specialization is:
P atient ⊑ isRegisteredWith.GP
A specialization axiom is useful when some concepts cannot be defined com-
pletely. The third type of inclusion is taxonomy. Concepts can be organized as a
hierarchy which is also known as a taxonomy. A concept can have sub-concepts
that represent the concepts that are more specific than the super-concept. For
example, the concept Doctors has the sub-concepts GP and Surgeon.
GP ⊑ Doctors
Surgeon ⊑ Doctors
Being a member of concept GP or Surgeon implies membership of its super-
concept Doctors. In addition, either GP or Surgeon membership constraints will
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Figure 4.1: Concept hierarchy
be inherited from their super-concept Doctors. Concept inclusion axioms are very
important in the structure of the knowledge base as they are used to generate
a taxonomy from a set of assertions in a TBox. Figure 4.1 depicts the concept
hierarchy.
Equation A concept equation of the form (C ≡ D) states necessary and suf-
ficient conditions that a TBox entity must hold in order for it to be included in
some concept. By including sufficient conditions, then any random TBox entity
that satisfies conditions D must be included in concept C. An example of this
kind of axiom is:
Doctors ≡ hasP atient.P atient
This states that an individual is a member of concept Doctors if and only if it has
the property relation hasPatient to members of concept Patient. Furthermore,
this axiom is a concept definition. A special kind of equation is a concept definition
of the form A ≡ C where the left hand side is an atomic concept. A concept
definition states the necessary and sufficient conditions that must hold in order
for a TBox entity to be included in some other concept. Having property C is
necessary and sufficient for a TBox entity to be included in concept A. Another
form of concept equation is a covering axiom that will be discussed later.
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Assertional Axiom Assertional axioms are statements related to ABox en-
tities. These axioms can be classified as either concept assertion or property
assertion axioms. A concept assertion is of the form C(i), where C is some con-
cept from the TBox and i is an individual, representing i as an instance of concept
C. An example is:
Doctors(DrAlice)
A property assertion is of the form P(i,j), where P is some property from the
TBox and i and j are individuals; where P(i,j) means that individual i has a
P relation to individual j. An example of a property assertion axiom is given in
the following:
hasP atient(DrAlice,Bob)
Modelling in OWL-DL
OWL-DL supports those users who want the maximum expressiveness while re-
taining computational completeness (all conclusions are guaranteed to be com-
putable) and decidability (all computations will be finished in finite time). OWL-
DL includes all OWL language constructs, but they can be used only under certain
restrictions of DLs. For instance, while a concept may be a sub-concept of many
concepts, a concept cannot be an instance of another concept.
Concept Concepts are sets of instances that are described using formal descrip-
tions. The formal description specifies the conditions and requirements that must
be satisfied by an individual to be a member of a concept. Being an instance of a
concept includes either explicitly asserting an individual as an instance of a con-
cept or implicitly inferring an instance as a result of reasoning over the asserted
knowledge (for example, subsumption constraints) [140]. There is a general built-
in concept named Thing which includes all individuals and is the super-concept
of all concepts. We may choose to make a new sub-concept of the concept Thing
named Doctors. We may also create a new concept named Surgeon that is a
sub-concept of Doctors. From this, a reasoner can deduce that any instance of
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Figure 4.2: Example of concept membership
the concept Surgeon is also an instance of the concept Doctors. Note that there
is no limitation on cycle creation in sub-concept hierarchies. For example, the
following is an instance assertion for concept Surgeon.
Surgeon(DrAlice)
Moreover, the following DL notation is the result of reasoning over the subsump-
tion constraint that infers DrAlice as the instance of concept Doctors.
Doctors(DrAlice)
Figure 4.2 is an example of concept membership.
Property Properties are binary relations that instances of concepts can have
between one another. For example, the property hasPatient might link the in-
stance DrAlice of concept Doctors to the instance Bob of concept Patient as:
hasP atient(DrAlice,Bob)
Each property can have an inverse which provides an inverse of a given relation.
For example, the property hasPatient relates the instances of concept Doctors
to the instances of concept Patient. The inverse of the hasPatient property can
be the hasDoctor property which relates the instances of concept Patient to the
instances of concept Doctors. This is shown in the following:
hasP atient ≡ hasDoctor−
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Figure 4.3: Set of individuals
Individual A concept can be instantiated by individuals. The instantiation of
concepts with individuals makes an individual be an instance of some concepts.
Properties may also be used to relate one individual to another. For example, an
individual named Bob may be described as an instance of the concept Patient and
the property hasDoctor may be used to relate the individual Bob to the individual
DrAlice. Figure 4.3 illustrates individuals.
In this thesis, concepts and properties are written in italic font; a Concept begins
with an Upper case letter and a property begins with a lower case letter. Note
that instances are written in a lower case typewriter font.
Domain and Range It is possible to add domain and range restrictions to
properties thereby restricting a given property to taking particular concepts as
its domain and particular concepts as its range. Therefore, by defining a domain
restriction for a property, the former individual specified with that property is
assumed to belong to the concept(s) specified in the property domain. Fur-
thermore, the latter individual specified with that property must belong to the
specified range concept. For example, the following DL fragment limits the do-
main and range of property hasPatient to only the instances of concept Doctors
(as domain) and Patient (as range).
Doctors ⊑ hasP atient.P atient
Open World Assumption Open World Assumption (OWA) is the opposite of
Closed World Assumption (CWA). The Closed World Assumption (CWA) is the
assumption that what is not known to be true must be false. On the other hand,
OWA is the assumption that what is not known to be true is simply unknown.
For example, consider the following statement: “Bob is a patient". Now, what
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if we were to ask “Is Bob a doctor?" Under a CWA, the answer is "no". Under
the OWA, the answer is "it is not known". The CWA applies when a system has
complete information. CWA is the logical basis for traditional database systems.
OWA applies when a system has incomplete information. This is the case when we
want to represent knowledge and discover new information. In the knowledge base
(ontology) absence of information means that the information has not been made
explicit and further knowledge may make it explicit. Hence, OWA is an essential
aspect of knowledge base systems. Some of the OWA closures in description logic
are: disjointness, unique name assumption, covering and closure axioms.
Disjointness In DLs, not asserting an individual as an instance of a certain
concept does not mean it is not an instance of that concept. It must be asserted
that two concepts do not share any instances. This relation between concepts is
called disjoint concepts. For example, consider the concept GP versus concept
Surgeon. These two concepts may never share individuals since a given general
practitioner (GP) can never be interpreted as a surgeon, i.e.
GP ⊓ Surgeon ≡ ⊥
where the bottom concept ⊥ is the special concept with no individuals as in-
stances. The above axiom thus says that the intersection of the two concepts GP
and Surgeon is empty.
Covering Axioms In addition to disjointness, it is important to consider
whether some set of sub-concepts fully covers the super-concepts. The Open
World Assumption makes it possible that being instances of a super-concept
without being also instances of its sub-concept. Figure 4.4 indicates that the
super-concept Doctors may have other instances that are not an instance of its
sub-concepts GP and Surgeon.
However, by defining covering axioms, it is necessary to explicitly state if an
individual is an instance of a super-concept, then it must be an instance of at
least one of its sub-concepts. Moreover, if the sub-concepts are defined as disjoint
concepts then an instance of the super-concept must be an instance of one of its
sub-concepts. Figure 4.5 illustrates the covering axiom for concept Doctors and
its sub-concepts GP and Surgeon that are disjoint with each other. The following
DL assertion defines a covering axiom for concept Doctors that guarantees it will
only have two sub-concepts.
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Figure 4.4: OWA without covering axiom
Figure 4.5: OWA considering covering axiom
Doctors ≡ GP ⊔ Surgeon
Closure Axiom Remembering the Open World Assumption, we need to define
a closure axiom if we want to restrict the possibility of further additions for a
given property. For example, the following fragment of DL assertion represents
the closure axiom on the hasDoctor property for the concept Patient :
P atient ⊑ ∃=1hasDoctor.Doctors
where the existential quantifier (∃) acts on the property hasDoctor having the
concept Doctors as property range. This closure states that to be an instance of
concept Patient, an individual must have exactly one hasDoctor property relation
to the instances of concept Doctors.
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Unique Name Assumption The Unique Name Assumption (UNA) refers
to a case where if two individuals have different names they are, by default,
different. DLs do not usually make the Unique Name Assumption, and indeed
our formal definition allows two individual names to be interpreted as the same
individual. Therefore, we have to make it explicit whether two names denote the
same or distinct individuals. For example, an instance of concept Patients, say
Bob may have only one relationship to exactly one instance of concept Doctors
with property hasDoctor. Assuming individuals DrAlice and DrClare are both
inferred as instances of concept Doctors, we can have the following individual
instantiation:
P atient (Bob)←−hasDoctor(Bob, DrAlice)⊓
hasDoctor(Bob, DrClare)
DrAlice and DrClare must be explicitly asserted as distinct individuals. Other-
wise, the cardinality restriction will consider the individuals DrAlice and DrClare
as the same individuals. Moreover, if the individuals DrAlice and DrClare have
been asserted as distinct individuals, the above instantiation would be inconsis-
tent, since Bob must have the hasDoctor relationship to exactly one instance of
concept Doctors.
Reasoning in Description Logic
The term reasoning refers to automatic inference of further implicit facts from
explicitly asserted statements within the ontology. An ontology contains knowl-
edge as structured data. The users of an ontology are typically interested in
obtaining information about relationships between concepts described in the on-
tology and querying about the knowledge existing in the ontology. Both tasks
require reasoning tools; tools that can derive new knowledge from the ontology’s
explicit knowledge. A DL reasoner provides a set of description logic inference ser-
vices such as Consistency checking, Classification and Concept satisfiability [95].
Consistency checking ensures that the ontology model does not contain any con-
tradictory facts. For example, given individual DrAlice is an instance of concept
Surgeon, it can be easily inferred that DrAlice is an instance of concept Doctors
if one can Figure out that the concept Doctors subsumes the concept Surgeon.
Classification refers to creating a concept hierarchy by computing the subsump-
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tion relations. By reasoning over an ontology a new concept or individual can be
assigned automatically to the correct taxonomy classification. Concept satisfia-
bility refers to the possibility for a concept to have some instances. If a concept
is un-satisfiable, then creating an instance of that concept causes the entire on-
tology to become inconsistent. A knowledge base modelled in OWL-DL can be
reasoned over by a DL reasoner such as Pellet [95].
Semantic Web Rule Language
The Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) [93, 141] is a rule language that ex-
tends the semantic information described in an OWL (consequently in an OWL-
DL) ontology. Since some policy rules may not be expressed in OWL-DL, there-
fore, we use SWRL. SWRL is based on a combination of the OWL-DL sub-
language of the Web Ontology Language and the Unary/Binary Datalog RuleML
sub-language of the Rule Mark up Language [142]. It includes a high-level ab-
stract syntax for Horn-like rules in OWL, that enables extra knowledge express-
ibility and the use of decidability tools (www.w3c.org). SWRL is based on OWL
and all rules are expressed in terms of OWL entities as concepts, properties, in-
dividuals, literals and so on. SWRL allows one to write rules expressed in terms
of OWL concepts and properties. The rules can be used to infer new knowledge
from existing OWL knowledge bases. A SWRL rule syntax is as follow:
(a1 ∧ ... ∧ an) −→ b
where ai (i = 1..n) is an antecedent; and b is a consequence, which both consist of
one or more atoms [141]. The conjunction constructor ∧ is interpreted as "and".
Atoms (ai (i = 1..n), and b) can be of the form:
• C(i), where i is an instance of concept C.
• p(i, j), where instance i is related to instance j via the object property p.
• sameAs(i,j), where determines two instances i and j are interpreted as the
same instances.
• differentFrom(i,j), where determines the two instances i and j are not the
same instances.
• Built-in(b, a1, ..., an), represents a Built-in specification b is satisfied if a
set of data type variables or data type values a1, ..., an within a particular
Subterfuge-Safe Trust Management for
Delegation of Permissions in Open
Environments
86 Seyedehsamane Abdigarmestani
(Samane Abdi)
4. Ontology-Based Implementation
for SSTM 4.1 Preliminaries
built-in are true.
• D(a), where a is an instance of data type D.
• u(i, a), where instance i is related to data type variable or data type value
a via the data type property u.
i and j represent object variables or individuals. It is denoted with a "?" prefix
or typewriter font, respectively.
The SWRL antecedent is satisfied, if it is empty (trivially true) or every atom of
it is satisfied. The SWRL atom in the consequent is satisfied if it is not empty
and atoms in the antecedent are satisfied. For example, a SWRL rule to express
that all surgeons (expressed by variable ?d) in OWL-DL are to be inferred as
both being a doctor and a PhD, can be expressed with the following assertion:
Doctors(?d) ∧ P hD(?d)
−→ Surgeon(?d)
It is possible to express some rules using only DLs depending on the number
of variables shared between consequent and antecedent. However in practice,
SWRL rules are used to express what is not expressible in DL (when two or more
variables are shared between antecedent and consequent).
Modelling in Semantic Web Rule Language The SWRL language includes
support for user-defined built-ins that are common to most programming and
scripting languages [140,143]. SWRL built-ins are predicates that accept several
arguments. All built-ins in SWRL must be preceded by the namespace quali-
fier"swrlb:". SWRL built-ins are categorized as: comparison operators, mathe-
matical operators, boolean values, strings, date, time, URIs, TBox, Abox, and
list operators [143,144]. Using built-ins will provide the flexibility for expressing
complex rules. The following SWRL rule:
Doctors(?d) ∧ numberOfP atient(?d, ?n) ∧ swrlb : lessThanOrEqual(?n, 50)
−→ GP (?d)
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states that any Doctors(?d) that has a a number of patients (?n) less than or
equal to 50 (swrlb :lessThanOrEqual) is to be classified as an instance of the GP
concept. SWRL supports the Open World Assumption. This means that the
SWRL does not support negation as failure, cardinality restrictions, and Unique
Name Assumption. It supports sameAs and differentFrom clauses. sameAs atom
can determine if two individuals are the same individual. Similarly, the different-
From atom can be used to express that two individuals are not the same. In the
following, we explain these in some concrete examples (Note that, invalid SWRL
syntax is denoted between the "<" and ">" symbols):
Example1 With SWRL, it is not possible to retract or remove facts from an
ontology. The following SWRL rule states that any doctor, ?d, having a greater
than or equal to 50 patients will have the range of the property isRegisteredDoctor
set to true.
Doctors(?d) ∧ numberOfP atient(?d, ?n)∧
swrlb : greaterThanOrEqual(?n, 50)
−→ isRegisteredDoctor(?d, true)
However, careful consideration is needed when adding new facts to the ontology
as these new facts may conflict with existing facts. For example, if a doctor for
whatever reason had its isRegisteredDoctor property previously initialized with
a relationship to the individual false, then that doctor may result in the isReg-
isteredDoctor property having both boolean values. As the isRegisteredDoctor
is intended to be functional, the DL reasoner will indicate an inconsistency with
the newly added facts inferred by SWRL inferencing.
Example 3 Negation as failure is not supported by SWRL. This is because
previously unknown facts yet to be discovered may invalidate a SWRL rule’s
conclusion. For example, it is not possible to state that individuals of concept
Doctors, not being an instance of concept Surgeon, should be classified as in-
stances of concept GP.
Doctors(?d)∧ < not Surgeon >
−→ GP (?d)
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Example 4 Both differentFrom and sameAs clauses are used by SWRL rules to
determine whether individuals that are identified by different names are in fact the
same individual or distinct individuals. These clauses are used in association with
DL axioms that define a particular set of individuals to be mutually distinct or
refer to the same individual. For example, stating that two independent instances
of concept Patient which have the same disease belong to the same department
(sameDept property relationship), requires explicitly defining both instances to
be distinct (differentFrom). This is represented by the following SWRL rule.
P atient(?p1) ∧ P atient(?p2) ∧ differentFrom(?p1, ?p2)∧
hasDisease(?p1, ?ds1) ∧ hasDisease(?p2, ?ds2)∧
swrlb : equal(?ds1, ?ds2)
−→ sameDept(?p1, ?p2)
Semantic Query-Enhanced Web Rule Language
Semantic Query-Enhanced Web Rule Language (SQWRL) [145] is an expressive
OWL query language that uses the SWRL semantics and serialization and sup-
ports comprehensive querying of OWL, and is defined based on the SWRL for
retrieving knowledge from OWL [145, 146]. It takes a SWRL rule antecedent
as a pattern specification for a query and replaces the consequent with a re-
trieval specification. For example, the most common SQWRL consequent is the
sqwrl:select operator, which takes one or more arguments (variables) that cor-
respond to those already specified in the antecedent. It builds a table where
arguments form columns of the table and the retrieval knowledge corresponding
to the arguments form each row. SQWRL queries can operate in conjunction
with SWRL rules in an ontology and can be used to retrieve knowledge inferred
by those rules. Note, all valid SWRL rule antecedent built-ins are valid within
SQWRL. SQWRL queries do not modify the knowledge within the ontology. The
following SQWRL query returns pairs of doctors and their associated patients :
Doctors(?d) ∧ hasP atient(?d, ?p)
−→ sqwrl : select(?d, ?p)
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SQWRL built-ins include basic counting (sqwrl:count) and aggregation
(sqwrl:min, sqwrl:max, sqwrl:sum, sqwrl:avg). These built-ins operate on the
query results and not on the underlying ontology. The sqwrl:count built-in, for
example, keeps track of the number of relevant items matched in a query, not the
number of such items in the ontology being queried. Similar to SWRL, the open
world assumption and the unique name assumption are supported in SQWRL.
SQWRL queries can also operate in conjunction with SWRL rules to retrieve
knowledge inferred by those rules. These inferences can be used by other rules
and queries. In addition to the query functionality, queries with more complex
closure requirements can not be expressed using these built-ins. For example,
queries with negation as failure, complex aggregation, or disjunction are not ex-
pressible. The set operators are added to support these requirements. These op-
erators include sqwrl:makeSet, sqwrl:groupBy, sqwrl:union, sqwrl:difference, and
sqwrl:intersection.
4.1.3 Methodology
Building an ontology is essentially a three stage process. First, design the TBox
for the knowledge base; second, populate the ABox with individuals; and third,
relate TBox and ABox. Below lists these steps specifically for building an ontol-
ogy.
1. Design the TBox for the knowledge base. a TBox consists of Concepts,
Properties, and Individuals.
1.1 Classify entities as concept, property, or individual.
1.2 Add concepts to TBox.
1.2.1 Declare atomic concepts.
1.2.2 Define non-atomic (constructed) concepts.
1.2.3 Create concept taxonomy.
1.2.4 Partition the concept taxonomy.
1.3 Add properties to TBox.
1.3.1 Declare transitive and symmetric properties.
1.3.2 Declare inverse properties.
1.3.3 Declare functional properties.
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1.3.4 Add domain and range restrictions to properties.
1.3.5 Add cardinality restrictions to properties.
1.4 Add other axioms to further refine concepts and properties.
2 Populate the ABox with individuals.
2.1 Enumerate and classify each individual according to available concepts.
2.2 Relate individuals via available properties in the ontology.
3 Relate TBox and ABox.
3.1 Create enumerated concepts.
3.1 Relate individuals to concepts via properties.
The details of designing TBox, ABox, and relating them will be showed in next
section.
4.2 SSALO
The Subterfuge Safe Authorization Language (SSAL) was introduced in chapter 3
as a policy language with the purpose of subterfuge safe delegation of permissions
among principals [147]. In addition to the design of SSAL for trust management,
it is also important to capture a common vocabulary that is understandable by
different distributed principals. Having a common vocabulary allows information
sharing and reuse, and therefore facilitates integration of security policies defined
by individual principles for access to their own resources. Using an ontology facili-
tates sharing and reuse of knowledge and interoperability in the domain of security
policies. For a policy language, the ontology can express the policy statements
and certificates in a conceptual way. In addition, the ontology provides a common
vocabulary for integration of heterogeneous policies defined by different principles
in distributed environments. In this section, we demonstrate an ontology-based
approach that implements SSAL as well as allowing integration of heterogeneous
security policies for subterfuge safe trust management. This approach, SSALO,
represents SSAL using OWL-DL and SWRL. This implementation provides a
policy engine that enforces subterfuge safe authorization of requests for accessing
the protected resources of distributed principals. SSALO also provides a common
domain model for integration of heterogeneous security policies. This approach is
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useful for secure cooperation and interoperability among principals in open envi-
ronments (such as coalitions) where each principal may have a different security
policy and different implementation. We discuss the characteristics of SSALO in
capturing SSAL and providing a framework for secure and dynamic integration
of heterogeneous security policies specified by distributed principals in different
domains. We employ various tools such as Protégé, Pellet, the Java programming
language, Eclipse workbench (www.eclipse.org), and Jena framework to imple-
ment our model.
The objective of this section is to develop an ontology for SSAL, with which to
reason about a set of assertions and SSAL rules. An ontology-based approach
models the SSAL policy language using the OWL-DL [92] and the Protégé [94]
knowledge-modelling tool. This section is a revised and extended version of the
work presented in [90]. SSALO is intended to be used as a policy engine. To build
the SSALO, we follow the methodology described in section 4.1.3 which consists
of designing the TBox, filling the ABox with individuals, and relating TBox and
ABox. Figure 4.6 depicts an overview of the SSALO.
4.2.1 Design the TBox for SSALO
SSALO includes five concepts as: Principal, Key, LocalName, LocalPermission
and Delegation. It also includes sixteen object properties: asAuthAs, delegates-
Permission, hasDelegator, hasDelegatee, hasNameSpace, hasOriginator, holds,
isHeld, speaksFor, isSpokenBy, isAccountable, isAccountableBy, impliesTarget,
impliesAction, hasTarget, and hasAction. The property isHeldBy is the inverse
of property holds, property speaksFor is the inverse of property isSpokenBy, and
the property isAccountable is the inverse of property isAccountableBy. In addi-
tion, SSALO includes a data type (string) property: hasName. All these concepts
and properties correspond to the entities in SSAL. For instance, the speaksFor,
asAuthAs OWL properties correspond to the "speaks for" relationships among
the principals, and "no less authoritative than" ordering relationship among lo-
calPermissions introduced in SSAL, respectively. In the following, we define the
concepts using property definitions. The constructor (∀) is a value restriction
which all values of a property for instances of a concept must belong to the spec-
ified concept or data type. The constructor (∃) is an existential quantifier that
restricts those individuals which have a relationship to instances of a concept. The
constructor (⊔) is interpreted as a union of sets of individuals and the constructor
(⊓) is interpreted as the intersection of sets of individuals. Inclusion (⊑) states
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a necessary but not sufficient condition for being an instance of a concept, and
equality (≡) states necessary and sufficient conditions that an individual must
hold in order for it to be included in a concept. The cardinality restriction (=,>)
specifies the intended number of relationships that an individual must have for a
given property.
Concept: Principal
This concept models the principal entity which was defined in the SSAL domain.
A principal is identified by either its public key or local name. The concept
Principal subsumes two sub-concepts as LocalName and Key; where an instance
p is a member of concept Principal if and only if it is an instance of either
LocalName or Key. This concept is expressed with the following restrictions:
P rincipal ≡ (LocalName ⊔Key)
From this definition we do not know whether an individual which is a local name
is also a public key or not. We can specify that any individual that is a local
name is not a public key and vice-versa. That is, the set of public keys and the
set of local names are disjoint in the following way:
(LocalName ⊓Key) ⊑ ⊥
This states that the set formed by the intersection of concepts LocalName and
Key will always be empty. An instance for example, KA, belongs to Principal
concept if and only if it belongs to either concept Key or LocalName. Similary,
KA belongs to concept Key and concept Principal, if and only if it does not belong
to concept LocalName. Figure 4.7 gives an overview of concept Principal.
Concept: LocalName
A local name is an arbitrary name N that principal P (identified by its public
key) chooses for principal Q in its name space. Principal P refers to principal Q
in its name space as N and uses the speaks for relation to link the local name to
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principal Q. It means that any statement that is signed by Q can be viewed as
originating from N in the name space of P . The concept LocalName, subsumed by
concept Principal and disjoint with concept Key, is the conceptualization of the
local name entity described in SSAL. This concept is expressed by the following
restrictions:
LocalName ⊑ P rincipal ⊓
∃ isSpokenBy.P rincipal ⊓
∃=1hasNameSpace.P rincipal ⊓
∃=1hasName.string
This expresses that the concept LocalName is a sub-concept of concept Principal.
An individual belongs to the concept LocalName if it has the object property
relation isSpokenBy (corresponding to the inverse of speaks for relation in SSAL)
to at least one instance of the concept Principal. Similarly, the individual must
have the object property relation hasNameSpace to exactly one instance of con-
cept Principal (either an instance of concept Key or LocalName), and have data
type property relation of hasName to string type. For example, an instance say,
kBAlice belongs to concept LocalName if it has the object property relation is-
SpokenBy to at least one instance of concept Principal such as kA. Similarly,
kBAlice belongs to the concept LocalName if it has the object property relation
of hasNameSpace to exactly one instance of concept Principal (either an instance
of concept Key or LocalName, in this example kB), and has data type property
relation of hasName to string Alice. The individual KBAlice as an instance of
concept LocalName is defined as the following:
LocalName(kBAlice)←−hasNameSpace(kBAlice,kB)⊓
hasName(kBAlice,Alice)⊓
isSpokenBy(KBAlice,kA)
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Concept: Key
The conceptKey, a sub-concept of Principal and disjoint with concept LocalName,
models the public key entity described in SSAL as the global unique identifiers
for principals. This concept is captured in SSALO with the following constraint:
Key ⊑ P rincipal
which states that the concept Key is subsumed by concept Principal. This sub-
sumption is valid if all instances of concept Key are necessarily instances of con-
cept Principal.
Concept: LocalPermission
Each principal chooses a permission specification arbitrarily for its own resource
and binds that specification to its name space (identified by a public key or local
name). The concept of LocalPermission is defined to model the localPermission
introduced in chapter 3. The binding of a permission to its name space is captured
with the hasNameSpace property in SSALO. In addition, each permission must
be originated by a principal and this is captured in SSALO with the isHeldBy
property. There is always an ordering relationship (either implicitly or explicitly)
among permissions in local policies defined by principals. The localPermission or-
dering relationship "no less authoritative than" is represented using the asAuthAs
relation in the ontology where the statement asAuthAs(Y,X) indicates that per-
mission Y is no less authoritative than permission X. The following necessary
and sufficient condition restricts an individual to be included as an instance of
this concept. This concept is defined with the following necessary condition that
an individual must hold to be included in concept LocalPermission:
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LocalP ermission ≡
∃=1hasNameSpace.P rincipal ⊓
∃>1isHeldBy.P rincipal ⊓
∃>1isAccountableBy.P rincipal ⊓
∀>0asAuthAs.LocalP ermission ⊓
∃≥1hasTarget.Target ⊓
∃≥1hasAction.Action
which states that an individual belongs to the concept LocalPermission if and
only if it has exactly one hasNameSpace relation to the instances of concept
Principal, has the property relation of isHeldBy to at least one instance of con-
cept Principal, and has the property relation of isAccountableBy to at least one
instance of concept Principal. Moreover, an instance of concept LocalPermis-
sion has binary relation of hasTarget to at least one instance of concept Target;
and has binary relation of hasAction to at least one instance of concept Action.
The constraint ∀>0asAuthAs.LocalP ermission states that all instances that have
asAuthAs property relation to instances of concept LocalPermission must belong
to the LocalPermission concept.
Concept: Target
The concept Target models the target element in a permission specification. Each
permission specifies access to a target or a resource. For example, there is a prop-
erty relation of hasTarget from instances of LocalPermission to concept Target.
Concept Target has no restriction in its definition in SSALO.
Concept: Action
Each permission specification specifies an action that can be performed on a
target or resource. The concept Action models the action element in a permission
specification. Each permission specifies the actions that can be carried out on
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a target or a resource. There is a property relation of hasAction from instances
of LocalPermission to concept Target. Concept Action has no restriction in its
definition in SSALO.
Concept: Delegation
A delegation statement indicates that the authority for a permission is delegated
from one principal to the other principal(s). An instance of Delegation concept
is defined with the following restrictions:
Delegation ≡ ∃=1hasDelegator.P rincipal ⊓
∃ hasDelegatee.P rincipal ⊓
∃ delegatesP ermission.LocalP ermisssion
These constraints state that an instance of a Delegation concept has property
relation hasDelegator to exactly one instance of concept Principal. This means
that the delegation statement is signed by only one principal called delegator.
Each instance of the Delegation concept has a hasDelegatee relation to at least one
instance of concept Principal. A delegation statement may state the delegation of
multiple permissions to multiple principals (delegatees). Therefore, an instance of
concept Delegation has the relation of delegatesPermission to at least one instance
of concept LocalPermission.
Properties in SSALO
Properties in SSALO are binary relations between instances of the concepts
in SSALO. SSALO includes sixteen object properties: asAuthAs, delegates-
Permission, hasDelegator, hasDelegatee, hasNameSpace, hasOriginator, holds,
isHeld, speaksFor, isSpokenBy, isAccountable, isAccountableBy, impliesTarget,
impliesAction, hasTarget, and hasAction. The property isHeldBy is the inverse of
property holds, property speaksFor is the inverse of property isSpokenBy, and the
property isAccountable is the inverse of property isAccountableBy. In addition,
it includes a data type (string) property: hasName. The domain and range for
each property is outlined in Table 4.3 .
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Table 4.3: Domain and range of properties in SSALO
Property Domain Range
asAuthAs LocalPermission LocalPermission
delegatesPermission Delegation LocalPermission
hasDelegatee Delegation Principal
hasDelegator Delegation Key
hasNameSpace LocalName Principal
hasPermission LocalPermission Permission
hasPermissionNameSpace LocalPermission Principal
holds Principal LocalPermission
isAccountable Principal LocalPermission
isAccountableBy LocalPermission Principal
isHeldBy LocalPermission Principal
speaksFor Principal Principal
isSpokenBy Principal Principal
The property names explain their meanings. For example, the postfix property
hasNameSpace(ln,p) is interpreted to mean that, the local name ln is in the name
space of the principal p. In addition, the domain and range for the property
hasNameSpace indicate that the individual ln is an instance of either concept
LocalName or LocalPermission, and the individual p is an instance of concept
principal. Moreover, table 4.4 demonstrates the terminological axioms and their
syntaxes with examples of SSALO.
4.2.2 Instantiating ABox with Individuals
The next step is to instantiate the various concepts and thereby populate the
knowledge base, in fact the ABox, with individuals. This step includes enumer-
ating the individuals, sorting them, and finally asserting knowledge about each
individual.
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Table 4.4: Terminological axioms and their syntaxes
Axiom DL Syntax Example
Concept Inclusion C ⊑ D Key ⊑ P rincipal
Concept Equivalence C ≡ D P rincipal ≡ (Key ⊔ LocalName)
Concept Assertion C(i) P rincipal(kAAlice)
Disjoint Concepts C ⊑ ¬D Key ⊑ ¬LocalName
Property assertion p(i, j) hasKey(kAAlice, kA)
Property Inversion P1 ≡ P2
− speaksFor ≡ isSpokenBy−
Property Transitivity P + ⊑ P speaksFor + ⊑ speaksFor
Disjoin Individuals i 6= j kA 6= kB where Key(kA), Key(kB)
Notation: C and D are concepts, P is property, i and j are individuals.
Enumerate and Classify Each Individual According to Available Con-
cepts
This step concerns adding concrete data to SSALO. For example, adding all
local names defined in the SSAL language to the concept of LocalName. A single
statement such as the following is required for each introduction and classification
of an individual:
LocalName(kBemployees)
Relate Individuals via Available Properties in SSALO
With the axiomatization in the TBox, it is a relatively straightforward procedure
to assert knowledge about individuals. For example, to relate each instance of
concept LocalName to instances of concept Principal, with the speaksFor property,
we have the following instantiation :
speaksFor(kA,kBemployees)
SSAL statements are captured as instances in SSALO. Note that, an individual
is called an instance when it is classified in the appropriate concept and is linked
Subterfuge-Safe Trust Management for
Delegation of Permissions in Open
Environments
103 Seyedehsamane Abdigarmestani
(Samane Abdi)
4. Ontology-Based Implementation
for SSTM 4.2 SSALO
to other individuals with appropriate properties. The following notation is used
for expressing instantiation in ABox. C is concept, Pk(k = (1..n)) is a property,
and i, j, l are individuals:
• C(i) ←− P k(i, j) ⊓ ... ⊓ P k(i,l): This denotes that the individual i has
the property relation Pk to the individual j, has the property relation Pk
to the individual l, and so on, to be an instance of concept C.
For example, the following delegation statement:
kA
〈(kB1 employees)createAccount〉
=⇒ kB
is captured in SSALO by the following instantiation:
Delegation(delForCrAc)←−hasDelegator(delForCrAc, kA)⊓
delegatesP ermission(delForCrAc,createAccount)⊓
hasDelegatee(delForCrAc,kB)
(This means that the individual delForCrAc has the property relation hasDelega-
tor to individual kA, has the property relation delegatesPermission to individual
createAccount, and has property relation to individual kB to be an instance of
concept Delegation.
LocalP ermission(createAccount)←−
hasNameSpace(createAccount,kB1employees)⊓
isHeldBy(createAccount,kB1employees)⊓
isAccountableBy(createAccount, kB1employees)
LocalName(kB1 employees)←−hasNameSpace(kB1 employees, kB1)⊓
isSpokenBy(kB1 employees,kA)
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4.2.3 Policy Rules
We use SWRL to represent SSAL rules introduced in chapter 3 and also in [74,75].
The policy statements are represented by individuals and their relations (via prop-
erties) with other individuals in SSALO. In addition to the asserted knowledge,
there is also hidden knowledge in the ontology that can be inferred from the
asserted knowledge. To infer that knowledge, a reasoning tool is required to per-
form inference. Along with SWRL there is a reasoning engine (Jess) [141, 148]
that provides reasoning over the asserted knowledge and produces new knowledge
regarding the asserted knowledge.
Name Rule
When principal Q identifies a name N in its name space, and Q speaks for R
then it is inferred that R is the implicit name space of N . A reduction rule is
derived in SSAL to reduce local names to principals; which considering ?p, ?q,
and ?r as principals, if principal ?q speaks for principal ?r, and ?q chooses name
?n for principal ?p, it can be inferred ?p is identified as ?n in the name space of
?r. This can be captured in SWRL with the following rule:
Ont−N1 :P rincipal(?p) ∧ P rincipal(?q) ∧ P rincipal(?r)∧
speaksFor(?p, ?qn) ∧ LocalName(?qn) ∧ hasNameSpace(?qn, ?q)∧
hasName(?qn, ?n) ∧ speaksFor(?q, ?r)∧
swrlx : makeOWLIndividual(?rn, ?qn)
−→ LocalName(?rn) ∧ hasNameSpace(?rn, ?r)∧
speaksFor(?p, ?rn) ∧ hasName(?rn, ?n)
Permission Delegation Rules
Delegation refers to the act of a principal propagating further the permission
that it obtains from other principals. If a principal ?r speaks for principal ?q,
any permission ?x that is delegated to ?q is implicitly delegated to ?r (Ont-
P1). Moreover, if a principal ?p delegates permission ?x, it implicitly delegates
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any permission ?y that is dominated by ?x (Ont-P2). This is modelled in the
following SWRL rules:
Ont− P1 :P rincipal(?p) ∧ P rincipal(?q) ∧ LocalP ermission(?x)∧
delegatesP ermission(?d, ?perm) ∧ hasDelegatee(?d, ?q)∧
hasDelegator(?d, ?p) ∧ speaksFor(?r, ?q)
−→ hasDelegatee(?d, ?r)
Ont− P2 :asAuthAs(?x, ?y) ∧ hasDelegator(?d, ?p)∧
hasDelegatee(?d, ?q) ∧ delegatesP ermission(?d, ?x)
−→ delegatesP ermission(?d, ?y)
Executing the Jess engine has the effect of setting the delegatesPermission prop-
erty as a relation from the individual ?d to a ?y that satisfies the rule.
Permission Holding Rule
Delegation of a permission does not necessarily imply that the recipient of the
permission holds it. Holding a permission depends on either the delegator already
originating the permission in its name space or already holding the permission to
propagate it further. This prevents malicious principals delegating permissions
that they do not hold, and as a consequence are not expected to delegate. A
principal by originating a permission asserts that it holds that permission. Hold-
ing a permission means that a principal is authorized to perform actions based
on that permission. The following implements this with a SWRL rule:
Ont− P3 :P rincipal(?p) ∧ P rincipal(?q) ∧ LocalP ermission(?x)
∧ holds(?p, ?x) ∧ delegatesP ermission(?d, ?x)
∧ hasDelegatee(?d, ?q) ∧ hasDelegator(?d, ?p)
−→ holds(?q, ?x)
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Permission Global Ordering Rule
There are reduction rules to reduce localPermissions defined in the name space of
a principal, and that principal is identified by a local name. Considering ?p, ?q,
and ?r as principals, and ?pn as localPermission, the rule P4 indicates reduction
of local permissions. It indicates that, if the permission ?pn is issued by principal
?p and principal ?q speaks for ?p then the permission ?pn is implicitly in the
name space of ?q. Note that the asAuthAs property is a transitive relation. This
can be captured with the following SWRL rule:
Ont− P4 :P rincipal(?p) ∧ P rincipal(?q) ∧ LocalP ermission(?x)
∧ LocalP ermission(?pn) ∧ hasNameSpace(?pn, ?p)∧
speaksFor(?q, ?p) ∧ asAuthAs(?x, ?pn)
−→ hasNameSpace(?pn, ?q)
The set of policy rules encoded in SWRL are used to reason over the knowledge
in SSALO and infer new knowledge from the existing knowledge to answer the
queries that come to the query engine. We will discuss the query engine later in
this chapter.
4.2.4 Integration of Policies within SSALO
Different principals define specific kinds of security policies to meet their specific
needs. For example, a confidentiality hierarchy is a kind of security policy in some
organizations, or access permission hierarchy is another kind of security policy in
file systems. These security policies are defined by different principals in different
name spaces and they may have their local techniques for implementation. To
effectively manage security policies we must be able to produce compatible pol-
icy representations. The existence of a large number of representation methods
leads to the conclusion that security policies, even when semantically compli-
ant, can be represented in ways that differ substantially in terms of formalism,
structure, and hierarchy, thus raising obstacles to their reconciliation. Therefore,
for effective management of trust and authorization among distributed principals
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one has to be able to integrate all policy representations to make proper access
decisions. Each principal defines its own security policy in its name space to
control access to its resources, so called a local policy. Local policies may have
different implementations in each name space. For example, one principal may
implement its security policy using XML, another principal may use an ontol-
ogy, and one may use the Prolog programming language to implement its local
security policy. In order to integrate with local policies of other principals for
federation, SSALO provides a common vocabulary that is understandable by dif-
ferent parties. We assume that each local policy contains a set of permissions
that constrain access to the corresponding resources. The set of all permissions
SP in a principal’s name space may be considered to form a pre-order relation
as (SP,⊑) : (spi ⊑ spj); (spi, spj ∈ SP ). In other words, spj implies spi, thus
a principal that holds the permission spj also holds permission spi (inferred by
reasoning using the rules Ont-P2 and Ont-P3 in SSALO). A permission ?x for a
given resource of principal ?p will be represented as the following:
LocalP ermission(?p)←− isHeldBy(?x , ?p) ⊓ hasNameSpace(?x , ?p)
In each local policy, the set of permissions and their ordering relationship is spec-
ified locally, therefore the principal who defines the policy must explicitly define
a global interpretation for the set of permissions and their ordering relation-
ship. By signing the set of permissions and their ordering a principal provides a
global unique interpretation for permissions and consequently prevents subterfuge
during open cooperation with other principals. This is modelled in the SSALO
through OWL individuals and properties where: the set of permissions are consid-
ered as instances of concept LocalPermission; the name space of these permissions
are instances of concept Principal that signs the whole set of permissions; and the
pre-order relations among the permissions is considered as the asAuthAs prop-
erty. For example, the permission read of a set of permissions {read, write}, and
the ordering relationship read ⊑ write signed by kA ({|(read, write,⊑)|}skA) will
be captured in SSALO as the following individual and properties:
LocalP ermission(kAread)←− isHeldBy(kA read, kA)⊓
hasNameSpace(kAread, kA) ⊓ asAuthAs(kAwrite, kAread)
Subterfuge-Safe Trust Management for
Delegation of Permissions in Open
Environments
108 Seyedehsamane Abdigarmestani
(Samane Abdi)
4. Ontology-Based Implementation
for SSTM 4.2 SSALO
Figure 4.10 depicts the locally defined policy by principal kA as a fragment of
SSALO. This way each principal can define its security policy locally, in any
Figure 4.10: Integrating the locally defined policy to SSALO
policy language. The signed set of permissions and their pre-order relations are
captured as instances of concept LocalPermission and the asAuthAs property
(through an interpreter implemented in Java). These individuals will be part of
the knowledge base in SSALO and can be reasoned over for making the access
decision.
4.2.5 Queries for Trust Management
In addition to reasoning over the knowledge in SSALO, a query engine is required
for querying over the knowledge to answer an access request. An access request
can be evaluated by querying the knowledge in SSALO. For example, to verify
whether or not a principal kB is authorized to sell flight number 123 for airline
A, it is necessary to verify if the relation holds( kB,(kAsellFlightNo.123 )) exists
or can be inferred in the ontology. This requires that before any possible request
evaluation, all the policy rules (implemented in SWRL) have to be executed to
infer all holds relations for principal kB and permission (kAsellFlightNo.123). The
following are the queries to evaluate if a request complies with the asserted policy
in the knowledge base.
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Query for Subterfuge Safe Authorization The following query determines
an authorization which checks whether the requester holds the permission to
accomplish what it requests.
Q1 :P rincipal(?p) ∧ P rincipal(?q) ∧ LocalP ermission(?perm)∧
holds(?p, ?perm) ∧ isAccountable(?q, ?perm) −→ sqwrl : select(?p, ?perm, ?q)
This query returns all triples of a principal and the permissions that it holds as
well as the principal that is accountable for the actions authorized by permission
?perm.
Query On Subterfuge Safe Delegation The following query determines a
subterfuge safe delegation which checks whether it is safe for a delegator to dele-
gate the permission to other principals and that some principal is held accountable
for this permission.
Q2 :P rincipal(?p) ∧ P rincipal(?q) ∧ P rincipal(?r)∧
Delegation(?delcert) ∧ LocalP ermission(?perm)∧
hasDelegator(?delcert, ?p) ∧ hasDelegatee(?delcert, ?q)∧
delegatesP ermission(?delcert, ?perm) ∧ isAccountable(?r, ?perm)
−→ sqwrl : select(?delcert, ?p, ?perm, ?q, ?r)
This query returns all tuples of delegation certificates with their issuer, subject,
permission that is delegated to the subject, and the accountable principal for each
delegation statement.
A DL reasoner, Pellet, is integrated into Protégé and performs reasoning tasks in
SSALO. Thus, we use SSALO as a policy engine to make a decision for an access
request. A policy engine takes a request, a set of certificates, and policy as input,
then outputs a decision for that request [149]. In our model, a requester makes a
request to access some protected resources through an Application Programming
Interface (API) in the resource owner’s trusted environment. The API queries the
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trust management engine (SSALO) via a query interpreter. The query interpreter
which is implemented in the Java programming language, queries the ontology
about the request. Note that, the requester may present a set of certificates
(encoded using the Security Asserted Markup Language (SAML) [150]) to the
resource owner as proof of its authorization. The certificates are in XML data
format and are added to the ontology as OWL individuals and their relations via
OWL properties. We demonstrate this in the next section. Figure 4.11 depicts
the application of SSALO as policy engine.
Figure 4.11: Implementation of SSTM
4.2.6 Case study: Trust Management for a Selling Service
by Brokers
Consider that the owner of airline A trusts broker B to act as its broker. Bro-
kers are authorized to sell flights. Airline A (the owner of public key kA)
originates (and therefore holds) a localPermission 〈kAsellF lightAll〉. Then the
airline A adds broker B to the group of brokers identified by the local name
(kA flightBroker) (broker B is the owner of public key kB). The following is the
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delegation certificate that airline A issues:
kA
〈kA SellF lightAll〉
=⇒ (kA flightBrokers)
Figures 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 are the XML implementation of the above SSAL
certificate.
Figure 4.12: Delegation certificate
Figure 4.13: Name certificate
Figure 4.14: Permission certificate
These certificates are captured in the following statements about individuals and
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their relationships in SSALO:
LocalName(kA flight broker)←−
isSpokenBy(kA flight broker, kB)⊓
hasNameSpace(kA flight broker, kA)⊓
hasName(kA flight broker, flight broker)
LocalP ermission(sellFlightAll)←−
hasNameSpace(sellFlightAll, kB)⊓
isHeldBy(sellFlightAll, kB)
Delegation(delSell)←−
hasDelegator(delSell, kA)⊓
delegatesP ermission(delSell,sellFlightAll )⊓
hasDelegatee(delSell,kA flight broker)
The set of policy rules (Ont-P1, Ont-P2, Ont-P3, and Ont-P4) that is encoded in
SWRL are used to reason over the asserted knowledge and infer new knowledge
for making proper access decision. Therefore, in receiving broker B’s request for
selling flights, airline A wishes to check whether kB’s request for selling flight at
the airline A is authorized or not. The policy engine executes the SWRL rule
Ont-P1 to reason over the asserted knowledge within SSALO . Thus, the SQWRL
query Q1 checks if the following statements can be inferred:
isHeldBy(sellFlightAll, kB)
isAccountableBy(sellFlightAll, kA)
As a result of a successful query, broker B’s access for selling flights of airline A
is granted.
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4.2.7 Run-Time Performance
In this section, we present the evaluation of SSALO as a policy engine. The ob-
jective of these experiments is to evaluate the ability of SSALO to integrate a
number of security policies defined by different principals within a certain time
intervals. We used our implementation of SSALO (an OWL-DL model imple-
mented in Protégé) and the description logic reasoner Pellet [95] to carry out
the experiments. We used the Jena Semantic Web Toolkit [97], which supports
rule-based inference over the OWL-DL knowledge base. The experiments have
been conducted on a Linux workstation with the following hardware configura-
tion: 8Gb RAM with AMD A10-4655M quad core processor. Figures 4.15 and
4.16 shows the results of the experiments. The run time performance of SSALO
depends on two factors: size of the asserted individuals in the ontology, number
of heterogeneous policies for integration.
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This experiment shows that the run-time increases approximately linear when
the number of asserted individuals (certificates and policies) increases and that
the performance is adequate for most intended scenarios such as web-based ap-
plications apart from time-critical ones. It also shows that reasoning based on
SSALO is a feasible computational task.
4.2.8 Related Work for Solving Heterogeneity Problem
Grid technology was the very first effort to resolve heterogeneity problems in
integration of data types such as security policies with different implementa-
tions [151]. The Grid infrastructure was a good start for principals to share their
data, integrate them and consequently cooperate with each other. The main focus
of that effort was resource sharing among virtual organizations for seamless in-
teractivity. Another approach for solving heterogeneity problems for integration
of security policies was using a matching scheme. Matching schemes are usually
based on XML, the match operator takes two graph-like structures as input and
produces matches between their elements. If two structures correspond seman-
tically to each other, matching is successful. The work presented in [152] which
performs matches between permission attributes, is a good example of this ap-
proach. Within the last few years, there has been an increase of interest in using
ontologies for representing access control policies. Ontologies are believed to be
important for solving heterogeneity problems in integration of security policies.
Ontologies provide a formal specification and common vocabulary for a domain
of interest. An example of an ontology approach for integration of policies is
AIR (Accountability In RDF) proposed by Kagal et al. [153]. They used AIR as
an ontology-based language to express the access control policy for sharing data.
AIR enables users to share their data in open environments such as web services.
However, the integration of multiple policies is based on matching the conditions
of a set of rules. The rules also have to be designed in the same language to
be able to perform matching on them. Integration and matching are technically
difficult especially if multiple policies are defined in different languages with dif-
ferent implementation techniques. The identification of semantic relationships
between these policies is also a difficult problem. Thus, an automated dynamic
integration solution is required. In SSALO, we address not only the automatic
integration of heterogeneous policies implemented with different techniques, but
also we address the subterfuge safe collaboration of distributed principals after
integration of their policies. This feature is unique to SSALO. To the best of our
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knowledge, no formal framework for integration of heterogeneous policies that
can address subterfuge safe cooperation among distributed principals exists.
4.2.9 Discussion
In the context of trust management, an ontology produces a shared understanding
of different policies in different domains, represented as a set of concepts, relations,
functions, axioms and individuals. There are several reasons for developing our
trust management model based on an ontology:
Knowledge Sharing The use of SSALO enables different principals to have
a common set of concepts about their security policies and interacting with one
another.
Knowledge Reuse SSALO as a policy engine can be reused by different prin-
cipals without building a new policy engine from scratch. Reusing ontologies
reduces engineering costs since it avoids rebuilding existing ontologies. Moreover,
since SSALO is understood as a means for sharing knowledge concepts, reusing
that increases the secure interoperability between different principals both on the
syntactic and on the semantic level. Principals using the same ontology are as-
sumed to hold the same view upon the modelled universe of discourse, and thus
define and use domain concepts in the same way.
Scalability The description of a trust management system in a machine-
understandable fashion (ontology) is expected to have a great impact in areas
of policy integration, as it is expected to enable dynamic and scalable coop-
eration among different principals of open environments such as web services,
organizations, coalitions.
Complexity Choosing OWL-DL provides the possibility of using the OWL-DL
reasoner as a policy engine and a query tool. The DL reasoner Pellet and the
SWRL engine have high complexity (NExpTime-complete) but DL reasoners can
handle all features of the OWL-DL language. The DL expressibility of SSALO
model is SHOIN(D), where S stands for ALC [154] plus role transitivity, H stands
for role hierarchy, O stands for nominals, I stands for inverse role, N stands for
cardinality restrictions, and D stands for datatypes. However, we did not use
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some features such as nominals or role hierarchy in our model. We evaluated the
complexity of OWL-DL with its specific features used in SSALO via a calculator
for complexity of reasoning in description logics [155], and determined it to be
NExpTime-complete.
Subterfuge Safe Policy Integration Ontologies are frameworks for organiz-
ing structured data. Defining permissions for hierarchical resources is a very com-
mon requirement for security policies. The permissions for hierarchical resources
can be modelled in the ontology since ontologies provide a set of hierarchical
and relational representational primitives. In the SSAL policy language we de-
fined the "no less Authoritative than" relation as the global ordering relationship
among permissions. This ordering relationship is assumed to be specified explic-
itly. However, resources in a system have a hierarchical structure and therefore
permissions to access those resources form partial ordering relations. For example,
airline A may specify permission 〈kA (sellF lightAll)〉 for selling all flights in its
domain and the permission 〈kA (sellF lightNo123)〉 for selling flight number 123.
Consider that there is an explicit ordering relationship among the permissions
that A defines in its name space. For instance, there is an ordering relation-
ship (sellF lightNo123) ⊑ (sellF lightAll) in which permission (sellF lightAll)
implies permission (sellF lightNo123). Any requester that holds the permission
〈kA (sellF lightAll) implicitly should be able to sell flight number 123. The re-
source owner must specify the ordering relation among the permissions it defines
in its local policies. This relation is modelled in SSALO using the OWL property
asAuthAs. This property (asAuthAs) also supports subterfuge safe cooperation
among distributed principals when their local policies are integrated with one
another.
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4.3 Summary
In this chapter, we first gave a background on the ontology technique, OWL-
DL, and SWRL. Then we introduced and demonstrated SSALO which is used as
the policy engine for SSTM. Using an ontology for representing and reasoning
over the policies provides a common vocabulary and well understood approach
for open environments, where multiple organizations with heterogeneous security
policies wish to cooperate. In addition, the OWA ensures reasoning over an ex-
isting security policy can be easily extended to include further security policies.
The implementation also supports integration of heterogeneous policies (policies
specified in different languages which may have different implementation in their
issuer’s name space) to facilitate trust management in open environments. Mul-
tiple SWRL rules may be executed in order to retrieve a set of information to
grant or deny the access request. SSALO can be potentially used in open sys-
tems such as distributed web services, cross coalitions cooperation, and cloud
federations [156] for subterfuge safe, and dynamic cooperation. The complexity
of reasoning over the knowledge in SSALO was evaluated as NP-complete which
means that the runtime required to reason over the asserted knowledge increases
as the size of the asserted knowledge grows in SSALO. Experiments have shown
adequate performance for typical non-time critical situations.
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Chapter 5
Extending SSTM for Supporting
Secure Cross Coalition
Cooperation
Sharing resources and information in a secure fashion is a requirement for col-
laboration by distributed entities. Appropriate access control mechanisms are
required in order to manage access to those shared resources. A coalition pro-
vides a virtual space for collaborators to share their resources and interact with
each other. To participate in a coalition, entities must ensure that their resources
are safe from inappropriate access while sharing specific resources with coalition
participants. Cross coalition cooperation happens while resources of one coalition
are shared with participants of another coalition. In this chapter, we introduce a
secure dynamic coalition framework that guarantees subterfuge safe cross coali-
tion cooperation. We add two extra SSAL rules to support secure cross coalition
cooperation. This allows participants in one coalition to openly cooperate and
share resources in a secure manner with other coalitions. Section 5.1 introduces
coalitions, and section 5.2 discusses coalition features for secure open coopera-
tion. Section 5.3 reviews existing coalition frameworks. In section 5.4 we discuss
the desirable characteristics in any coalition supporting framework. Section 5.5
outlines the process of formation of a new coalition, the issuing of membership,
the two additional SSAL rules for sharing resources of coalition participants, and
describes the coalition split and merge processes. The characteristics of our model
for secure dynamic coalition cooperation are discussed in section 5.6. Section 5.7
provides an example. Finally, a summary for the chapter is given in section 5.8.
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Figure 5.1: A sample of coalition structure
5.1 Coalition Definition
Sharing resources and cooperation among entities are defined in terms of a coali-
tion. A coalition provides a virtual space across a distributed environment to al-
low participants to share resources and cooperate securely for a specific duration
of time. The coalition can be formed for simple collaboration among individuals
that share resources such as normal sharing of information via email, or can be
for more structured and complex collaboration among organizations that share
resources for business purposes. For example, a coalition might provide a vir-
tual space for a group of citizens uniting behind a common goal. It also might
be an operational structure and regulation for a business-to-business relation-
ship. A group of companies that create a mutual trust between each other can
form a coalition in order to increase their profit. For example, Dunkin’ Donuts
and Baskin-Robbins formed a coalition by sharing stores and thus sharing rev-
enue [157]. At a system level, a coalition can be used to manage the relationships
between its resources. For example, a distributed application may be thought
of as forming a coalition between its execution components and the system re-
sources that are available for them to use. A coalition consists of an authority
who manages the coalition and coalition participants that provide/use coalition
resources and services. A coalition participant can be a resource/service provider,
and therefore provides services and resources for other participants of the coali-
tion. A coalition participant can be also a resource/service user, and therefore
uses the resources and services that are provided by the provider participants.
Figure 5.1 demonstrates an example of a coalition structure.
The ability to securely share resources is critical for service providers when they
join a coalition. Before accessing a coalition resource or using a coalition ser-
vice, a service user should obtain permission from the coalition authority who
makes the access decision for that resource or service. The service user sends a
Subterfuge-Safe Trust Management for
Delegation of Permissions in Open
Environments
120 Seyedehsamane Abdigarmestani
(Samane Abdi)
5. Extending SSTM for Supporting
Secure Cross Coalition
Cooperation 5.1 Coalition Definition
request to the service provider (the coalition participant who provides services
and shares its resources with other participants of the coalition). If the service
provider believes that the requester is authorized by an authority to use the ser-
vice/resource, then the request is allowed. Figure 5.2 depicts the request process
between a service provider and service user of a coalition with the involvement
of a central authority. Participants in a coalition may authenticate each other by
asking the question “who said this?” and share resources by asking the authoriza-
tion question “ who is trusted to access this resource?”. Usually authentication is
accomplished with the involvement of a central authority (CA) and authorization
is accomplished by an Access Control List (ACL), in which a set of trusted prin-
cipals for an action listed [158, 159]. However, authentication and authorization
mechanisms alone cannot provide cooperation control among participants of dif-
ferent coalitions. Authentication and authorization mechanisms rely on a super
security administrator who is familiar with all available resources and assigns per-
missions for those resources to the appropriate users in a centralized manner. In
centralized environments, both coalition participants and permissions for coali-
tion resources are defined and controlled by the super security administrator. In
decentralized environments, each participant in a coalition is familiar with and
controls its own resources. The resource owners (principals) decide on their own
who is trusted to access their resources. However, principals do not have a com-
plete picture of all trusted principals in coalition cooperation; thus, a framework
is required to support cooperation and sharing of resources across coalitions. This
is called a coalition framework. In coalitions, because of the incomplete view of
the system for making access decisions, trust management systems help partic-
ipants to make appropriate access decisions in decentralized environments and
cross coalition cooperation. Figure 5.3 depicts decentralized access control using
trust management for coalitions.
Figure 5.2: Centralized access control for coalitions
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5.2 Coalition Features
A secure coalition framework provides a formalized template for membership
management, type of administration, type of cooperation, coalition formation and
evolution. The formalised template ensures that only the authorized principals
can access the shared resources in the coalition. In this section, we outline these
security features for coalitions.
5.2.1 Membership Management
Participants that gather together to form a coalition are called members of that
coalition. Coalition members are a subset of all principals in the network. A
principal must be able to prove its membership of a coalition to use the coalition
services and resources. It is also important to distinguish coalition members from
other principals in order to assign permissions only to members of a coalition.
5.2.2 Administration
A coalition can rely on a super security administrator (centralized) to control ac-
cess to the coalition resources. Relying on a super security administrator brings
challenges in forming dynamic coalitions. The super security administrator must
be appointed and be agreed before coalition formation by all the participants will-
ing to join in the coalition. The super security administrator controls the coalition
access control model. Thus, a good access control model relies on the super se-
curity administrator’s expertise and expertise. Moreover, giving all the power
to the super security administrator will bring concerns about possible arbitrary
behaviour by the administrator. For example, after a coalition is established and
Figure 5.3: Decentralized access control for coalitions
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participants agree on sharing resources, the super security administrator, having
all powers on the shared resources, may arbitrarily authorize other individuals
or organizations outside the coalition to access the shared resources. A coali-
tion can also rely on decentralized security administrators, where two or more
administrators (with either the same or different authority) control the appro-
priate access to the coalition resources. Decentralizing coalition administration
among two or more administrators prevents failure in coalition operation when
one of the security administrators fails. However, there exists a challenge in hav-
ing the same authority for all security administrators. An administrator can use
its full authority to authorize principals outside of the coalition to access the
coalition resources without the agreement of the other coalition administrators.
Having multiple coalition administrators with different authority allows princi-
pals in decentralized environments to share their resources. Each principal can
be viewed as an administrator for sharing its own resources with other coalition
members. Loss of an administrator affects only resources that are controlled by
that administrator. Thus, the rest of the coalition can work properly.
5.2.3 Subterfuge Safe Open Cooperation
A coalition may define and allow operations only within the coalition, called
closed cooperation. For closed cooperation, a coalition does not need any glob-
ally unique identifier to represent it in a global environment. Open cooperation
relies on the ability of a coalition for subterfuge safe cross coalition delegation to
principals outside of a coalition. An open coalition uses a globally unique iden-
tifier to represent itself. When cooperating with other coalitions, the members
and permissions of an open coalition are bound to its global identifier. Thus,
the members and permissions of an open coalition can be recognized. There-
fore, an attempt by a malicious principal to access a resource by evading the
intended controls of a security mechanism in a coalition is unsuccessful. In order
to assign appropriate permissions to only trusted users, a delegation scheme was
introduced in SSAL. Permissions that are delegated must have globally unique
interpretation to prevent deceptive behaviour that may be accomplished by ma-
licious principals. The following scenario demonstrates the subterfuge problem
in cross coalition delegation for open cooperation among coalitions. Alice, Bob,
and Mary are members of coalition Blue. Alice trusts Bob and Bob trusts Mary
for selling flights at Alice’s company. By transitivity, Mary can prove her au-
thorization for selling flights from Alice. Eve, Bob, and Dave are members of
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Figure 5.4: Subterfuge in open cooperation of coalitions
coalition Red. Eve intercepts the certificate for sell from Alice and delegates sell
permission to Bob. Bob thinks that authorization is from Eve and delegates it
to Dave. Dave can prove authorization for sell from Alice. Figure 5.4 illustrates
this scenario.
5.2.4 Formation and Evolution
Before forming a coalition, the participants may need to decide whether it would
be safe for them to establish the coalition and share their resources. This decision
is based on the security mechanisms that a coalition may provide. The security
mechanism must determine to what extent the members of a coalition can be
trusted. Coalition frameworks are mechanisms that provide templates to establish
secure coalitions. The participants may also decide which category of a coalition
is desired. For example, the coalition could have a centralized administration or
a decentralized administration, and a coalition could have closed cooperation or
open cooperation. When the category of a coalition is decided, a suitable coalition
framework is used to provide a template for secure formation and evolution of the
coalition. Two or more coalitions may come together and merge, or one coalition
may split into more than one coalitions.
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5.3 Existing Coalition Frameworks
Several coalition frameworks have been proposed to form secure coalitions and
their enhancements [40,64,87,160–164]. We investigate these coalition frameworks
in terms of the mentioned security features as dynamic membership, type of
administration, and subterfuge safe open cooperation.
5.3.1 Systems Research Centre Model
Lampson et.al. [165] introduced a framework to manage group membership at
Systems Research Centre (SRC). This framework defines a group where each
member speaks on behalf of the group. In order to speak on behalf of a group, a
principal must become a member of that group. This will be done by obtaining
group membership from the certificate authority of the group. A central authority
manages the group membership. The group is represented by a group name and
does not have a globally unique identifier. The certificate authority manages the
group membership by listing all group members and the group name in a single
membership certificate. The membership certificate is signed by the private key
of the certificate authority and issued to all group members. None of the group
members can admit new members or revoke the membership of the current mem-
bers by modifying the membership certificate. When a membership certificate is
issued, principals are listed in a membership certificate and therefore, principals
can prove their membership by presenting the membership certificate. For any
principal who receives the group membership list certificate, it can distinguish
whether itself (or another principal) is a member of the group or not. Consider
a group, named as friends, that has Alice, Bob and Mary as its members. The
membership certificate C1 is issued by the authority of the group and is held
by all members of the group, that is (Note that sk means that the authority,
identified by public key k, issues and signs the certificate):
{|Alice, Bob, Mary|}sk
In order to join the group friends, Dan sends a request to the authority. The
authority issues certificate C2 to all group members, that is:
{|Alice, Bob, Mary, Dan|}sk
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Figure 5.5: The SRC framework
Figure 5.5 demonstrates how Dan joins the friends group. In this framework,
group maintenance would be difficult if the group has a large number of members.
Issuing or revoking membership results in having the authority update and re-
issue the entire membership list certificate to all related principals. On the other
hand, a group is controlled by a single certificate authority. Thus, it is subject
to the problem of having single point of failure. Open cooperation is impossible,
since it is impossible to distinguish that the message is from the group. The reason
for this is that a group is only represented by a group name that may not uniquely
identify the group over the open network. Without a globally unique identity,
it is impossible to distinguish a given group from other groups. Therefore, cross
coalition cooperation is not possible.
5.3.2 Coalition-Based Access Control Model
The Coalition-Based Access Control model (CBAC) was proposed as an access
control model for coalitions [163]. CBAC is a family of access control models
to capture the semantics of coalition interrelationships and the characteristics
of access control in such environments. CBACbasic is the simplest model in the
CBAC family, adding coalition entities and relationships to a role-based model.
CBACteam builds on CBACbasic to support the collection of users, acting in roles,
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into teams. CBACtask builds on CBACbasic to allow access to be determined based
on task state. Finally, CBACteam+task combines the concepts of both teams and
tasks to enable team activation based on task state. The administration in CBAC
is distributed and is based on delegation of authority. Consider, for example, an
organization A that participates in coalition C. Members of organization A have
authorization to access coalition resources and the administrator of organization
A defines roles and assigns members to roles that operate within the coalition. In
defining roles and assigning members to those roles, the administrator delegates
authority within its own organization. Therefore, CBAC supports decentralized
administration. In CBAC a coalition is not represented by a unique identifier;
therefore, open cooperation with other coalitions is impossible since the coali-
tion is not identified in a global manner. The membership management for the
coalition is not addressed in CBAC.
5.3.3 Virtual Private Network Model
Virtual Private Network (VPN) [164] was developed for supporting secure cooper-
ation from different physical locations of the same company. Similar to ISC [162],
the objective in VPN is to provide secure communication among members of the
same coalition and therefore open cooperation was not the purpose of their de-
sign. VPN supports symmetric key and public key authentication. The routers or
the AAA (authentication, authorization and accounting) servers are the security
administrators. They keep all user information about keys and identities. In a
VPN, there could be many routers, each assigned to a subnet, making it scalable.
However, it focuses on the authentication of individual users to join a coalition,
and it does not address cooperation with other coalitions.
5.3.4 Mäki-Aura Model
A model for ad-hoc membership management and later a distributed security
architecture for ad-hoc networks were proposed by Mäki and Aura in [160,161]. In
this model, a principal, who is the group leader, establishes a group and refers to
that group by the group’s signature key. For admitting new members, the group
leader issues and signs a membership certificate as a verification of membership.
The group leader may also issue and sign a leader certificate to specify a group
leader with the same authority as the group establisher (the first group leader).
When a principal is appointed as a leader, it can use its own signature key to
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sign certificates for admitting members and appointing leaders. Also, all group
leaders share the same signature key for issuing certificates. Different rights may
be delegated to different types of members by defining different roles. In this
framework, if a group leader leaves the group for any reason, the group will not
be broken. The form of administration is distributed and all leaders have the same
authority for managing the coalition resources. However, this framework suffers
from the problem that a compromise of the signature key leads to breakdown
failure of the entire group. The other disadvantage of this approach is that a
malicious principal who obtains the leadership of a group with the same authority
of other leaders, can misuse its authority for illegal behaviour.
5.3.5 Internet Services of Coalition Model
A framework for future Internet Services of Coalitions(ISC) was proposed in [162].
The focus of ISC is on collaboration of service providers in provisioning future
internet services. The form of administration is distributed as resource shar-
ing decisions are taken by each participant (an individual service provider) in
the coalition. It supports dynamic membership where a coalition is formed au-
tonomously by individual service providers. Several service providers may join
and leave the coalition at any time. Cross coalition cooperation is not an ob-
jective in their framework. We argue that the ISC framework does not support
cross coalition cooperation since the coalitions are not identified uniquely in the
global environment.
5.3.6 Ellison-Dohrmann Model
A model of access control for mobile computing platforms was proposed in [64]
based on SDSI name certificates. The form of administration is decentralized
in this model. Because the coalition does not rely on a central authority. The
coalition has a leader that admits members and controls all the resources of
the coalition. A coalition leader represents the corresponding coalition using a
SDSI name certificate. The leader may directly admit members by issuing name
certificates that relate its local name for the coalition with the public keys of
members. A coalition leader also controls all resources of the coalition. However,
this model is vulnerable to the subterfuge problem which limits the usage of this
model for open cooperation. A malicious principal E may deceive a principal P
that is already a member of group A, to join its group M . A malicious principal
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Q intercepts the principal P ’s group membership certificate C1 in group A, and
principal P may issue a name certificate C2 to accept Q as a member of group M .
However, regardless of P ’s intention, principal Q can use the set of certificates
{C1, C2} to prove its membership in group A. Thus, this framework does not
support subterfuge safe open cooperation.
5.3.7 Distributed Authorization Language Model
A framework for establishing decentralized secure coalitions is proposed based
on a role-based Distributed Authorization Language (DAL) [87]. The coalition
is formed with the involvement of a constructor, founders, and oversight. The
constructor defines the regulation of the coalition and creates the coalition based
on those regulations. The founders agree on the coalition regulation that is spec-
ified by the constructor. The oversight is a pre-agreed penalty contract by the
coalition constructor and all the coalition founders. This framework supports
the dynamic establishment of coalitions, forming of further coalitions, and coali-
tion merge. A coalition has a unique identifier that includes its signature key as
defined in DAL. The purpose of the coalition key is to sign the initial coalition
regulations during the formation of the coalition. The coalition key is generated
and initially held by the constructor of the coalition. The constructor is selected
by the coalition founders and may be a trusted external third party or prospec-
tive member of the coalition. Once the initial coalition regulations that identify
the coalition constructor, founders and oversights have been signed and the coali-
tion formed, the coalition key is not used for further signing. Further specified
coalition regulations are signed by coalition founders. In forming a coalition, the
constructor signs a penalty contract accepting responsibility for the proper use of
the signing key. If the key is misused then the constructor becomes liable under
the terms of the contract. The coalition regulations are such that it is not possible
to establish a coalition without signing this contract. In practice, it is expected
that after forming the coalition, the constructor will destroy the coalition key in
order to avoid accidental compromise. This coalition framework does not rely
on a central authority. Once a coalition is formed, then all the authority of the
coalition stands with the founders who can create and regulate their own coalition
structure. Moreover, delegation subterfuge can be prevented by associating the
originator’s public key to permissions. However, this suffers from the challenge
of referencing public keys and relies on a globally defined function to define per-
mission relationships. Also, DAL as a basis for a coalition framework, does not
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Figure 5.6: Summary of coalition features of different frameworks
support SDSI extended names as a way of providing indirect referencing among
participants in different coalitions for more expressiveness. Figure 5.6 depicts a
comparison of the reviewed coalition frameworks and the SSTM-based coalition
framework that will be introduced in section 5.5.
5.4 Secure Coalition Characteristics
To support formation and evolution of a secure coalition that is able to cooperate
openly with other coalitions we explain that the following characteristics are
desirable in a coalition framework.
Globally Unique Identification A secure coalition must have a permanent
and unique coalition identity to identify itself in open environments. This is im-
portant when a coalition makes a statement, as it must be clear for the principals
outside the coalition which coalition the statement is from.
Dynamic Formation The formation and evolution of a coalition must be
achieved entirely by its participants. Moreover, coalitions may form further coali-
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tions (split). Coalitions may also come together to dynamically form a new coali-
tion (merge).
Dynamic Leadership and Membership Membership and leadership man-
agement should not be managed by any central authority. In a dynamic coalition
environment, any principal should be able to establish a coalition (following the
regulations) and assign a leader for the coalition and admit members.
Subterfuge Safe Cross Coalition Cooperation Permissions that may be
delegated from one coalition to another coalition must clearly reference their
originator. Therefore, the recipient of a permission in one coalition cannot misuse
the permission in another coalition. This way secure cooperation among multiple
coalitions is possible.
Accountability A coalition framework must provide a mechanism for tracking
responsibility for the permissions that are delegated within the coalition and also
across the coalitions. This prevents malicious participants in a coalition from
behaviour that results in misuse of coalitions resources while appearing legitimate.
Decentralized Administration The access control model for an open coali-
tion should be decentralized. In other words, the open coalition access control
model should not have to rely on a central authority or a centralized authorization
server. In a decentralized approach, each resource owner in the coalition should
prevent inappropriate access of its resources.
We are not aware of any existing approach that provides an infrastructure that
has all of the above characteristics. Using SSTM, we introduce a framework for
formation of secure and dynamic coalitions. Coalitions framework using SSTM
can be formed in a fully distributed manner without relying on a centralized
administration. This framework can be used to split a coalition into further
coalitions or allow multiple coalitions to merge.
5.5 SSTM-Based Coalition Framework
Cross coalition delegation is a challenge for open cooperation among coalitions.
When two or more participants from different coalitions define the same permis-
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sion specification for accessing their resources, they are vulnerable to delegation
subterfuge [71]. The same permission specification might be ambiguous and cause
confusion for the principal who receives similar permissions. This ambiguity and
associated confusion results in delegation subterfuge, in that the principal who
receives the permission in one coalition can misuse it to access the resources
of another coalition via an indirect and apparently authorized route. Defining
two similar permission specifications happens because none of the participants in
different coalitions have a complete picture of the name schema for permission
specifications. This vulnerability for subterfuge was discussed in detail in chapter
1 and also presented in [71, 75].
Using policy based trust management systems provides a systematic security
mechanism for automatic trust decisions regarding the open cooperation of mem-
bers of different coalitions. This is a more controlled systematic way in contrast
to reputation based trust management systems. A variety of trust management
systems have been developed over the years to address the requirement for con-
structing trust and managing authorization without relying on a central author-
ity [9,10,43,46,60,65]. They assume unique and unambiguous permission names
are provided by a global name provider service. Although global name servers
provide a unique interpretation for each name, the principals participating in
coalitions may still use arbitrary names to represent their own resources. It de-
pends on the experience of the coalition participant administrator who creates the
permissions to specify non ambiguous permissions. However, the design of non
ambiguous permissions should not rely on this; it should be formalized in a formal
authorization language. Therefore, without a reliable name schema for globally
unique permission specification, it is impossible to prevent ambiguity and provide
subterfuge safe cross coalition delegation and consequently open cooperation.
SSAL was proposed to support subterfuge safe delegation in large scale distributed
systems without relying on a pre-agreed global naming service or super security
administrator [75]. A SSTM-based coalition framework uses SSAL as the security
policy to provide a secure framework when coalition participants are distributed.
The proposed coalition framework provides dynamic membership and subterfuge
safe delegation of permission across different coalitions without relying on a super
security administrator and global naming scheme. Moreover, it does not have the
problem of relying on a globally defined function to define permission ordering
relationships, such as existed in [87]. In addition, SSAL supports SDSI’s extended
names that provides a mechanism for indirect referencing among participants in
different coalitions. SSAL can be used as a policy language to construct state-
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ments and manage authorization/delegation relationships to automate the deci-
sion making process for securely sharing resources among coalition participants.
In this section, we describe the process by which new coalitions are formed using
SSAL. To build an effective coalition, we must first establish the coalition enti-
ties and their relationships to one another. A coalition is identified by a unique
coalition identifier and is composed of coalition leaders, coalition members, and
a set of all shared resources of all members of the coalition.
5.5.1 Forming a New Coalition
A new coalition is created by generating a fresh (public/private) key pair. The
new key pair (kC , kC
−1
) is called the coalition key. The public key kC is used as
the coalition global unique identifier. The coalition signature key kC
−1
is used to
assign the coalition’s leader. The owner of the coalition key is called the leader of
this coalition and controls the coalition signature key. In this way, coalitions can
be formed dynamically. In some existing frameworks, coalitions may not have a
globally unique identifier [165]. If the coalition does not have a unique identifier,
then it cannot be identified over the global distributed network. Therefore, when
a coalition (spoken for by its leader) makes a statement it is not clear to the
principals outside of the coalition that the statement is from the coalition, and
thus cross coalition delegation is not possible. In forming a coalition, the coalition
leader generates a fresh key pair and signs the leadership statement for itself. This
is done by issuing a SSAL name certificate with the coalition signature key as the
issuer of the certificate and the leader’s global unique identification (either public
key or local name) as subject of the certificate. For example, assuming kc is the
coalition public key, and L the leader of the coalition, the following certificate:
(kc leader) −→ L1
means that L1 is the leader of the coalition identified by the coalition public key
kc. Once the coalition is formed and the leader is appointed, the coalition signa-
ture key (ephemeral private key) will be destroyed in order to avoid accidental
compromise of the coalition key. Then all the authority of the coalition lies with
the leader who can admit members and regulate the coalition.
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5.5.2 Issuing Membership
In the beginning, the leader is the only member of the coalition. The leader may
admit members by issuing SSAL name certificates for principals willing to join
any coalition. The certificates are signed with the leader’s signature key rather
than the coalition signature key. For example, the coalition leader L1 may admit
principal M1 to join the coalition as the coalition member. The coalition leader
L1 issues the following name certificate to accept M1 as a coalition member:
(L1 member) −→ M1
Note that the leader uses its own key to admit new members. In other words, the
coalition leader speaks for the coalition. When a coalition leader admits members
to the coalition, it passes along all the certificates that prove its own status as
a leader in the coalition. In this way, a member can prove its membership to
another coalition member or to an outsider by presenting a set of certificates
related to its membership. In the above certificate, the member M1 proves its
membership to other members of coalition kC by presenting the following set of
certificates:
(kc leader) −→ L1
(L1 member) −→ M1
where, the following statement can be inferred (applying the rule introduced in
section 3.3.1):
(kc leader member) −→ M1
In this way, the membership of M1 in coalition k
c can be proved.
5.5.3 Local Policy for Cross Coalition Sharing Resources
To effectively participate in dynamic coalitions, participants must be able to
share their resources within the coalition as stated in their access control policy.
They need to make sure that their resources are safe from access that does not
comply with their local policy. This requires each participant to define a security
policy for accessing its resources called a local policy (LP). It is important that
each participant in a coalition has a local policy to govern coalition members in
accessing its resources. Each local policy may contain a set of permissions that
constraint access to the corresponding resources. The set of all permissions S in
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a coalition member’s name space may be considered to form a pre-order relation:
(S,⊑) : (Si ⊑ Sj); (Si, Sj ∈ S)
This means if a principal holds the permission Sj it also holds the permission Si,
we say Sj implies Si. For example, there might be a pre-order relation over the set
of permissions including {read, write} corresponding to a coalition member’s file
system resources, as read ⊑ write. To avoid ambiguity in permission interpreta-
tion when two different coalition partners define the same permission specification
for their resources, the SSAL framework provides a localPermission mechanism.
A permission x for a given resource of a coalition member identified by either its
public key or local name M will be represented as a localPermission 〈M x〉. The
set of permissions is created locally and a coalition member must explicitly define
how the permission that it originates locally, relates to other permissions glob-
ally. Thus, the coalition member M may define the permission global ordering no
less authoritative than over the set of permissions in its name space. Assuming
y as the other permission specification defined locally in the name space of M ,
where x ⊑ y, the coalition member M defines the permission global ordering as
x y (x is no less authoritative than y). However, it is not effective to define the
permission global ordering no less authoritative than among permissions of the
set of permissions individually forming a pre-order relationship. In other words,
it is neither effective nor efficient for a principal that is willing to join a coalition
to define localPermissions and their orderings through a multiple signing process.
The participant in a coalition should be able to define a set of permissions for its
resources and their orderings in its name space, and sign the entire permission
set and their ordering in a single signing process to make them globally unique.
We add two SSAL rules to transform the local pre-order relation among a set of
permissions defined in a coalition member’s local policy to the global permission
ordering no less authoritative than. These rules are defined in the following:
LP1
A resource owner signs the set of permissions for its resources and the pre-order
relation among permissions with its public key in a single signing process. In this
way, the resource owner holds any individual permission of that set in its name
space. Given a set of permissions S with pre-order relation among the permissions
of this set (S,⊑), a permission x in S, and public key K of the resource owner,
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we define the following rule:
{|(S,⊑)|}sK ; x ∈ S
K ∋ 〈K x〉
This denotes that a coalition participant defines the set of permission S and
their ordering relationship as (S,⊑) for its resources. The participant holds each
individual permission x by signing the entire permission set and their orderings
(S,⊑) in a single signing process while willing to share its resources within the
coalition.
LP2
The pre-order relation among a set of permissions in a principal’s name space may
be transformed to the permission global ordering relation, no less authoritative
than, in the following rule:
{|(S,⊑)|}sK ; x ∈ S; y ∈ S; x ⊑ y
〈K x〉 〈K y〉
This denotes that by signing the entire set S, each permission in the set will
have a global unique interpretation, and the permission local ordering relation-
ship among each individual permission specification can be transformed to the
permission global ordering relationship no less authoritative than. Therefore, in
participating in a coalition, a resource owner only signs the set of permissions de-
fined in its local policy and then by applying rules LP1 and LP2 the permissions
and their ordering will have a global and unique interpretation. This prevents a
participant of a coalition signing every single permission in its local policy to pro-
vide a global unique interpretation across one coalition and also among different
coalitions.
A coalition participant that is willing to share its resources may sign the entire
permission set and their orderings over its resources and delegate it to the coalition
leader for further delegation (either within the coalition or cross coalitions). In
this way (applying rule LP1 and LP2) each permission is globally and uniquely
referenced by its originator as an accountable principal; so subterfuge will be
avoided. Moreover, the coalition leader may accept accountability (signing an
accountability statement) for the permissions that it receives from the member of
its coalition for further delegation of that permission to other coalitions. Figure
5.7 illustrates a coalition that is formed by leader issuing certificates to members.
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5.5.4 Coalition Split/Merge
SSTM-based coalition framework allows the dynamic formation of coalitions
among participants that are willing to collaborate, as well as supporting arbitrary
merge and split to modify a coalition partitioning. In the following sections, we
explain how a coalition can be split into further coalitions, as well as merging
multiple coalitions to one coalition.
Split
An existing coalition can decide to split into smaller coalitions where any coalition
Uni=1 Ci can be split into the smaller coalitions as {C1, ..., Cn}. A participant
(including leader and members) of the existing coalition (where the coalition is
identified by its public key kc1) generates a coalition key pair as (kc2, kc
−1
2 ). The
split coalition key kc2 can be used to assign a leader for split coalition kc2 and
then the leader can admit members. Assigning a leader and admitting members
will be done among the participants of coalition kc1. A coalition split happens
when a coalition member prefers to share its resources with a number of coalition
participants while still participating in the previous coalition. At this point, a
coalition member decides to split the coalition, appointing itself as the leader
of the split coalition, admitting members from the subset of current coalition
participants, and sharing its desired resources with the participants of the new
split coalition.
Merge
Multiple coalitions can merge into a larger coalition where any set of coalitions
{C1, ..., Cn}
can be merged to one coalition as
Uni=1 Ci
In other words, the union of participants of multiple coalitions in order to share
their resources is called a coalition merge. Members of merged coalitions are the
union of the members of the previous coalitions before merging. The leaders of
two or more coalitions may come together and decide to merge their coalitions.
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Assume two coalitions with two globally unique identifiers kc1 and kc2 want to
merge. L1 is the leader of k
c1 and L2 is the leader of k
c2, denoted by the following
SSAL statements:
(kc1 leader) −→ L1
(kc2 leader) −→ L2
One of the leaders of these coalitions, issues a membership statement to admit, as
its coalition member, the leader of the coalition willing to merge. Therefore, only
a membership certificate needs to be issued for admitting the leader of a previous
coalition as a member of the new merged coalition. An instance of membership
certificate for merging coalitions is as follows:
(L1 member) −→ L2
Thus, the certificate (kc2 leader) −→ L2 will be revoked (we do not consider
the mechanism for key revocation or certificate revocation in this thesis). The
previous membership statements issued by leader L2 can be used to refer to the
membership in the merged coalition. These are a form of extended local names
and can be inferred by applying the SSAL rule described in section 3.3.1. M2
is admitted as a member of coalition kc2 with the following SSAL statements
(employee is an arbitrary chosen name that L2 chooses for its members):
(kc2 leader) −→ L2
(L2 employee) −→ M2
The new membership of M2 in the coalition k
c
1 will be inferred from the above
statements by applying rule described in section 3.3.1 to the existing membership
statements:
(L1 member) −→ L2
(L2 employee) −→ M2
Applying SSAL rule 3.3.1, the membership of M2 in the coalition k
c
1
((kc1 Leader) −→ L1) can be inferred by the following extended name, that is:
(L1 member employee) −→ M2
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5.6 Discussion
STM-based coalition formation has a number of characteristics that we discuss
in the following.
Globally Unique Identification for Coalitions Every coalition is identified
by generating a key pair (public /private keys) by its leader. With the public
key the coalition will identify itself over the distributed environments. When a
coalition (spoken for by its leader) makes a statement, it is clear to the principals
outside the coalition which coalition the statement is from.
Dynamic and Autonomous Formation All coalitions, leaders, and members
can be viewed as principals which are identified as globally unique by a public
key. Then each principal can form a coalition autonomously using the SSTM
framework and consequently split/merge the coalitions.
Dynamic Leadership and Membership The leadership and membership
process is dynamic. Any principal that generates a key pair can establish the
coalition and consequently appoint itself as the leader of the coalition. Members
are admitted by the leader (speaking for the coalition).
Subterfuge Safe Cross Coalition Delegation SSAL statements and rules
can be used in the coalition framework to provide subterfuge safe cross coalition
delegation. Permissions delegated from one coalition to another coalition clearly
reference their originator. The recipient of a permission in one coalition, cannot
misuse the permission in another coalition.
Accountability Originating a permission creates an accountability for the re-
source owner. The SSTM framework provides two forms of accountability, ac-
countability by originating a permission, and accountability by issuing a state-
ment regarding the acceptance of accountability by a principal that holds the
permission (for example, the leader of a coalition).
Decentralized Access Control The coalition framework using SSAL state-
ments and rules, does not require a super security administrator. The coalition
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participants (including leader and members) define the permissions and their or-
derings in the local policy in order to control access to their resources. The per-
missions and their orderings in the local policy will be transformed to a globally
unique interpretation and global ordering using the SSAL new rules in the frame-
work. In this way, the resources shared in the coalition are under the distributed
control of their owners. When a principal makes a request to the resource owner,
SSTM can be used by the coalition leader to make the appropriate decision for a
particular resource.
5.7 Case Study
In this study, we present about the formation of a coalition, assigning a leader,
admitting members, coalition split, and coalition merging.
Forming a coalition Alice establishes a coalition called Org by generating the
public key kcorg as the coalition’s global unique identifier. Alice is the coalition
leader because she generates and consequently owns the coalition signature key.
For proving her leadership, Alice, where, kA is Alice’s public key, appoints herself
as the coalition leader with the following certificate:
(kcorg leader) −→ kA (5.1)
Admitting members Alice may accept Mary, the owner of public key kM , as
a member of coalition Org by issuing the following certificate:
(kA member) −→ kM (5.2)
So, Mary as her proof of membership in coalition Org presents the certificates
(5.1), and (5.2).
Sharing resources To allow the participants of a coalition read and write on
her resource filex, Mary defines the following permission set and ordering in her
local policy and signs it as follows:
{|(read, write; read ⊑ write)|}skM
Subterfuge-Safe Trust Management for
Delegation of Permissions in Open
Environments
141 Seyedehsamane Abdigarmestani
(Samane Abdi)
5. Extending SSTM for Supporting
Secure Cross Coalition
Cooperation 5.7 Case Study
Mary delegates her signed set of permissions and orderings to Alice for further
delegation to the coalition’s participants as following:
kM
{|(read,write;read⊑write)|}skM=⇒ (kcorg leader)
Mary’s locally defined permission and ordering will have the following globally
unique interpretation 〈kM read〉, 〈kM write〉, and global unique ordering:
〈kM read〉 〈kM write〉
this prevents confusion and subterfuge in cross coalition delegations. Moreover,
it provides a form of accountability for Mary for these permissions.
Splitting coalitions Mary may decide to split the coalition to form a new
coalition HR and share part of her resources with specific participants in the
coalition. Mary generates the key pair (kcHR, k
c
HR
−1), as the coalitionHR globally
unique identifier, and issues the following certificate to appoint the leader of the
coalition HR:
(kcHR leader) −→ kM (5.3)
(kM hrMember) −→ kB (5.4)
Merging coalitions Consider another coalition Salec, identified by public key
kcSL. Smith, the owner of public key kS, establishes this coalition and consequently
is the leader of this coalition. Dave is a member of this coalition. The following
are the certificates that are issued for establishing coalition Salec:
(kcSL leader) −→ kS (5.5)
(kS member) −→ kD (5.6)
Mary, the leader of coalitionHRc, and Smith, the leader of coalition Salec, decide
to merge to form a new coalition called HSc. Lucy, the owner of public key kL,
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generates the coalition public key as kcHS to identify the merged coalition. Lucy
issues the following leadership certificates:
(kcHS leader) −→ kL (5.7)
(kL hsMember) −→ kM (5.8)
(kL hsMember) −→ kS (5.9)
Dave who was a member of coalition Salec, after merging the coalitions HRc
and Salec to coalition HSc can be inferred as a member of coalition HSc from
statements (5.7) and (5.9) (applying rule 3.3.1) as the following extended name:
(kcHS leader hsMember ) −→ kS (5.10)
and from statements (5.6) and (5.10) applying rule 3.3.1 we have the following
as the proof of Dave’s membership:
(kcHS leader hsMember member) −→ kD (5.11)
Mary and Smith delegate the permissions that they hold to Lucy as the leader of
the merged coalition. For example, Mary delegates the set of permissions in her
local policy as (all;⊑) to Lucy, and Lucy delegates them further to share Mary’s
resources with the merged coalition participants.
kM
{|(all;⊑)|}skM=⇒ (kcHS leader)
kL
{|(all;⊑)|}skM=⇒ (kL hsMember)
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In this chapter, we have used and extended SSTM as a policy based trust man-
agement framework for dynamic formation of coalitions among distributed par-
ticipants. A coalition may be formed by any principal that generates a key pair to
uniquely refer to the coalition in the global network. The principal appoints itself
as the leader (consequently the first member) of a coalition and admits members.
SSTM focuses on delegating permissions, whereby there is a global permission
ordering defined over localPermissions that have globally unique interpretations.
The globally unique interpretation provides a form of accountability for the orig-
inator of a permission and avoids the subterfuge problem that can occur in cross
coalition delegation [71, 75]. This advances the work presented in [87] for sub-
terfuge safe cross coalition delegation for open cooperation. The two new rules
allow the permissions and their orderings to be defined locally and delegated glob-
ally. The two rules can be used to transform the locally defined permissions and
their orderings to a globally unique interpretation and ordering. This chapter
addressed how participants in the coalitions can originate, manage, and delegate
their own policy rather than relying on a central definition of policy for defining
the access control policy for the whole coalition.
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Chapter 6
Application of SSTM
In the previous chapters we introduced the subterfuge safe authorization lan-
guage, SSAL. We also developed SSALO, an ontology-based approach for sub-
terfuge safe access control in open environments. Using SSALO as the policy
engine, SSAL as the policy language, SSTM provides a trust model to build and
manage trust and authorization relationships across distributed principals. In
this chapter we describe the application of SSTM in two case studies. These case
studies demonstrate the use of SSTM for federation of clouds in section 6.1 , and
for managing the federation of XMPP instant messaging servers in section 6.2.
6.1 Secure Cloud Federation
Cloud computing is a new paradigm in which applications, data, and IT resources
are provided to customers as services in an open manner (over the internet) rather
than running locally on the customer’s machine. A cloud computing platform
enables customers to access these services with a high degree of freedom anywhere
and any time. In order to be more beneficial and productive, different cloud
computing platforms can share their resources with each other while guaranteeing
that each cloud computing platform has enough resources to achieve adequate
performance. This can be achieved through cloud federation.
A cloud federation [166] is a collaboration among different cloud computing plat-
forms to share their resources to take advantage of aggregation and produce an
enlarged computing utility. A cloud computing platform may share its resources
with other cloud computing platforms when it has resources beyond the needs of
its own customers. Similarly, a cloud computing platform may request resources
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Figure 6.1: Breakdown in accountability for permissions in cloud federation
from another cloud computing platform when its workload cannot be satisfied by
its own resources. In this way, both cloud computing platforms benefit because
one can obtain more customers, and the other will retain its existing customers.
Despite the potential gains achieved from cloud federation, there are security
concerns regarding access to the cloud computing resources [167,168]. Because of
the cloud federation characteristics such as large amounts of distributed resources,
and lots of distributed customers, a decentralized approach for managing access
to cloud computing resources is required. Trust management systems provide a
decentralized approach and are suitable to address access control for cloud com-
puting resources when multiple cloud computing platforms establish federation.
Permissions are delegated from the owner of resources of one cloud computing
platform to the service provider of another cloud computing platform rather than
directly controlling the access to cloud computing resources, thereby forming a
chain of delegations. A delegation chain provides permission evidence for ac-
cessing a resource, and also ensures accountability for the delegated permission.
Breakdown in accountability may arise when there is not a unique interpretation
for a permission specification. Thus, the delegation chain which is used by service
providers to verify their access to cloud computing resources may not reflect the
correct accountability for a permission in the chain.
In receiving two identical permission specifications, the delegator may be confused
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when inferring the accountability for further delegation. However, permission ac-
countability should not rely on ad-hoc strategies, rather, a systematic way of pro-
viding accountability is required. The notion of localPermission was introduced
to provide a systematic way of providing globally unique interpretation for locally
defined permissions [147]. We use localPermissions to achieve robust accountabil-
ity for delegated permissions in cloud federation. This case study discusses the
breakdown in accountability for delegated permissions in cloud federation, and
then demonstrates how using SSTM provides breakdown-robust accountability.
6.1.1 Breakdown in Permission Accountability in Cloud
Federation
In this section, we introduce an example to explain the ambiguity regarding per-
mission specification that results in breakdown of accountability for that permis-
sion when different cloud computing platforms establish a federation. Note that,
accountability refers to the tracking of a principal’s activity under the permission
that the principal holds. The permission might be delegated by another principal
who must also be held responsible for the actions activated by that permission.
In trust management systems, certificates (cryptographic assertions) specify del-
egation of permissions among principals. Principals may further delegate their
permissions to other principals. A delegation statement indicates that the au-
thority for a permission is delegated from one principal to another principal(s).
The delegation statement is denoted as P
X
=⇒ Q, whereby principal P signs a
statement that it authorizes principal Q for permission X. A principal is consid-
ered to be accountable for a permission, if it accepts responsibility for how the
permission is used by other principals. Ambiguity regarding the unique interpre-
tation of a permission can result in confusion of the principal who is considered
to be accountable for that permission. From now on, we refer to cloud computing
platform with the term "cloud". Suppose that cloud A wants to federate with
cloud B and with cloud M , to use the maximum capacity of their data storage
resources. Cloud B, identified by its public key kB, issues a delegation statement
enabling cloud A, identified by its public key kA, to access data storage space at
cloud B. This is denoted by the statement:
c1 : kB
Storage
=⇒ kA
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On the other hand, suppose that the malicious cloud M , identified by its public
key kM , intercepts the delegation statement issued by kB (c1), and uses it in the
following delegation statement issued by kM :
c2 : kM
Storage
=⇒ kA
Cloud A does not realize that it received the same permission specification (from
kB) and therefore it is led to believe that permission specification Storage is
related to accessing data storage resources at cloud M . As a consequence of
this confusion, cloud A grants access to the data storage space of cloud M to its
customer, identified by public key kC, denoted as:
c3 : kA
Storage
=⇒ kC
This scenario is depicted in Figure 6.1. However, customer kC , colluding with
the malicious cloud M , can use the certificates c1 and c3 as proof of authoriza-
tion to access the data storage space of cloud B. Regarding accountability, when
cloud A issues the certificate c3 (A is considered the accountable principal for
delegated permission in c3), it believes that the certificate c2 provides the cor-
rect accountability for cloud M (as a track record of accountability for delegated
permissions). However, kA is confused and should not be held accountable for
inadequacy in the permission specification that was specified by cloud B. One
may argue that this breakdown in accountability could be prevented by adding
extra information about the originator of the permission to the permission spec-
ifications. For example, the permission cloudB/Storage is clearly related to its
originator. However, a malicious service provider at cloud M , may intercept the
certificate:
c4 : kB
cloudB/Storage
=⇒ kA
and issue a delegation certificate to delegate permission cloudB/Storage to cloud
A, as:
c5 : kM
cloudB/Storage
=⇒ kA
Cloud A does not realize that cloud M does not have any authority over cloud
B’s resources and in further delegation to its customer, kC, issues the following
certificate as :
c6 : kA
cloudB/Storage
=⇒ kC
Cloud A claims that it cannot be held accountable for the confusion when kC uses
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Figure 6.2: Locally defined permission with global unique interpretation
the delegation certificates c4 (instead of c5) and c6 to access the data storage of
cloud B.
6.1.2 Accountability for Delegated Permission
Using localPermission prevents the resource owners from issuing ambiguous per-
missions. The localPermission 〈P P erm〉 represents a permission specification
named locally as P erm in the name space of cloud P . P is identified by pub-
lic key k. The permission P erm signed by P ’s public key (sk), {|P erm|}sk is
the globally unique reference that corresponds to (refers to) permission P erm
in the name space of P . This provides a globally unique interpretation for per-
mission specifications and prevents ambiguity. Therefore, principals such as a
cloud administrator receiving two identical permission specifications cannot mis-
use the permission or get confused and use of them for non-intended purposes.
Unambiguous interpretation for each permission makes the originator of each per-
mission accountable for any actions enabled by that permission. This is denoted
as P ⊲ 〈P P erm〉. For example, by originating a permission for granting access
to its data storage space, cloud B (owner of public key kB) is implicitly accepting
accountability for the use of this storage space, i.e. kB ⊲ 〈kB Storage〉. Fig-
ure 6.2 depicts the localPermission of this example. Moreover, in existing trust
management systems the set of permissions implicitly have a globally defined
pre-order relation. localPermissions are specified locally and an originator must
explicitly define how the permissions which are originated locally, relate to other
permissions globally. An ordering relation X  Y is explicitly defined between
permissions X and Y , where permission X is dominated by permission Y . In
other words, a principal that is authorized for the resources enabled by permis-
sion Y is considered to be authorized for resources enabled by permission X.
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Figure 6.3: Trust management for cloud federation
For example, cloud B originates a localPermission 〈kB federation〉 authorizing
federation with another cloud. Cloud B also asserts that anyone authorized for
federation has authority to use its data storage space, denoted as:
〈kB Storage〉 〈kB federation〉
This represents a policy that is local to cloud B but is globally interpretable. A
principal Q may accept accountability for the permission 〈P P erm〉 by signing a
statement to that effect. However, the principal asserting accountability must be
authorized for the permission in the first place. This prevents a malicious prin-
cipal claiming accountability for a permission (enabling access to a resource) for
which it is not trusted. For the example in Figure 6.1, kM asserts that it accepts
accountability for 〈kB Storage〉, however, kM is not authorized for 〈kB Storage〉
and therefore, kA cannot deduce that kM is accountable for 〈kB Storage〉 (denoted
as kM ⊲ 〈kB Storage〉).
6.1.3 Compliance Checking for Accountability
Compliance checking is at the heart of a trust management system [14]. The
inputs for a compliance checker are a request, a set of certificates, and a security
policy. The compliance checker checks whether a set of certificates proves that
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Figure 6.4: Inputs and output of a compliance checking system
a requested action complies with the security policy. Figure 6.4 illustrates the
inputs and outputs of a compliance checking system. Compliance checking in cur-
rent trust management systems corresponds to answering the query (by principal
P ):
Is requester r authorized to access the resources specified in permission X?
This is evaluated by verifying that the request is supported by a set of certificates
that complies with the security policy. Thus, accountability is not addressed
directly in current compliance checking mechanisms for trust management. In
our approach, if principal P originates permission X then it is deduced that
principal P , as the originator of non-ambiguous permission X, is accountable
for that permission (P ⊲ X). However, in the case that P is not the originator
of permission X, principal P should determine that some principal R can be
held accountable for actions associated with permission X. This needs to be
determined before P can sign a delegation statement to delegate permission X to
other principals. This is evaluated by determining whether principal R (an earlier
principal in the delegation chain) is accountable for permission X, denoted as
(R⊲X), and that P trusts R to provide accountability. If the check succeeds then
P delegates permission X to other principals. We define two types of compliance
checking for determining accountability: one for accountability for authorization
to access a resource, and the other for accountability for further delegation of
permissions.
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6.1.3.1 Authorization Check
Compliance checking for accountability regarding accessing a resource owned by
principal P corresponds to the query:
CK1: Is requester r allowed to access the resource governed by permission X, for
which a principal R is accountable?
This is evaluated by determining whether the requester r can prove (with a set
of certificates) that it holds permission X and an accountable principal for per-
mission X can be inferred.
6.1.3.2 Delegation Check
Similarly, compliance checking for accountability regarding further delegation of
permission X corresponds to the query (by principal P ):
CK2 : Is a principal R accountable for permission X, that was delegated to
principal P?
This is evaluated by determining whether a principal R is accountable and
whether P trusts R to provide accountability. We assume that if a principal
is trusted for some permission, then any assertion that the principal makes for
accepting accountability for that permission is also trusted.
6.1.4 Managing Cloud Federation Using SSTM
SSTM can be used to manage the trust relationships among different clouds for
securely sharing their resources in a federation. Suppose that the service provider
for cloud B (identified by public key kB) in Figure 6.3 uses SSTM for controlling
access to its resources. When a request from an untrusted customer is made
to access cloud B’s resources, SSTM helps the service provider of cloud B in
making well-founded access decisions. Suppose all cloud A’s resources are in
use and cloud A, identified by its public key kA, is unable to instantiate further
resources for its customers. In order to be able to continue providing service to
its customers, cloud A decides to federate with cloud B. Thus, the federation
agent in cloud A (FA), identified by public key kF A, sends a signed request for
federation, including the IP address ranges of cloud A, to the federation agent in
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cloud B (FB), identified by public key kF B as in the following:
msg1 : FA։ FB : {federation, IP range = 192.168.1.1− 192.168.1.100}skF A
Note that, all customers for cloud A are in this IP range. In addition, along with
the request, FA presents the delegation certificates that it obtained to prove that
FA can be trusted for using cloud B’s resources:
msg2 : FA։ FB : {kB
〈kB federation.IP range〉
=⇒ kF A}skF A
The federation agent for cloud B (FB) confirms the signature on the message
msg1 from the requester kF A and, if valid, then it queries SSTM as to whether
cloud A is trusted to federate with cloud B. As a consequence of a successful
query, cloud A federates with cloud B and the resources of cloud B can be shared
with cloud A. It is worth noting that the shared resources are then within cloud
B. After establishing federation, a customer S (identified by public key kS) for
cloud A sends a signed request including its IP address (which is in the range of
IP addresses of cloud A) for using the data storage space of cloud B:
msg3 : S ։ FB : {Storage, 192.168.1.50}skS
In addition, cloud B defines the following local policy that any principal that is
authorized for federation in the mentioned IP range is also authorized to access
the data storage space (LPB denote the local policy of cloud B):
LPB : 〈kB Storage〉 〈kB federation.IP range〉
Then cloud A defines its own local policy and originates a permission that ex-
plicitly identifies how the permission that it originates is related to the access
permission for cloud B’s data storage space. Cloud A asserts (LPA denote the
local policy of cloud A):
LPA : 〈kB Storage〉 〈kA Storage〉
and authorizes customer S for the data storage space:
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Figure 6.5: Robust accountability for permissions in cloud federation
kA
〈kA Storage〉
=⇒ kS
Thus, when customer S requests cloud B’s data storage space, it presents a set
of certificates (LPB, and LPA) that are intended to satisfy the compliance check-
ing. The compliance checking evaluates whether it is safe to allow customer S
to access the data storage space at cloud B for which cloud A is held account-
able. Returning to Figure 6.1, cloud A checks whether any earlier principal in the
chain of delegation can be held accountable for actions authorized by permission
〈kB Storage〉. Cloud A received this permission from kB, and kB is both the origi-
nator of this permission and is accountable for it. Therefore, the compliance check
for delegation is successful. On the other hand, cloud A might not aware of the
statement 〈kB Storage〉 〈kB federation.IP range〉. Then in the presence of a
malicious delegation statement kM
〈kB Storage〉
=⇒ kF A , cloud A will not mistakenly
think that kM is accountable. When cloud A searches for an accountable princi-
pal, it cannot find any statement that a principal is held accountable to authorize
kM for the permission 〈kB Storage〉. Therefore, verification of accountability is
unsuccessful. This scenario is depicted in Figure 6.5.
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6.1.5 Discussion
SSTM provides a systematic security mechanism for automatic trust determina-
tion for open federation of clouds. Although a global name service provides a
unique interpretation for each name, the cloud administrator may still use arbi-
trary names to represent permissions for their own cloud resources. The cloud
computing administrator who originates the permissions must try to specify non
ambiguous permissions for cloud resources in order to provide accountability.
However, providing accountability for delegation of permissions should not rely
on ad-hoc strategies; it should be formalized in a systematic way. The localPer-
mission provides a reliable name schema for globally unique interpretations for
permissions without relying on a central authority. Using localPermissions, none
of the service providers have an excuse for confusion caused by inadequate infor-
mation in permissions specifications. Thus, SSTM provides a reliable scheme for
robust accountability for permission delegation in cloud federation.
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6.2 Trust Management for Secure Federation of
XMPP Servers
6.2.1 Introduction to XMPP Servers
The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is a communication
protocol based on XML for sending and receiving messages between distributed
entities. The conventional use of XMPP is in instant messaging (IM) and pres-
ence such as GoogleTalk. However, it supports a much wider range of other
applications such as multi party chat, voice and video calls, and remote comput-
ing. The XMPP network consists of XMPP servers, XMPP clients, and XMPP
services shown in Figure 6.6. XMPP services are hosted by XMPP servers and
offer remote functionality to other XMPP entities connected to the network, for
example, to XMPP clients. All traffic is routed through the XMPP servers. When
users of different XMPP servers want to exchange messages, the relevant XMPP
servers initiate server-to-server connections called XMPP federations. Establish-
ing XMPP server federation requires management of access control to XMPP
services. A system administrator who manages the XMPP services controls the
appropriate access to those services. This administrator must also deal with re-
quests for federation with new XMPP servers. In practice, XMPP servers feder-
ation is non-trivial, time-consuming and vulnerable to the delegation subterfuge.
6.2.2 SSTM for XMPP Servers Federation
SSTM can be used to automate the security administration of XMPP servers
involved in a federation. Using SSTM, rather than implementing directly on
the access control, the administrator creates a security policy that defines the
conditions controlling access to the XMPP services. SSTM provides the policy
framework and can be used to manage the trust relationships between the admin-
istrator and requesters. The advantage of using SSTM as a trust management
framework is that it does not necessarily rely on a centralized authorization/policy
service and the policy rules can be distributed across the network without any
subterfuge vulnerability in the open federation of XMPP servers. A Federated
Autonomic Configuration for Network Access Controls (FACNAC) security agent
was introduced in [169] to provide individual XMPP servers with autonomic con-
figuration of end-to-end services. SSTM can be used by the FACNAC agent to
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Figure 6.6: XMPP server, client, and service connections
help to manage the trust relationships across the federated servers and to decide
when it is safe to federate. FACNAC running on an XMPP server, on behalf
of the administrator, accepts configuration change requests and, if the request is
permitted by the SSTM policy, then the agent updates the configuration. The
request may originate from the administrator or from the user of another XMPP
server, requesting federation. The FACNAC agent must determine that the se-
curity policy indicates that the requester can be trusted. We use a case study to
demonstrate the federation of XMPP servers for instant messaging (IM) services.
The trust relationships between FACNAC agents are managed using SSTM.
6.2.3 Case Study
Two organizations Org1 and Org2 sign a business agreement and decide to feder-
ate their XMPP servers. Alice (the owner of public key kA) is the administrator
for Org1, and Bob (the owner of public key kB) is the administrator for Org2.
A trusted certification authority CA, identified by public key kCA, issues name
certificates for Alice and Bob as follows:
(kCA Alice) −→ kA (6.1)
(kCA Bob) −→ kB (6.2)
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Alice, the administrator of Org1, also acts as the certification authority for Org1
and issues a name certificate for IM service manager, Dave (owner of public key
kD); that is:
(kA Dave) −→ kD (6.3)
Alice defines a role imManager for IM services management at Org1 and adds
Dave to this role by issuing the following certificate:
(kA imManager) −→ (kA Dave) (6.4)
On the other hand, Bob defines a group (kB admins) that defines his adminis-
tration staff, and issues a name certificate to add Clare (identified by public key
kC) to this group as the following:
(kB admins) −→ kC (6.5)
Dave manages Org1 ’s IM servers and defines permission 〈kD federation〉. This
permission specification indicates that the holder of this permission can federate
with Org1 ’s XMPP server. Dave is the originator of this permission and it is in-
ferred that he holds this permission denoted as: kD ∋ 〈kD federation〉. Dave also
defines a local policy that any principal holding the permission 〈kD federation〉
is also permitted to federate with its IM servers with IP address i, that is:
∀i : 〈kD fedIP range.i〉 〈kD federation〉 (6.6)
Dave trusts Alice (the administrator of Org1 ) to decide with whom to federate
and delegates the permission 〈kD federation〉 to Alice by issuing the following
delegation certificate:
kD
〈kD federation〉
=⇒ kA (6.7)
On the other hand, Alice, the administrator of Org1 wishes the IM servers of
Org1 federate with IM servers of Org2 and therefore, accepts any email that is
signed by users of Org2. She originates permission 〈kA fedOrg1〉 for federation
with Org2, and permission 〈kA email〉 for authenticated email services. The
organization Org2 ’s IP address range is 192.168.1.∗.
〈kA email〉 〈kA fedOrg1〉 (6.8)
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Alice trusts the administrator of Org2, Bob, for these services and delegates the
permission 〈(kCA Alice) fedOrg1〉 to the administrator of Org2, Bob, with the
following delegation certificate:
kA
〈(kCA Alice) fedOrg1〉
=⇒ (kCA Bob) (6.9)
and Bob, in turn delegates this permission to his administration group by issuing
the following certificate:
kB
〈(kCA Alice) fedOrg1〉
=⇒ (kB admins) (6.10)
Recall from chapter 4 that these statements are represented as instances within
SSALO. For example, the delegation statement (6.9):
kA
〈(kCA Alice) fedOrg1〉
=⇒ (kCA Bob)
is captured in terms of the following instances and their relationships in SSALO:
LocalName(kCA Alice)←−
isSpokenBy(kCA Alice, kA)⊓
hasNameSpace(kCA Alice, kCA)⊓
hasName(kCA Alice, Alice)
LocalP ermission(fedOrg1)←−
hasNameSpace(fedOrg1, kCAAlice)⊓
isHeldBy(fedOrg1, kA)
Delegation(fedDel2)←−
hasDelegator(fedDel2, kA)⊓
delegatesP ermission(fedDel2,fedOrg1)⊓
hasDelegatee(fedDel2,kCA Bob)
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Figure 6.7: Representation of the delegation statement 6.7 in SSALO
This fragment of SSALO is illustrated in Figure 6.7. The SSAL statements 6.1,
6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 are captured in SSALO in terms of the following instances
and their relationships:
The SSALO fragment corresponding to statement 6.1:
LocalName(kCA Alice)←−
isSpokenBy(kCA Alice, kA)⊓
hasNameSpace(kCA Alice, kCA)
The SSALO fragment corresponding to statement 6.2:
LocalName(kCA Bob)←−
isSpokenBy(kCA Bob, kB)⊓
hasNameSpace(kCA Bob, kCA)
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The SSALO fragment corresponding to statement 6.3:
LocalName(kA Dave)←−
isSpokenBy(kA Dave, kD)⊓
hasNameSpace(kA Dave, kA)
The SSALO fragment corresponding to statement 6.4:
LocalName(kA imManager)←−
isSpokenBy(kA imManager, kA Dave)⊓
hasNameSpace(kA imManager, kA)
The SSALO fragment corresponding to statement 6.5:
LocalName(kB admins)←−
isSpokenBy(kB admins, kC)⊓
hasNameSpace(kB admins, kB)
The SSALO fragment corresponding to statement 6.6:
LocalP ermission(federation)←−
hasNameSpace(federation, kD)⊓
isHeldBy(federation, kD)
LocalP ermission(fedIPrangei)←−
hasNameSpace(fedIPrangei, kD)⊓
isHeldBy(fedIPrangei, kD)⊓
AsAuthAs(federation, fedIPrangei)
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The SSALO fragment corresponding to statement 6.7:
Delegation(fedDel1)←−
hasDelegator(fedDel1, kD)⊓
delegatesP ermission(fedDel1,federation)⊓
hasDelegatee(fedDel1,kA)
The SSALO fragment corresponding to statement 6.8:
LocalP ermission(fedOrg1)←−
hasNameSpace(fedOrg1, kCAAlice)⊓
isHeldBy(fedOrg1, kA)
LocalP ermission(email)←−
hasNameSpace(email, kA)⊓
isHeldBy(email, kA)⊓
AsAuthAs(fedOrg1, email)
The SSALO fragment corresponding to statement 6.10:
Delegation(fedDel3)←−
hasDelegator(fedDel3, kB)⊓
delegatesP ermission(fedDel3,fedOrg1)⊓
hasDelegatee(fedDel3,kB admins)
Having these instances and their relationship in SSALO, the set of SWRL rules
implementing the axioms of SSAL in chapter 4 are then used to reason over the
known facts in SSALO and infer new facts. For example, consider the above
statements. Dave wishes to check whether Clare’s request to federate with IM
services at IP address 192.168.1.10 is authorized. Dave originates the permis-
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sion 〈kD fedIP range.192.168.1.10〉 and in SSAL
O defines the instances and their
relationship as:
LocalP ermission(fedIPrange192168110)←−
hasNameSpace(fedIPrange192168110, kADave)⊓
isHeldBy(fedIPrange192168110, kD)
He then executes the SWRL rules for the SQWRL query to check whether it is
possible to infer that kC ∋ 〈kD fedIP range.192.168.1.10〉 holds. Assuming the
scenario depicted in Figure 6.8, Dave manages Org1 ’s IM server with the help of
his FACNAC agent. Clare, an Org2 administrator, is responsible for managing
Org2 servers and relies on a FACNAC agent. Clare’s FACNAC agent uses public
key kC on behalf of Clare and sends a signed request to federate with Org2 ’s IM
server to the relevant FACNAC agent (associated with public key of Dave kD),
along with Org2 ’s IP address.
Msg1:kC ։ kD : {federation request, ip = 192.168.1.10}skC
Org1 ’s FACNAC agent (Dave) checks whether the requester holds the author-
ity to federate from IP address 192.168.1.10 with its IM server. Dave uses
SSALO to check whether it is possible to deduce that kC holds the permission
〈kD fedIP range.192.168.1.10〉, denoted as: kC ∋ 〈kD fedIP range.192.168.1.10〉.
The following SQWRL query determines whether the requester “?q” is authorized
by permission “?x”, for which “?r” is accountable.
P rincipal(?q) ∧ P rincipal(?r) ∧ LocalP ermission(?x)∧
holds(?q, ?x) ∧ isAccountable(?r, ?x)
−→ sqwrl : select(?q, ?x, ?r)
This query is issued by Dave to check whether it is possible to deduce that the
requester kC holds 〈kD fedIP range.192.168.1.10〉. The result is shown in the
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Figure 6.8: FACNAC/SSTM federation scenario
following table.
Requester ?q Permission ?x Accountable by ?r
kD kD fedIPrange192168110 kD
kC kD fedIPrange192168110 kD
6.2.4 Checking for Subterfuge Safe Delegation
Before a principal signs a delegation statement, it should check whether it leads
to subterfuge. In other words, the principal needs to make sure that there is an
accountable principal for the actions associated with the permission.
The following SQWRL query determines whether the principal "?r" can be held
accountable for permission "?x" for further delegation.
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P rincipal(?r) ∧ LocalP ermission(?x) ∧ isAccountable(?r, ?x)
−→ sqwrl : select(?x, ?r)
When Bob wants to delegate permission 〈(kCA Alice) fedOrg1〉 to his adminis-
tration staff (kB admins), he checks if there is a principal who is accountable for
this further delegation. The result of Bob’s query is shown in the following table
Permission ?x Accountable by ?r
fedOrg1 (kCA Alice)
fedOrg1 kA
The sequences of this scenario is depicted in Figure 6.8.
6.2.4.1 Discussion
Federation of XMPP servers require security controls to provide end-to-end ser-
vices. A system administrator who manages the XMPP services controls the
appropriate access to those services. This administrator must also deal with re-
quests for federation with new XMPP servers. In practice, XMPP servers feder-
ation is non-trivial, time-consuming and vulnerable to the delegation subterfuge.
In establishing a federation, the agent uses a local knowledge-base, SSALO, which
implements local policy, integration of different policies defined by each XMPP
server for access control. Each XMPP server can have its own local FACNAC
agent, resulting in the distributed management of trust and authorization rela-
tionships. SSTM is used by the FACNAC agents to help managing the distributed
access control for secure federation and to help make decision for subterfuge safe
federation.
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In this chapter we demonstrated the applicability of SSTM in two real world ex-
amples: cloud federation; federation of XMPP servers. Although cloud federation
and federation of XMPP servers offer effective distributed sharing of resources,
both require mechanisms to control access and provide accountability for the
use of resources. Permissions are delegated among distributed principals to al-
low each other access to non-local resources. By using unambiguous permission
specifications, there is no confusion regarding the accountability for the permis-
sions in sharing resources. The results show that SSTM is a robust model for
subterfuge safe delegation of permissions in federation and also provides strong
accountability for principals. The success of SSTM for these case studies indi-
cates that it provides a general solution for subterfuge safe management of trust
and authorization relationships in open cooperation of entities. It can apply to
other examples of open cooperation in open distributed environments.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we draw conclusions, summarise the contributions made in this
thesis, and indicate some future research directions.
7.1 Overview
Future distributed applications will be large scale, open, and will often need to
deal with complex collaborative interactions. A key necessity for the development
of these applications will be a powerful, scalable, flexible and extensible security
mechanism. A security mechanism is composed of a sequence of legitimate actions
that are performed by a number of principals. It provides a way to ensure that
principals will achieve those purposes that are consistent with the security policy.
When designing a security mechanism, we would like to ensure that a malicious
principal cannot bypass the security mechanism via some legitimate (according
to the design) but unexpected behaviour. A malicious principal can be a trojan
horse exploiting a covert channel; a spy engaging in a replay attack on a security
protocol; an ordinary principal engaging in authorization subterfuge in a trust
management scheme.
Many existing security mechanisms are designed in an ad-hoc manner and their
design follows best practice based on the expertise of their designer. Expertise-
based design only prevents known malicious behaviours. Delegation subterfuge
may still occur because a principal receiving a permission in one domain may
misuse the permission in another domain via some deceptive but apparently au-
thorized route.
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The research question in this thesis was:
Can we design a well-founded systematic method to avoid subterfuge for
cooperation of distributed principals in open environments?
7.2 Summary of Contributions
An overview of access control models, especially trust management systems was
presented in this thesis. Trust management provides operations that are used for
decentralized access control. As with any protection mechanism the challenge is
to make sure that the mechanisms are configured in such a way that they ensure
some useful and consistent notions of security.
localPermission We showed how poorly specified permissions within delega-
tion certificates can lead to delegation subterfuge during indirect delegation of
permissions. The subterfuge vulnerability results in another vulnerability con-
cerning the accountability of the authorization provided by the delegation chain.
The challenge in this thesis was to ensure that permissions have a unique global
interpretation. Since permissions are intended to be shared in open environ-
ments, then their references must be global. We discussed some ad-hoc strategies
to ensure globalization of permissions. However, we showed that the design of a
security mechanism should not rely on ad-hoc methods, rather, it should be for-
malized in a systematic way to prevent subterfuge. The notion of localPermission
was introduced for this purpose.
SSAL An authorization language, SSAL, was provided to specify trust-related
policies. Using SSAL, a principal may define, without reference to any central
authority, its own local permissions, and define a local ordering over the permis-
sions in its name space. In addition, a principal who holds a permission, X, from
another name space can assert a global ordering between the permissions in its
own name space and permission X. Typical trust management systems make the
implicit assumption that there exists a super security administrator that defines
the permission name space and its orderings. For example, Distributed Autho-
rization Language prevents subterfuge by restricting delegation to permissions
that have an associated originating public key [87]. While effective, in contrast
to SSAL this approach suffers the challenge of reliably referencing public keys
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and relies on a central authority to define permission ordering relationships.
Distributed Certificate Chain Discovery Algorithm An efficient algo-
rithm was introduced to discover the certificate chain between a resource owner
and the requester when certificates are stored distributively. It has been shown
that the algorithm returns the chain of delegations if one exists.
SSALO An ontology, SSALO, was built as the policy engine of SSTM. SSALO
provides a generic representation for knowledge related to the SSAL-based secu-
rity policy. SSALO enables integration of heterogeneous security policies which
is useful for secure cooperation among principals in open environments where
each principal may have a different security policy with different implementation.
SSALO can be used for subterfuge safe and dynamic cooperation in open dis-
tributed systems. Example applications include distributed web services, cross
coalition cooperation, and cloud federation. The experiments in this study have
shown adequate performance for typical non-time critical situations.
SSTM Subterfuge Safe Trust Management (SSTM) was designed to support
subterfuge safe delegation of permissions in open environments. SSTM uses lo-
calPermissions to provide support for subterfuge safe access control and trust
management.
SSTM-Based Coalition Framework SSAL was extended for dynamic for-
mation of a coalition among distributed participants. A coalition may be formed
by any principal that generates a key pair to uniquely refer to the coalition in the
global network. The principal appoints itself as the leader/first member of the
coalition and admits members. The SSTM-based approach (using localPermis-
sion) mostly focuses on subterfuge safe cross coalition delegation of permissions.
Two additional SSAL rules are used to transform the locally defined permissions
and their ordering to a globally unique interpretation and ordering (localPermis-
sion). We also addressed how participants in a coalition can originate, manage,
and delegate their own policy rather than relying on a central authority to define
an access control policy for the whole coalition.
Federation The application of SSTM in two real world federation case stud-
ies has been presented. A cloud federation offers effective distributed sharing of
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resources but requires mechanisms to control access and provide accountability
for the delegated permissions. In the first case study, the application of SSTM
for sharing resources in a cloud federation was demonstrated. SSTM provides
robust accountability for the use of permissions in a cloud federation. By us-
ing localPermissions there is no confusion regarding the accountability for the
delegated permissions. The proposed compliance checking provides a means of
determining accountability, and therefore can be used in preventing unauthorized
access to the cloud resources.
The second case study demonstrates the application of SSTM for managing trust
and authorization for federation of XMPP servers. The results showed that SSTM
is a robust mechanism for subterfuge safe delegation of permissions for federation
of XMPP servers. These case studies is an evidence of using SSTM to provide
a robust trust management for subterfuge safe open cooperation of distributed
principals.
7.3 Future work
Possible future directions of this work can include extending the theoretical model
and improving the implementation. An example of the former is incorporating
threshold structures into the model, and an example of the latter is run-time
optimization of SSTM authorization queries.
7.3.1 Threshold Structures
A threshold structure means that at least K of N number of principals are re-
quired to grant a permission or further delegate of that permission. In other
words, multiple principals are required to sign a certificate. The SSAL logic does
not directly support threshold structures. Without this support, a delegation to
a threshold of principals can only be implemented by conjunction of many delega-
tion statements and each delegation statement delegates the same permission to
different principals. This kind of complex statement is difficult to implement and
manage in practice. As a topic of ongoing research, one can investigate the incor-
poration of threshold structures into SSTM. There are situations that a request
should require several signatures. For example, Amazon Relational Database
Service makes it easy to use replication to enhance availability and reliability for
production workloads. A replication is a collection of nodes, with one primary
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read-write cluster and up to five secondary read-only clusters, which are called
read replicas. Applications can read from any cluster in the replication group.
More than one replica is required to grant permission to the application which
wants to access the data resources if one replica is not available. Incorporating
the threshold structures to the model would make this type of applications more
manageable in practice.
7.3.2 Run-Time Optimization
To answer a query using SSTM, the interpreter first instantiates the SSALO with
individuals, then the reasoner builds all the possible relations (either asserted or
inferred) among all individuals, and finally the SQWRL runs over the knowledge
base and answers the query. When the number of individuals increases in SSALO,
the time the reasoner consumes to build up the relations and then infer the
statements to answer the query increases. For example, to answer the query of
the form: "is Alice authorized to read file X?", the query processor queries SSALO
to retrieve the instances that satisfies this query. Before querying, the knowledge
in SSALO is loaded into the reasoner. This step ensures the consistency, concept
satisfiability, and classification. During the loading phase, axioms about concepts
are put into the TBox and assertions about individuals are stored in the ABox.
For example, the interpreter interprets Alice’s requests {(readfileX)}skA and
sends it to the query processor. The query processor checks whether it can satisfy
the following statement in SSALO:
holds(kA,readfileX) ∧ isAccountable(?p, readfileX)
In our experiment, we have evaluated the total time that it takes the reasoner
to check the consistency of the knowledge base and the time it takes to answer
each query. The experimental results show that this approach works well with
a relatively small number of asserted individuals and policies but it takes longer
time as the size of the target data set increases. While lack of efficiency may be
tolerable for some applications where time is not critical, but when we expect a
rather wide-scale application for security policies integration, optimizing run-time
for reasoning needs to be investigated as an ongoing research direction.
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7.4 Summary
In this chapter we gave a brief overview on the work done in this thesis. The works
contributed to the state of the art are: introducing the notion of localPermission;
Subterfuge Safe Authorization Language (SSAL); an algorithm for distributed
certificate chain discovery; an ontology-based implementation, SSALO, as policy
engine; Subterfuge Safe Trust Management(SSTM); SSTM-based coalition frame-
work; and the application of SSTM in two real world federation case studies. We
produced a well-founded mechanism for dealing with an important problem in
distributed open systems. Future research such as those suggested on threshold
structures and run-time optimization can build on, and add value to the current
work.
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Appendix A
List of Abbreviations and
Symbols
Abbreviations
ACL Access Control List
ALC Attribute Concept Language
ABox Assertional Axioms
CBAC Coalition-based Access Control
CWA Closed World Assumption
DAL Distributed Authorization Language
DL Description Logic
FACNAC Federated Autonomic Configuration for Net-
work Access Controls
FOL First Order Logic
ISC Internet Services of Coalitions
OWA Open World Assumption
OWL Web Ontology Language
OWL-DL Sub-pieces of OWL with maximum expressive-
ness while retains decidable
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RDF Resource Description Framework
RT Role-based Trust management
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A. List of Abbreviations and Symbols
SDSI Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure
SPKI Simple Public Key Infrastructure
SSAL Subterfuge Safe Authorization Language
SSALO An Ontology for Subterfuge Safe Authorization
Language
SSTM Subterfuge Safe Trust Management
SQWRL Semantic Query Web Rule Language
SWRL Semantic Web Rule Language
TBox Terminological Axioms
VPN Virtual Private Network
XML Extensible Markup Language
XMPP Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
Symbols
P
P erm
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Q This is used in RT and represents that principal
P delegates permission P erm to principal Q
P ∋ X principal P holds permission X
P −→ Q principal Q speaks for principal P
P
X
=⇒ Q principal P delegates permission X to principal
Q
P ⊲X principal P is accountable for permission X in
the delegation chain
X  Y localPermission Y is no less authoritative than
localPermission X
(P N) local name N in the name space of principal P
〈P P erm〉 locally defined permission P erm in the name
space of principal P
A։ B : {a, b, c, ...}sA The entity A sends a message to entity B. The
message {a, b, c, ...} is signed by the sender (sA)
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Appendix B
Proof of properties of SSAL Logic
B.1 Proof for Property 1
Theorem
Assuming principals P, Q, R, and permissions X, Y, Z, then when P delegates
permission X to Q and Q delegates permission Y to R, we can infer that the
greatest lower bound of X and Y is delegated to R. In the following Z is the
lower bound of permissions X and Y and is dominated by the greatest lower
bound of X and Y :
((P
X
=⇒ Q) ∧ (Q
Y
=⇒ R) ∧ (Z  X) ∧ (Z  Y )) ⇒ (P
Z
=⇒ R) (1)
Proof
Axiom P5:
Z  X; Z  Y
Z  (X ⊓ Y )
From axiom P5 we have:
((Z  X) ∧ (Z  Y )) ⇒ (Z  (X ⊓ Y )) (I)
Axiom D4:
P
X
=⇒ Q; Q
Y
=⇒ R
P
X⊓Y
=⇒ R
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B. Proof of properties of SSAL Logic B.2 Proof for Property 2
From D4 we have:
((P
X
=⇒ Q) ∧ (Q
Y
=⇒ R)) ⇒ (P
X⊓Y
=⇒ R) (II)
Axiom D3:
P
Y
=⇒ Q; X  Y
P
X
=⇒ Q
From D3 we have:
((P
X⊓Y
=⇒ R) ∧ (Z  (X ⊓ Y )) ⇒ (P
Z
=⇒ R) (IV)
From (I), (II) and (IV) we have:
((P
X
=⇒ Q) ∧ (Q
Y
=⇒ R) ∧ (Z  X) ∧ (Z  Y )) ⇒ (P
Z
=⇒ R) (1)
B.2 Proof for Property 2
Theorem
If the delegator holds some permission then the delegatee also holds any domi-
nated permission.
((P ∋ Y ) ∧ (P
Y
=⇒ Q) ∧ (X  Y )) ⇒ (Q ∋ X) (2)
Proof
Axiom H2:
P ∋ Y, P
Y
=⇒ Q
Q ∋ Y
Axiom H4:
Q ∋ Y ; X  Y
Q ∋ X
From H2 we have:
((P ∋ Y ) ∧ (P
Y
=⇒ Q)) ⇒ (Q ∋ Y ) (I)
From H4 we have:
((Q ∋ Y ) ∧ (X  Y )) ⇒ (Q ∋ X) (II)
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B. Proof of properties of SSAL Logic B.3 Proof for Property 3
From (I) and (II) we have:
((P ∋ Y ) ∧ (P
Y
=⇒ Q) ∧ (X  Y )) ⇒ (Q ∋ X) (2)
B.3 Proof for Property 3
Theorem
If a principal holds a permission, Y , and delegates it to Q then any principal that
speaks for the delegatee also holds all permissions that are dominated by Y .
((P ∋ Y ) ∧ (P
Y
=⇒ Q) ∧ (X  Y ) ∧ (Q −→ R)) ⇒ (R ∋ X) (3)
Proof
Property 2:
((P ∋ Y ) ∧ (P
Y
=⇒ Q) ∧ (X  Y )) ⇒ (Q ∋ X) (2)
Axiom H3:
P ∋ X; P −→ Q
Q ∋ X
From axiom H3 we have:
((Q ∋ X) ∧ (Q −→ R)) ⇒ (R ∋ X) (I)
From property (2) and (I) we infer:
((P ∋ Y ) ∧ (P
Y
=⇒ Q) ∧ (X  Y ) ∧ (Q −→ R)) ⇒ (R ∋ X) (3)
B.4 Proof for Property 4
Theorem
If a principal is being delegated a permission and the delegator holds any domi-
nated permissions, the delegatee also holds the dominated permissions.
((P ∋ X) ∧ (P
Y
=⇒ Q) ∧ (X  Y )) ⇒ (Q ∋ X) (4)
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B. Proof of properties of SSAL Logic B.5 Proof for Property 5
Proof
Axiom D3:
P
Y
=⇒ Q; X  Y
P
X
=⇒ Q
Axiom H2:
P ∋ X; P
X
=⇒ Q
Q ∋ X
From axiom D3 we have:
((P
Y
=⇒ Q) ∧ (X  Y )) ⇒ (P
X
=⇒ Q) (I)
From axiom H2 we have :
((P
X
=⇒ Q) ∧ (P ∋ X)) ⇒ (Q ∋ X) (II)
From (I) and (II) we have:
((P ∋ X) ∧ (P
Y
=⇒ Q) ∧ (X  Y )) ⇒ (Q ∋ X) (4)
B.5 Proof for Property 5
Theorem
Given principal P and Q, if Q speaks for P (P → Q) then any permission N that
is originated by P (〈P N〉) is also a valid permission in Q’s name space (〈Q N〉),
and is dominated by 〈P N〉.
((P ∋ 〈P N〉) ∧ (P −→ Q)) ⇒ (〈Q N〉 〈P N〉) (5)
Proof
Axiom P3:
〈P N〉 X; P −→ Q
〈Q N〉 X
From P3 we have:
((〈P N〉 X) ∧ (P −→ Q)) ⇒ 〈Q N〉 X (I)
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B. Proof of properties of SSAL Logic B.6 Proof for Property 6
X is a permission originated by P . Therefore we replace X with 〈P N〉 in the
statement (I):
((〈P N〉 〈P N〉) ∧ (P −→ Q)) ⇒ (〈Q N〉 〈P N〉) (II)
Lemma
The permission ordering  is reflexive if and only if a permission is originated
by a principal:
(P ∋ X) ⇐⇒ (X  X) (L1)
Proof for Lemma Axiom H1:
{|N, {|N |}sK |}sK
K ∋ 〈K N〉
From H1 we infer that if there exists a permission 〈K N〉, some principal origi-
nated the 〈K N〉.
Therefore, From L1 we have:
(P ∋ 〈P N〉) ⇐⇒ (〈P N〉 〈P N〉) (III)
From (II) and (III) we infer that 〈P N〉 〈P N〉 is always true if P has originated
〈P N〉 denoted as (P ∋ 〈P N〉). Consequently, we rewrite the statement (II) as:
((P ∋ 〈P N〉) ∧ (P −→ Q)) ⇒ (〈Q N〉 〈P N〉) (5)
B.6 Proof for Property 6
Theorem
Permission global ordering relation No less authoritative than denoted as  , is
transitive.
((X  Y ) ∧ (Y  Z)) ⇒ (X  Z) (6)
Proof
Axiom P4:
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B. Proof of properties of SSAL Logic B.7 Proof for Property 7
X  〈P N〉; P −→ Q; 〈Q N〉 Y ; Q⊲ 〈P N〉
X  Y
The speaks for relation is transitive. From axiom P4 and substituting Q for P ,
and Z for Y :
((X  〈Q N〉) ∧ (Q −→ Q) ∧ (〈Q N〉 Z) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈Q N〉)) ⇒ (X  Z) (I)
The statement Q → Q is always true, therefore statement (I) is rewritten as:
((X  〈Q N〉) ∧ (〈Q N〉 Z) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈Q N〉)) ⇒ (X  Z) (II)
Axiom A5 (a principal which is accountable for a localPermission also holds it):
R⊲X
R ∋ X
From A5 substituiting Q for R and 〈Q N〉 for X we have:
(Q⊲X) ⇒ (R ∋ 〈Q N〉) (III)
From (II) and (III) we have:
((X  〈Q N〉) ∧ (〈Q N〉 Z) ∧ (Q ∋ 〈Q N〉)) ⇒ (X  Z) (III)
If 〈Q N〉 is a properly defined permission, there is a principal that originated it
and therefore holds it. The statement (Q ∋ 〈Q N〉) is a always true.
Finally, by rewriting 〈Q N〉 as Y and eliminating the true statement Q ∋ 〈Q N〉
we can infer transitivity of permission ordering  :
((X  Y ) ∧ (Y  Z)) ⇒ (X  Z) (6)
B.7 Proof for Property 7
Theorem
If a principal Q accepts accountability for permission N in the name space of a
principal P , and principal Q also speaks for P , any permission, X, that dominates
permission 〈Q N〉, also dominates the permission 〈P N〉:
((〈Q N〉 X) ∧ (P −→ Q) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈P N〉)) ⇒ (〈P N〉 X) (7)
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B. Proof of properties of SSAL Logic B.8 Proof for Property 8
Proof
Axiom P4:
X  〈P N〉; P −→ Q; 〈Q N〉 Y ; Q⊲ 〈P N〉
X  Y
From axiom P4, substituting 〈P N〉 for X and X for Y we have:
((〈P N〉 〈P N〉) ∧ (P −→ Q) ∧ (〈Q N〉 X) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈P N〉)) ⇒ (〈P N〉 X) (I)
The statement 〈P N〉  〈P N〉 is true from lemma L1, and also P ∋ 〈P N〉 is
implicitly stated in the statement Q ⊲ 〈P N〉. Permission 〈P N〉 is defined by
principal P and that P as the originator holds it (P ∋ 〈P N〉). Therefore we
have:
((〈Q N〉 X) ∧ (P −→ Q) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈P N〉)) ⇒ (〈P N〉 X) (7)
B.8 Proof for Property 8
Theorem
If a principal Q accepts accountability for the permission N in the name space of
the principal P (〈P N〉), and Q speaks for P , any permission that is dominated
by permission N in P ’s name space (〈P N〉), is also dominated by the same
permission N in the name space of Q (〈Q N〉).
((X  〈P N〉) ∧ (P −→ Q) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈Q N〉)) ⇒ (X  〈Q N〉) (8)
Proof
Axiom P4:
X  〈P N〉; P −→ Q; 〈Q N〉 Y ; Q⊲ 〈P N〉
X  Y
From axiom P4 and substituting 〈Q N〉 for Y we have:
((X  〈P N〉) ∧ (P −→ Q) ∧ (〈Q N〉 〈Q N〉) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈P N〉)) ⇒ (X  〈Q N〉) (I)
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B. Proof of properties of SSAL Logic B.9 Proof for Property 9
Axiom A4:
R⊲ 〈P N〉; P −→ Q
R⊲ 〈Q N〉
From A4 and substituting Q for R we have:
((Q⊲ 〈P N〉) ∧ (P −→ Q)) ⇒ (Q⊲ 〈Q N〉) (II)
From (I) and (II) we have:
((X  〈P N〉) ∧ (P −→ Q) ∧ (〈Q N〉 〈Q N〉) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈P N〉)) ⇒ (X  〈Q N〉)
From lemma L1 the statement 〈Q N〉 〈Q N〉 is always true, therefore we have:
((X  〈P N〉) ∧ (P −→ Q) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈Q N〉)) ⇒ (X  〈Q N〉) (8)
B.9 Proof for Property 9
Theorem
If principal Q speaks for P and is accountable for permission 〈P N〉, then the
permission 〈Q N〉 dominates permission 〈P N〉:
((P −→ Q) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈P N〉)) ⇒ (〈P N〉 〈Q N〉) (9)
Proof
From property 8 and substitute 〈P N〉 for X we have:
((〈P N〉 〈P N〉) ∧ (P −→ Q) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈P N〉)) ⇒ (〈P N〉 〈Q N〉) (I)
From lemma L1 the statement 〈P N〉  〈P N〉 is always true. Therefore, we
have:
((P −→ Q) ∧ (Q⊲ 〈P N〉)) ⇒ (〈P N〉 〈Q N〉) (9)
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